

The background of the book cover is a dark, textured surface. In the upper left, there are three glowing, semi-transparent spheres in shades of yellow and orange. In the center, there are two white, fan-like structures made of many thin, radiating lines, resembling stylized birds or abstract sculptures. The title is printed in a white, serif font, centered on the cover.

PHILOSOPHY CULTURE and VALUE

Essays on the Thoughts of G.C. Pande

Editor

R.C. Pradhan

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An abstract artwork on a dark background. In the upper left, three glowing spheres with yellow and orange-red bands are arranged diagonally. Below them, two white birds, constructed from numerous thin sticks or straws, are depicted in flight. The bird on the left is larger and more detailed, with its wings spread wide. The bird on the right is smaller and simpler. The overall composition is dynamic and artistic.

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INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
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Introduction

Professor G.C. Pande, one of the living intellectual giants of the country, is a philosopher, historian, poet and also a creative writer. His contribution to the Indian intellectual life is enormous and many-faceted. He has commented on every aspect of the intellectual life of India as also the world on diverse topics from culture, history and philosophy to the aesthetics and the literary writings, and religious and moral traditions. Professor Pande represents the best in the Indian and the world culture in terms of the depth of insight and the breadth of vision. He is in the tradition of the ancient *rishis* of India.

As a seer and philosopher, Professor Pande has developed a world-view in the tradition of the Upanishadic thinkers who have seen unity in plurality, harmony in chaos and order in disorder. Like the ancient sages, he has seen immortality in death, light in darkness and truth in untruth. Thus, Professor Pande has not been uprooted from his cultural tradition by the influx of the Western ideas. He has mastered the Western philosophical wisdom without being subjugated by it. He has developed his own philosophical genius within the tradition established by great thinkers like Buddha, Mahavira, Sankara and Sri Aurobindo.

It is not accidental that Professor Pande has been interested in the foundations of Indian culture which he lives and breathes every moment of his life. He has brought out the eternal truths embodied in the vast body of Indian culture which he calls the Sanatana Dharma. These truths consist in the Vedic vision of life of immortality, the four *purusarthas*, the eternal ideal of *Moksa* and the well-ordered life of the four *ashramas* which have a timeless appeal to all mankind. Professor Pande, without being partisan, has done a great service to Indian culture by bringing out the highest truths embodied in it.

Professor Pande finds Buddhism and Vedanta as the two pillars of Indian philosophy and culture. That is why he has written extensively on the historical and the philosophical development of Buddhism. According to him, Buddhism is not a pessimistic and other-worldly religion and philosophy as it has been made out to be by the Western interpreters of Buddhism. He makes great effort to bring Buddhism closer to the Vedantic tradition without denying the originality and profundity of the philosophy of Buddhism. For him, the ultimate truth is the same for both Buddhism and Vedanta and that is the realization of the *Moksa* or Nirvana. Professor Pande sees harmony rather than conflict among the different schools of Indian thought. He has developed a holistic vision of Indian philosophy in which the different schools develop the diverse aspects of thought and life.

Professor Pande's study of Sankara's life and thought is unique and profound. He finds in Sankara a great constructive thinker who not only propounded the Advaita Brahmapada, but also reorganized the Indian society on the basis of the Vedic vision of life. Sankara revived Vedic philosophy and established it on a firm footing. Professor Pande is profoundly influenced by

Sankara's metaphysics, though he does not subscribe to his Mayavada. He occupies a middle position between Sankara's Advaitism and Sri Aurobindo's Integral Monism. Professor Pande's metaphysics can be called transcendental integralism which comprehends both the historical-temporal world and the transcendental reality in a grand synthesis.

Professor Pande has included the study of ethics, aesthetics and religion in his philosophical system. He finds that the vision of beauty is as much a part of the total vision as the vision of truth and goodness. The ultimate reality for him is not Truth alone but also the Goodness and the Beauty. Truth, Beauty and Goodness are part of the same Ultimate Reality. As a poet and visionary, Professor Pande has seen the entire reality in its many-faceted aspects. He does not accept a personal God as the Creator of the Universe; but, for him, Brahman is the Ultimate Reality, the all-comprehensive Reality.

Professor Pande considers human life as the quest for the realization of the transcendental values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. This sums up his philosophy of life, culture and society which, according to him, are the expressions of the value-seeking of mankind. The ultimate goal of human life is to realize the highest values which have a transcendental origin.

In this collection of essays, eminent thinkers in their fields of study have presented the different facets of Professor Pande's philosophical thought. They have made an attempt to project him as a creative philosophical genius having a world-view of his own that is rooted in the Indian philosophical tradition. The authors have been authentic in their presentations of the themes from the vast ocean of Professor Pande's writings. Though it is difficult to do justice to all that he has written on phi-

losophy, the contributors here have been honest in acknowledging that all that they have done is a fraction of the totality of Professor Pande's thought and works.

We hope that this collection of essays will constitute an humble attempt to understand one of the greatest philosophical minds of our country.

Hyderabad.

R.C. Pradhan

1

G.C. Pande: Some Salient Features with Special Reference to his Neo-Integralism in the Context of *Śūnyatā*, *Tattva* and *Ekam Sat*

G.C. NAYAK

Professor G.C. Pande, with his encyclopaedic knowledge and versatility, is a renowned scholar, an eminent Indologist, historian and a philosopher of repute. But I don't think that this is all that is there to Pande, possessing as he does a wonderfully multi-faceted personality vastly reflected in his scholarly works of multi-dimensional nature. He and his research cannot, I am afraid, be satisfactorily dealt with by a mere discussion of his attainments and a critical analysis of his numerous works. There will always remain a feeling of inadequacy, of having left something out which is of great importance, as there is a depth in him which is inexhaustible and unfathomable, even if to all outward purposes, he is straightforward and unassuming. There is a spiritual depth—I mean to say—to which both his personality and thoughts point and to which his works and even his daily life draw our attention—a depth, I must admit, that is beyond the scope of our limited understanding.

An element of depth in feeling, therefore, is needed on one's part, if at all one is interested in understanding the man and his thoughts, in this particular case, along with one's intellectual acumen, of course, if any. There is a definite call here to transcend the limits of our intellect, although intellectual approach in itself is never undermined or over-looked at any stage by Pande himself.

Could a mere evoking of an element of depth in feeling by itself be capable of giving us some additional knowledge? I don't think so. But it appears to me that this can give us some insight into and an empathetic understanding perhaps of the man and his works, which would be otherwise denied to us if we were to concentrate only on an analysis on the intellectual plane. Hence, at the outset, I make this plea deliberately, so that at least some semblance of justice could be done to that transcendental aspect of Pande, which is quite likely to be ignored or undermined on account of what I consider to be our intellectualist bias.

As a result of a unique combination of spiritual depth with intellectual acumen confronting us here and because of the inexhaustibility of the multi-dimensional and multifarious aspects of Professor Pande, the man, his works, and his thought. I have no other alternative but to concentrate here only on certain limited aspects for discussion. Such a choice—while limiting my scope quite evidently of course—is expected to give me a little foothold to go ahead.

What strikes me as the most significant feature of Professor Pande's personality is his apparent indifference to honour, name, fame, etc. that are well-known to be the last infirmity of the noble mind which is otherwise indifferent to all worldly enjoyments and prosperity. This makes him much more attractive and charming—from

my point of view at least—for it makes him extraordinary. In the Vaiṣṇava śāstras, a true Vaiṣṇava is supposed to be one who does not care for recognition, for whom *pratiṣṭhā* is *śūkarī viṣṭhā*, and from this point of view, G.C. Pande can be regarded as a true Vaiṣṇava, of course. Only recently, however, I was somewhat astonished to find Garth Pearce¹ pointing out in one of his articles, how Al Pacino was 'learning to live with fame at last', while Al Pacino himself admitted that he was 'tired just about everything to escape from being burnt by fame' and that he had 'never liked the recognition, the questions, the publicity'. Sounding as it does to be so very genuine, I can only hope that it is not a sheer publicity stunt.

With due apology, and without intending any comparison, I must say that I find at present Pande 'learning to live with fame at last'—fame that has come to him uncalled for and is unavoidable, mainly because of his monumental works. The article by Garth Pearce, in any case I must admit, has given me some understanding (I may be wrong, of course) of the significance of Pande's evident humility (one won't be able to recognize him, I swear, in a crowd or even in a group of scholars, unless one is out to search for and find him). It is perhaps this variety of genuine humility that was regarded 'as the most difficult of all virtues to achieve' by T.S. Eliot,² and the Vaiṣṇava tradition makes the most of this particular virtue in man, highlighted in the *Śikṣāśṭakam* as '*Tṛṇādapi sunīcena*', etc. And this typical humility seems to be inbuilt in G.C. Pande's character; he is a great scholar no doubt, but his greatness as a scholar does not lie heavy on his shoulders.

Now coming to Professor G.C. Pande's contributions, we find them to be multi-faceted and numerous; in any case, it would be of very little use, I think, if only we start

counting them on our fingers, referring to his works one by one. I would rather concentrate here on some points only. In order to understand the importance of Professor Pande's contributions to these seminal ideas in Indian thought, I will be dealing first of all with the Buddhist *anātmā* and *śūnyatā* and then consider if, at all, it can be integrated with the Ātman of Vedānta, at least on the experiential level—a significant point made by Professor Pande, promising to give a fresh direction in the field.

When we come to deal with the *anātmavāda* or the no-self doctrine of Buddhism, we need to be cautious—rather a little extra cautious—in our understanding of it as a form of nihilism. If there is no self, there will be simply an end to all our transactions (*jagadāndhya prasaṅgāt*, as it has been aptly pointed out by the Vedāntins), not to speak of philosophical transaction of any sort for that matter. It is, therefore, obvious that the Buddhist theory of *anātmā* could not be a no-self theory in a crude sense nor should it be construed as such in any case. It is, rather, a denial of a permanent unchanging self-substance, over and above the five *skandhas*, at least in one of its characteristic aspect,³ while the *vyāvahārika*, the practical view of and the ordinary transaction with the self remain unaffected as usual. It is evident from the usage of *ātma dīpo bhava* (*attadīpa*, *attasaraṇa*, etc.) in the early Buddhist literature available to us, in *Mahāparinibhāṇa sutta* for example, and also from the usage of *Ātmā hi ātmano nāthaḥ* in the *Dhammapada*. There is, however, no implication here of a permanent unchanging self or of a separate ego-entity, as is popularly understood.

Hume's observations on the nature of self come prominently to one's mind in this connection easily and naturally, specially where Hume observes, 'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I

always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.... I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement'. It has been stressed that 'all the remaining Buddhist doctrines may, more or less, be found in other philosophic systems and religions, but the *anattā* doctrine has been clearly and unreservedly taught only by the Buddha. Whoever has not comprehended that in reality, there exists only this continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena, and that there is no separate Ego-entity within or without this process, he will not be able to understand Buddhism'.⁴

For a more sophisticated understanding of the no-self doctrine of Buddhism, we have to dive deep into a proper assessment of the doctrine of *Pratītya samutpāda* which constitutes the cornerstone of the entire Buddhist edifice, and in the light of which alone the Buddhist *anātmā* would make sense. In view of the subsequent development of Buddhism into different schools with various ramifications, the same *anātmā* of Buddhism has assumed different forms in different schools like *viññānavāda* and *śūnyavāda*, where again concepts such as *ālayaviññāna*, *śūnya*, etc., have given rise to a number of misinterpretations and misunderstandings. Nowhere, it is worth nothing, there is an implication of a permanent unchanging self (a *kūṭasthanīya ātman*, as it is regarded in Vedānta) in any of these schools,⁵ while at the same time it will be a gross misunderstanding—rather sheer injustice—to label any

of them as nihilism and then look for an absurd annihilation or denial of our practical life (*vyavahāra*) in any of them.

Professor Pande, however, draws our attention to an important aspect which is easily ignored by those who make too much of the Buddhist theory of impermanence. There are sayings of the Buddha himself—Pande points out to us—from which it becomes clear that 'the *Vijñāna* or consciousness was not regarded simply as a particular and transient empirical phenomenon, but also as the original and pure consciousness which would be eternal and infinite on liberation. It is the empirical and finite *Vijñāna* that is impermanent, not the *Vijñāna* in its original or ultimate condition. As the doctrine of *Vijñānavāda* developed, many varieties and tiers of *Vijñāna* were discovered'⁶. Professor Pande further points out at another place that '*Vijñaptimātratā* is non-empirical, non-dual consciousness beyond the scope of particularities or conceptual thought', and 'since the *vijñaptimātratā* is identified with *Tathatā* and the *Dharmakāya*, it must be deemed timeless'.⁷ This information is noteworthy and revealing, and it only confirms the multidimensional aspects of the Buddha and Buddhavacana as well as of the further developments of the same into different schools with multiple ramifications and staggering varieties. Hiriyanṇa⁸ was right in pointing out that within the fold of Buddhism itself, diverse philosophical schools had developed at different times. Pande has referred to a theory of pure consciousness within the Buddhist framework transcending the dualism of the subject and the object as also the phenomenal plurality. The *Tathāgatagarbha* is declared as *ādi-viśuddha*, *śāśvata*, *śiva*, *sarva sattvadehāntargata* and *nirvikalpa-nirābhāsa*, which brings it very near to the *Ātman/Brahman* of the *Upaniṣads*

and, as has been pointed out by Pande, 'it is clearly reminiscent of the *Ātmavāda*'.⁹ The *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* distinguishes it, of course, from the *Ātman* of the Tīrthikas or non-Buddhists, as *Ātman* leads to eternalism, because of its clinging to affirmation; this is a typically Buddhist approach to the doctrine of *Ātman* (*Ātmavāda*).

Now, coming to the *Śūnyavāda* or the Mādhyamika school of thought, it is important to bear in mind that here *śūnyatā* is identified with *pratītya samutpāda* itself and, consequently, with essencelessness or *niḥsvabhāvatā*. For the Mādhyamikas, *śūnyatā* as *niḥsvabhāvatā* is the ultimate reality, just as *viññāna* is the ultimate reality for the Vijñānavādins, and *śūnyatā* itself is regarded here as the *summum bonum*, the highest good or the *paramārtha*. *Pratītyasamutpāda*, taught by the Buddha, is described in negative terminology by Nāgārjuna as '*anīrodhamanutpādamanucchedamaśāśvataṃ, anekārthamanānārtha, manāgamamanirgamaṃ*'. And this is the *tattva*, i.e., the exact or the real nature of the case, according to him. *Pratītyasamutpāda*, which is the same as *śūnyatā*, being thus the *tattva* or the true significance of the concepts as also of the things, one cannot meaningfully talk of its origin, destruction, etc. And, when this is realized, there is freedom from essentialist thought-construction and craving of the mind, and that is why *tattva* is said to be '*aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcāraprapñcitaṃ*' in Nāgārjuna's *Kārikā* under '*Ātmaparīkṣā*' prakaraṇa.

One important consequence of viewing *pratītyasamutpāda* as a logical theory of interdependence (*parasparāpekṣā*) of concepts, as is done in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, is that it is identified with *śūnyatā* which, in its turn, is identified with *niḥsvabhāvatā* (essencelessness) and also with the Madhyamāpratipad (middle path), thus making the entire Buddhist thought

appear as one systematic and harmonious whole with a central message of its own, which, to be precise, is not a message but a paradigm of philosophical activity. The Buddhist *anātmā* is to be understood in this light, at least in one of its most characteristic aspect of *śūnyatā* as *niḥsvabhāvatā* or essencelessness. Both *ātmā* and *anātmā* are to be understood in terms of *pratītya samutpāda*, as referring to the essencelessness of these concepts, and that is why Nāgārjuna in his *Ātma Parīkṣā prakaraṇa* of *Mūla Madhyama Kārikā* (Chapter 18.6) clearly points out, '*Ātmetyapi prajñapitaṃ anātmetyapi deśitaṃ, Buddhairnātmā na cānātmā kaścidityapi deśitaṃ*'. The Buddha's affirmation or denial of the self, as the case may be, needs to be understood in different contexts as avoiding the extremes of metaphysical commitments and the dogmatic views of *śāśvata-vāda* (eternalism) on the one hand and *uccheda-vāda* (nihilism) on the other.¹⁰

The attainment of *paramārtha*, the *summun bonum*, in this specific sense only constitutes an important feature of nirvāṇa. It is only when one realizes the *śūnyatā* or essencelessness of the concepts and things—when one understands how concepts do not have any fixed immutable essence or *svabhāva* of their own—that one comes to realize nirvāṇa in the Mādhyamika framework, nirvāṇa that is characterized as *sarvakalpanākṣaya rūpa* and *prapañcopaśama*.

What then are the various implications of this nirvāṇa which is free from all thought-constructions? Freedom from all sorts of metaphysical vagaries is the ideal set before us by the Mādhyamikas. One concept leads us to another, one idea leads to the other, and this is alright in its sphere. But metaphysicians make an illegitimate use of and a rigidly exclusive demand on these concepts, thereby falling into the trap of confusion and inconsis-

tencies. Philosophical insight consists in avoiding extreme metaphysical positions through an understanding of these concepts as *śūnya* or *niḥsvabhāva*. The philosopher, like a good shepherd, checks the metaphysical vagaries from taking the upper hand. That all sorts of metaphysical speculations are to be consistently avoided is clear from the following statement of the Buddha—'*Astīti nāstīti ca kalpanāvatāmevaṃ carantāna na duḥkha śāmyati*', i.e. those who speculate in terms of existence and non-existence will never realize the cessation of suffering. Professor G.C. Pande has very rightly observed, 'Buddha declared his position to be different from both eternalism and annihilationism'.¹¹ Similarity in insight is evident in this regard when we find Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya also pointing out, 'Both affirmation and denial of any position are two equally distorted ways of theorization. Buddha's is not a theory, not a position'.¹² Candrakīrti points to the contending metaphysical theories available in his time, e.g., those of Jaimini, Kaṇāda, Kapila, the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas, the Yogācāras, etc., which, according to him, are not conducive to the cessation of misery. This shows that freedom from contending metaphysical theories is one of the significant features of 'nirvāṇa' or philosophical enlightenment here. But this is possible through a realization that there is no essence to hang upon or to cling to in our ordinary discourse which is merely conventionally useful.

Mādhyaṃika thinking presents to us a model of philosophical analysis resulting in enlightenment regarding the nature of concepts as also of things as essenceless (*niḥsvabhāva*). It is neither nihilism nor is it absolutism, as is popularly understood, and one who falls into the trap of any such 'ism', is incurable, according to Nāgārjuna. '*Śūnyatā sarvadr̥ṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ, yeṣāṃ tu*

śūnyatā, drṣṭistānasādhyān vabhāṣire,' says Nāgārjuna quite explicitly in one of his *Kārikās*. The difference with regard to such ontological commitments is at the root of all other differences between Vedānta and Mādhymika Śūnyatā philosophy, and also the corresponding differences between nirvāṇa and mokṣa. However, the difference here is more at the conceptual level rather than being at any *tāttvika* level—at the level of the tattva or the Reality—according to Professor Pande. There is no difference in the ultimate realization. The difference, wherever there is any, could be on account of contextual dissimilarities and differences in the historical background as well as development, on this view; little fundamental difference is expected to be confronted at the experiential plane. This is a significant contribution of Professor Pande not only to Buddhism and Vedānta in particular, but to Indian thought as a whole and to the world-culture in general.

The idea is developed fully in Professor Pande's later treatises like *Ekam Sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*, but it has always been there as the main theme of his typically integral approach to the world of thought in general and Indian thought in particular. The fundamental Reality being the same, the difference lies only in different ways of articulation by great teachers, necessitated by the demands of circumstances, according to Professor Pande. '*Tattad yuga pravṛttibhedād upadeśyānām vāsanābhedācca mahapurusaśeṣanā api bhejire nānātvaṃ*', '*Maulikāni tattvāni sarvatra tulyāni, vikalpitāni rūḍhāni ca bhinnāni*'.¹³ This is not only a typically Indian way of looking at the Reality, the fundamental experience, and the way any such experience is articulated, which has come down to us from the hoary past when the Ṛgvedic seer declared from his experience that the one and the same Reality is called

by different names (*Ekam Sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*) but it has been more or less corroborated by the subsequent seers and scholars too of different generations one after the other, barring a few exceptions, of course.

But even these exceptions have also been taken into the main fold by an integral approach which is so very characteristic of our cultural heritage. Professor Pande's philosophical position, which I would regard as a typical variety of Neo-Integralism, is a veritably mature and ripe fruit belonging to that particular heritage; it is '*nigama kalpatarorgalitaṃ phalaṃ*', so to say, if I may be permitted to take a line from the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, that great text supposed to be the *akṛtrima Bhāṣya* (natural commentary) on the *Brahmasūtras*.

It is against this background that one can appreciate what Pande has to say about both Buddhism and the Vedāntic tradition. He admits that 'Brāhmaṇical authors have often failed to appreciate the true meaning of *śūnyatā*', but 'it is equally true that the Buddhists have in general not taken *Ātman* in that absolutist or idealistic sense which belongs to it in some Upaniṣadic texts, Gaudapāda, and Śaṅkara. The differences in this case relate not so much to the conception of ultimate reality as to the correct description of the phenomenal. It is in actuality more a controversy about the nature than the existence of the self'.¹⁴ Pande, with his deep insight, further points out that the *Anātmavāda* developed mainly with the practical motive to 'deal a death blow to the source of the deepest worldly attachment',¹⁵ i.e., the reality of the Ego. It is the false idea of the ultimate reality of the Ego that is the cause of desire. Thus it is that the realization of *Nairātmya* or the insubstantiality of the Ego leads to *vāsanākṣaya* or the destruction of *vāsanā*, as is pointed out by Dharmakīrti. Candrakīrti declares that

the purpose of *śūnyatā* is emancipation from *karma* and *kleśa*.¹⁶

The middle doctrine beyond the *Ātman* and *Anātman* is, however, emphasized by the *Mādhyamikas*, which, according to Professor Pande, is the correct interpretation of Buddha's silence. 'The correct interpretation of the silence', according to him, 'appears to be that Buddha regarded the true state of affairs as falling beyond word and thought. In ultimate reality distinctions disappear; hence predication is impossible with respect to it'.¹⁷ Here Professor Pande, as is expected, finds a parallel in the dialogue between *Bādhva* and *Bāṣkali* referred to by *Śaṅkara* in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, 3.2.17. This point to the typically integral approach of Professor Pande to our tradition to which *Vedānta* and *Buddhism* both equally belong.

This is so very true of, and presents before us an appropriate picture of the multi-faceted Indian thought and culture. The integral approach seems to be inbuilt in the very structure of theorizing here to such an extent that despite vehement criticisms advanced against each other, it is at the same time candidly acknowledged that ultimately, it is an exercise in search of the ultimate reality which really matters, not mere criticism of others' views or position. Here one would be reminded of another serious philosopher-scholar of the recent days, Acharya *Pattabhirama Sastri*, who points out that even the *Mīmāṃsakas* had taken to this integral approach which needs to be highlighted in our search for the nature of Reality that ultimately matters, even if we may be engaged in criticizing the opposite standpoint from time to time in order to explain our position. He goes to the extent of pointing out that even if one position gets refuted by forceful logical arguments, it need not be assumed

that either that particular position is wrong or the critic himself is an omniscient being. What is important, according to him, is what he calls 'Tattad dārśanika vastutattva-parijñāna', knowledge of the respective philosophical truths of different systems of philosophy, for which one should aspire, through an integrated approach (*samanvayātmaka pantha*).¹⁸

Professor Pande is of firm conviction that what divides the two different philosophical traditions like Advaita and Mādhyamika is 'the fact that they belong to two different streams of spiritual culture appealing to historically divided revelatory tradition or Āgama' but 'all such traditions are the historical variations of the one and eternal Revelation which must be universal in its superhuman essence'.¹⁹ This points to what I would regard as a typical form of Neo-Integralism in Professor Pande's approach to reality as well as systems of thought. One may wonder if the concept of 'superhuman essence' would be applicable everywhere, whether, for example, the Mādhyamika Śūnyatā and the Ātman of Śaṅkara would equally point to some such 'superhuman essence'. In any case, at the innermost, the deepest, and the highest plane, all differences vanish, according to Professor Pande, or to quote his own words, '*Maulikāni tattvāni sarvatra tulyāni*'. In that case, there would be no difference at the fundamental level, between the realization of Śūnyatā and that of the Advaita *tattva*, except only on a verbal plane, of course. Śūnyatā would in such a case point to that *ekam sat*, one ultimate reality, which is regarded as the non-dual Ātman in the Advaita framework. The Ātman in the context of Advaita is certainly not the empirical self or ego; it is beyond *jñātā-jñeya*, *pramātā-prameya*, dichotomy while being immanent everywhere, and śūnyatā is not the same as void or a mere transcendent Absolute transcending our empirical world in which we live, move

and have our being. (That is why, Ngārjuna pointed out that there is no distinction between saṁsāra and nirvāṇa.)

In that case, *Ātman* and *Śūnyatā* may be seen to have little fundamental difference, in spite of the fact that belonging, as they do, to two different streams or traditions with their respective variations, one may smack of eternalism of some sort while the other tends to steer clear of the extremes of both eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*) and annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*).

'Buddha', we are told by Pande, 'did affirm a reality which is infinite, eternal and beyond thought and speech. It is this reality the attainment of which constitutes the *summum bonum* of life and the end of saṁsāra'.²⁰ This is illuminating as well as thought-provoking, standing in need of further corroboration through an understanding of one's own and a mutual understanding of each other's experience at the higher level. The ingenuity and rare insight with which Śaṅkara and Buddhism are brought together in the integral, and all-encompassing vision of Professor Pande are noteworthy, and once one gets acquainted with this vision, one cannot but be goaded to rethink and reorient his ideas, in order to see if something very important and significant has not been missing all the while in one's conceptual framework with a normal tendency to emphasize the difference between these two great systems and traditions of Indian thought. 'For both Śaṅkara and Buddhism', says Professor Pande, 'the emancipating vision of infinite reality is obscured by egoistic attachment. The Buddhists do not call this reality the self because they look upon the self as the egoistic principle. Śaṅkara calls it the self but divests it of all individuality and limitation. For both the end of the journey is liberation from individuality and absorption in eternity through knowledge'.²¹ Pande admits that 'all the

systems agree in seeking detachment from egoistic life', but at the same time he also points out that 'it is only Śaṅkara and Buddhism who regard the very individuality of the empirical self as ultimately unreal'.²² It is because of this that Śaṅkara's *Ātmavāda* and Buddhist *Anātmavāda* are brought close to each other in his conceptual framework and their relationship, according to him, 'can hardly be regarded as one of total opposition'.²³

It gives a fresh impetus to rethink of Śaṅkara and Buddhism with an integral vision instead of taking them as opposite systems of thought clashing with each other under the fixed labels of *Ātmavāda* and *Anātmavāda*, and this undoubtedly is an important contribution to our philosophic understanding. It also seems to open for us a new vista for further exploration into the exact nature and implication of what is known as revelation.

This thought process by itself points to the inexhaustive richness of human experience and of the numerous interpretations put on those very experiences. And this is what the concept of Bhūmā in the *Upaniṣads* stands for, 'Yo vai Bhūmā tat sukhaṃ, nālpe sukhamasti', which is highlighted in Professor Pande's typically integral approach to the different philosophical theories like *Ātmavāda*, *Anātmavāda*, *Vijñānavāda*, *Śūnyavāda*, etc., culminating in the ultimate realization of the 'Ekaṃ Sat' of the Vedic seer. The problem, no doubt, is how to get at the ultimate without any interpretation whatsoever and whether the historical variations in traditions do not enter into the very structure of our experience,²⁴ even at the deepest level. At that level, however, where *Ekaṃ Sat* is realized, it is to be admitted that the human intellect, with all its dissecting apparatus is already transcended with 'the emancipating vision of infinite reality' in Professor Pande's terminology. In the words of the *Upaniṣads*, 'Tamātmasthaṃ yēnupaśyanti dhīrā steṣāṃ sukhaṃ śāśvataṃ netareṣāṃ'.²⁵

The following observations of Professor Pande are specially worth mentioning at the end and need our serious consideration, as they are indeed characteristic of his neo-integral approach. 'Different philosophical schools', says Pande, 'are different traditions of learning, interpretation and criticism, they have no strict connection with spiritual or revealed truth; or, rather, that they represent different logically possible interpretations. Attempts have been made to schematise them also, to see the deeper unity of transcendental reference in them. Buddha's Upāyaukāśālyā, Jaina Syādvāda, Vedantic prasthānabheda, illustrate such attitudes. Gauḍapāda boldly cut across the difference of Vedānta and Mahāyāna.²⁶ This typical approach is indeed a bold one, to say the least, in the history of intellectual as well as spiritual enterprise, an approach that certainly deserves to be explored further in depth.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Cf. Garth Pearce, 'To Hell and Back', *The Sunday Times*, 20 October 2002.
2. Cf. T.S. Eliot, *Selected Essays* (London, 1932, 1969), Chapter on 'Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca', p. 130, 'Humility is the most difficult of all virtues to achieve, nothing dies harder than the desire to think well of oneself'. This could be the reason why Ācārya Śaṅkara at the very outset of his *Satpadī Stotram* prays for the eradication of conceit or *avinaya*, as he calls it.
3. Cf. *Milinda Panha*, *The Questions of King Milinda*.
4. Cf. Nyantilok, *Buddhist Dictionary*.
5. Cf. T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London, 1955), p. 26, 'The entire development of Buddhist philosophy and religion is proof of the correctness of our *nairātmya* interpretation of Buddhism. There is no Buddhist school of thought which did not deny the ātman'.
6. G.C. Pande, *Studies in Mahāyāna* (Sarnath, 1993), pp. 103-4.

7. G.C. Pande, *Life and Thought of Śaṅkarācārya* (Delhi, 1994), p. 267.
8. Cf. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (Delhi, 1983), p. 198, 'All the different shades of philosophical theory—realistic and idealistic—are found within Buddhism itself; and we have, so to speak, philosophy repeated twice over in India—once in the several Hindu systems and again in the different schools of Buddhism.'
9. Pande, *Studies in Mahāyāna*, p. 105.
10. Cf. *Samādhirāja Sūtra*, 9.27, 'Asīti nāstīti ubhēpi antā, śuddhi aśuddhīti imēpi antā, tasmādubhe anta vīvarjayitvā madhyēpi sthānaṃ na karoti paṇḍitaḥ'. Also cf. Nāgārjuna, *Mūla Madhyama Kārikā*, 15.10, 'Astīti śāsvatagraho nāstītyuceheda darśanaṃ, tasmādastitva nāīśitve nāīśiyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ'.
11. G.C. Pande, *Life and Thought of Śaṅkarācārya* (Delhi, 1994), p. 264.
12. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Knowledge, Freedom and Language* (Delhi, 1989), p. 271.
13. G.C. Pande, *Ekam Sad Viprā Bahudhā Vadanti* (Varanasi, 1997), p. 40.
14. Cf. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism* (Delhi, 1971), p. 500.
15. Ibid., p. 503.
16. *Mādhyamika Kārikā Vṛtti* of Candrakīrti, 'Atha kiṃ punaḥ śūnyatāyāṃ prajoganaṃ tadultameva... Karmakleśakṣaye mokṣaḥ' as quoted in Ibid., p. 504.
17. Pande, Ibid., p. 505.
18. Cf. The Editorial Introduction in *Shabara Bhāṣya* (ed.), Acharya Pattabhīrama Sastri 'Padmabhushan' (N. Delhi, 1984), p. 41, 'Sarvōpidārśanikaḥ svīyaparamparāprāpta panthānamāśritya gacchan paramata Khaṇḍanāpi vyāpīṛbhavati. Tadiḍaṃ khaṇḍanaṃ na bhedabuddhi jananaṃ kintu sva pratipādyā viśayagata prāsastya pratipa adanāya iti nahi nindanāyayovabodhayati. Pravaiaistarkaiḥ pramānaiśca khaṇḍane kṛtēptaddar śanaṃ khaṇḍitamiti na parigaiyate. Ataḥ khaṇḍane matiṃ parityajya tattad dārśanika-vastutattvaparijāne yatitavyaṃ mānavaiḥ sudhibhiḥ. Vādavivādagosthyāṃ vāvadūkena kenacana anyasmin parajitēpi na tena darśanasya nyunatā siddhyati, nāpi svasya sarvajñatvaṃ sādhitam bhavati. Ayameva samanvayātmakḥ panthā mīmāṃsakairāśritaḥ.'

19. Pande, *Studies in Mahāyāna*, p. 160.
20. G.C. Pande, *Life and Thoughts of Śaṅkarācārya* (Delhi, 1994), p. 264.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 265.
24. Cf. J.N. Mohanty, *Essays on Indian Philosophy, Tradition and Modern* (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 2, 'In the texture of Philosophy, as in the texture of all experience, the historical and the supra-historical are inextricably woven together.'
25. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 6.12.
26. G.C. Pande, *Studies in Mahāyāna* (Sarnath, 1993), p. 161. It is interesting to note, how Professor Pande refers in this context to Dara Shikoh who 'discovered a basic unity behind technicalities and convention in Hinduism and Islam', and also to Ramakrishna Paramahansa who 'personally attested to the truth of the systems of worship in different religions'. B.K. Matilal's endorsement, in his article 'The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism', of the spirit of what he regards as 'intellectual non-violence' of the Jaina philosophers in India is also worth noting here. Cf. *Oxford University papers on India*, edited by Allen, Gambrich, Raychaudhuri and Rizvi (Delhi, 1986), p. 134.

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G.C. Pande on the Origins of Buddhism

S.R. GOYAL

Professor G.C. Pande is undoubtedly one of the greatest philosopher-historians of India. He has produced original works not only on ancient Indian history and culture but also on philosophy, religion, metaphysics, philosophy of history, historiography and numerous other branches of Indology. The very fact that a national seminar is being held on Professor Pande's thought and works is a proof of his multidimensional genius.

But the first love of Professor Pande has been Buddhism and he initially became famous for his thesis *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism* for which he was awarded D.Phil. degree by the University of Allahabad in 1947.¹ By that time much had already been written on early Buddhism and Mrs. Rhys Davids had already raised the all-important question: what was the original message of Buddhism? Her pointed query had rudely disturbed the almost settled composure of Buddhist scholarship, for as soon as it is admitted that the original mandate of Buddhism might have been something different from what it

is traditionally reported to have been, we are forced—as Professor Pande pointed out—to adopt a more critical and historical outlook towards the problems of Buddhist origins.

Professor Pande divided his thesis on the origins of Buddhism into three parts—studies in Early Buddhist sources entailing a stratification of scriptures; studies in the historical and cultural background of early Buddhism which included a study of the life and personality of the Buddha; and studies in the early Buddhist doctrines with a view to reconstructing as far as possible the original teachings of the Master.

The method then usually adopted for stratification of such ancient texts was a combined application of linguistics and the scale of cultural evolution. Through this method, many scholars had attempted to determine the relative chronology of Vedic hymns and the epics.² Broadly, Professor Pande also adopted this method to determine the chronology of the different layers of early Buddhist scriptures and to put the ideas contained in them in their proper historical context. As even the earliest available collections within the Buddhist canon are of uncertain date and heterogeneous contents, they do not preach a uniform set of doctrines and contain within themselves the seeds of multiform growth. A critical-historical approach to ancient Buddhism, he argued, most certainly entails the stratification of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas and their study with reference to their historical and genetic relationship.³

Professor Pande on the Broad Chronology of the Early Buddhist Texts

According to Buddhist tradition, the *Vinaya* and the *Sutta* Piṭakas were compiled immediately after the death of the

Buddha in the First Council⁴ held at Rājagṛha. Oldenberg and Franke did not believe in the historicity of the First Council mainly on the ground that the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* offers not a word about the session of the Council. But, as Jacobi pointed out, it was not really necessary for the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* to go out of its way to describe the Council. However, even if the First Council is not regarded as pure fiction, its nature and work remain uncertain. That the huge mass of the *Vinaya* and the *Sutta Piṭakas* was 'recited' in the First Council is, of course, obviously impossible, though a beginning in the direction might have been made. However, lack of certain evidence makes it difficult to reach any conclusion.

The years following the Parinirvāṇa appear to have been marked by a process of growth with respect to the rules of both *Vinaya* and *Dhamma*. The *Saṅgha* grew in wealth and membership and its organization became more complex. The original teachings must have left room for interpretative divergences and the *Theras* in the various communities would act not only as the transmitters of the tradition but also as commentators, with the result that the original message began to be embedded in scholastic growth. In the *Nikāyas*, in spite of occasional discrepancies, there is a general impression of homogeneity and though *Saṅghabheda* is feared, it is not assumed as an actuality, except perhaps at a very few places. The *Nikāyas*, thus, appear to reflect the first and earliest period of the history of Buddhist thought when the *Saṅgha* was, in appearance at least, doctrinally one. Further, if the *Kathāvatthu* was composed (or at least some parts of it) in the reign of Aśoka, as the tradition asserts, the *Nikāyas* would have to be placed at the latest in the first half of the fourth century. Further, frequent and direct references of the *Kathāvatthu* to the *Nikāyas*, and stylistic and

doctrinal considerations suggest that the greater part of the Nikāyas should be placed prior to the composition of the *Kathāvatthu*.

But some scholars doubt the historicity of the Third Council. The more plausible opinion seems to be that the Third Council did take place, although it was a sectarian affair. The fact that Aśokan edicts are silent over the Council may also be explained by the supposition that he was not as intimately connected with the Council as the Pali tradition would have us believe. An examination of the Bharhut and Sanchi inscriptions also shows that 'some time before the second century BC; there was already a collection of Buddhist texts, which was called, Piṭakas and was divided into five Nikāyas that there were 'suttas' in which the 'Dhamma'...was preached, that some of these agreed with those contained in our *Tipiṭaka*, and that Jātakas of exactly the same kind as those contained in the *Tipiṭaka*, already belonged to the stock of Buddhist literature...' Lastly, if the entire Pali Tipiṭaka was written down in Sri Lanka in the first century BC the Nikāyas should go back to the third century BC at least.

Thus, concludes Professor Pande, the evidence for ascertaining the chronology of the canon, of which the Pali version is still available in its entirety, is small, but it may be asserted that the growth of the Nikāyas falls between the fifth and the third centuries BC. The fact that the Nikāyas take but slight notice of the issues contested by the earliest sects certainly suggests that they had practically reached completion in the first century AD. The silence of the Vinaya over the Third Council suggests that it had reached completion in the first two centuries after the Buddha. The silence of the canon over Aśoka—which contrasts so strongly with later tradition—is also significant in this respect and suggests its antiquity.

Criteria of Stratification

As regards the general criteria which may help us in stratifying the Nikāyas, Professor Pande describes it thus: The evolution of the Nikāyas falls between the age of the Upanishads and that of the Abhidharma and other Buddhist sectarian literature. This provides us with a general sense of direction in trying to discover what is early and what is late in the Nikāyas. The growth of monastic learning and of philosophical analysis and controversy led to increased complexity, subtlety and system in the realm of ideas, till the message of Buddha was converted into a stupendous scholastic philosophy. At the same time, the spread of Buddhism among the common masses led it to imbibe many elements of popular religion and helped the apotheosis of Buddha. *Pari passu* with this orientation in doctrinal change, there was a corresponding change in the style of expression which tended to lose simplicity and spontaneity and poetic vigour in favour of dry-as-dust abstract scholastic formulae. Linguistically too, the change may be seen in the use of new technical terms and in the development of new technical senses for old words. As regards the state of doctrinal evolution within the Nikāyas, there appears to have been a steady growth of metaphysical interest resulting in increasing enumeration, classification and definition. There was also the growth of a systematic Buddhist theology including the infiltration of the deities of local cults, especially among the 'Bhummā-Devas' (earth-gods) and the Nāgas. But the most far reaching theological trend was the apotheosis of the Buddha. The idea of a Being incomparably superior to all creatures, including gods, and from time to time incarnating, actually or apparently, according to a fixed norm (Dhammatā) solely out of compassion, was entirely new.

The change that came over the concepts of Saddhā and of 'omniscience' is also significant in this respect. Similar was the extension of the practice of Thūpa-worship, which came to acquire quite an exceptional importance for later Buddhists. There was also the growth of the physiognomical dogma of the thirty-two *Mahāpurisalakkhaṇas*.

Literary style is also a criterion for stratification. In general, an older style is revealed by its striking simplicity, spontaneity and earnestness. In response to the needs of scholastic controversies and of the inculcation of dogmatics among the novices, a dry-as-dust style came into being. There was also a considerable development of what may be called the 'Purāṇic', or perhaps the 'Mahāyānic' style. This trend is characterized by its wealth of narrative and descriptive material, by its predominantly mythological character, by its toleration of miracles and by exaggeration in numbers (of years, followers, converts, distances, etc.). Many *suttas* reveal patchwork. It was but natural in view of the fact that they were transmitted down long and independent lines of reciters steeped in later ideas, formulae and interpretations, who never had a single standard linguistic expression, and underwent probably more than one editorial revision. Many times the old texts were merely 'retouched' or lists of adjectives lengthened or cut down, or conventional beginnings or endings added.

Vocabulary and other linguistic features may also be used as indicators of the age of a text or of its part. Unfortunately, uncertainty besets many of our word-histories, which have, in any case, not been comprehensively worked out. The test from vocabulary is indeed important, but it is in most cases dependent on the view taken of the evolution of ideas in early Buddhism. Professor Pande has given a list of the words which, through change

in their meaning or importance, indicate the age of the compositions in which they occur. According to Thomas,⁵ the expansion of geographical knowledge towards the South and the West indicates a relatively later character of the reports. An 'extension' of geographical knowledge, however, is difficult to prove. Even in the sixth century BC, Kosambi had political connections with Avanti and presumably with the adjacent states to the northwest; and traders plied in caravans along the great highways to the North and the West. It may be recalled that Rhys Davids has cogently argued for the great antiquity of the Aṅguttara list of the sixteen Mahājanapadas.

It, however, stands to reason that there was a geographical extension of the Buddhist Saṅgha, and it must have taken place along the trade routes. Warlike relations between Avanti and Magadha, shortly after Buddha's death, may have both retarded as well as promoted the westward movement of the Buddhist monks. The materials, unfortunately, for reconstructing the pre-Aśokan geographical expansion of the Saṅgha is still inadequate.

According to Winternitz, the poetical pieces were not at first generally recognized. Their claim to be regarded as sacred texts was contested and they were only later on combined into a Nikāya, namely the Khuddakanikāya. But Professor Pande argues that verse is a greater conserving medium and, in oral transmission, likely to be more conservative than prose. Besides, in our texts, where prose and verse occur together, it is impossible to say in general whether the one or the other is older. In short, the verse-form is in itself of no stratigraphic significance. The political data of the Nikāyas belong almost wholly to the age contemporaneous with the Buddha. As regards social data, it is unlikely to throw much light on the problem of Nikāyas' stratification.

Professor Pande on the Pre-Buddha Background

Professor Pande studied the emergence of Buddhism in the light of the evolution of Indian moral, philosophical and religious concepts of the pre-Buddha period and, in this connection, underlined the significance of the discovery of the Indus civilization. When the Indus civilization first came to light, Marshall described it as non-Vedic and pre-Vedic, a view which was still the dominant one when Professor Pande wrote his dissertation. Marshall and his supporters had *mutatis mutandis* argued that the Aryans worshipped natural forces while the Indus people conceived their gods in the form of images. Vedic people were pastoral, Indus people enjoyed urban life. Aryans were a warlike people, Indus people were peace-loving. Vedic people were illiterate, Indus people knew and practised the art of writing. Aryans knew and used horse for transport and military purposes, the Indus people did not know this animal. Further, the mature phase of the Indus civilization was over while the Aryans were still in West Asia. It was the decadent phase of the Indus civilization which was destroyed by the Aryans. Later on, M. Wheeler also held the Vedic Aryans responsible for its destruction. Stuart Piggott was generally of the same view. In his *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, Professor G.C. Pande also wrote that after the discovery of the Indus civilization, we can no longer regard the course of Indian history as the career of a victorious Aryan civilization contaminated increasingly by the force of indigenous barbarism. On the contrary, the Aryan invasion of India must be regarded as 'the arrival of barbarians into a region already highly organized into an empire based on a long-established tradition of literate urban culture. This is a veritable Copernican revolution!,'⁶ He also conceded that undeniably some of

the most important elements of the religious life of latter-day India go back to the Indus civilization. Among these may be mentioned the worship of a prototype of Śiva, who is represented as Paśupati, Yogī, and perhaps Naṭarāja; of the Mother-Goddess, of the *pīpal* tree, and of the bull and some other animals associated with the gods. Phallic worship and the great sanctity that has ever been attached to water in India may also go back to the Indus civilization.⁷ Most important, the definite occurrence of a cross-legged posture with the out-stretched palms placed on the knees, and the probable occurrence of what looks remarkably like the Śāmbhavī Mudrā seem to suggest that the beginnings of Yogic practice in India may also belong to the Indus civilization. The worship of gods in a personal and iconic form, as a kind of 'pujā', has been traced back in India to pre-Aryan sources, which ought to include the Indus civilization too. As regards the date of the Indus civilization, Professor Pande expressed the view that the Aryan invasion of India cannot be placed much later than 2000 BC. Now if we regard 2300 BC as the mean date in the career of the Indus civilization, which was then 'in full flower', we get the period 2800 BC–1800 BC as the possible date of this civilization. This will harmonize well with the evidence of archaeology, Vedic philology, ancient Indian history and ancient Near-Eastern history.

But recently, in his *Vaidika Saṁskṛiti*, published in 2001 from Allahabad, Professor Pande has adopted an altogether different view which is nothing but a complete U turn from his earlier position, another veritable Copernican Revolution! In this work, he holds that known facts do not prove that the Vedic and Indus civilizations were basically different. Their cultures differed in styles but they did not necessarily belong to two different ages and

regions. He now also believes that the Vedas were composed in 3000 BC or earlier than that, in the region stretching from the Gaṅgā and Sarasvatī to Afghanistan. Thus, the Indus and Vedic cultures both flourished in the same general period and in the same region. He now supports the view that the Aryans also knew *purās* (that is, cities). The Vedic culture may not have been urban, but its coexistence and contemporaneity with an urban civilization is not impossible.

Thus the Indus civilization could very well have been the urban aspect of rural Vedic culture. The Indus people no doubt knew image worship while Vedic people propitiated their gods by sacrifices. But on the one hand it is also a fact that Vedic gods were also conceived in anthropomorphic form while the discovery of fire-altars at Indus sites have brought the Indus religion quite close to the Vedic religion. The difference in sacrificial ritual and image worship, Professor Pande now asserts, does not prove the separateness of the two civilizations, while the discovery of horse bones at Indus sites has weakened the validity of the argument based on the supposed ignorance of the Indus people of this animal. The problem of the literacy and illiteracy of the two civilizations depends on the questionable assumption that the Vedic Aryans did not know the art of writing. Thus, the Indus and the Vedic civilizations could have coexisted both in time and space or could have been the two aspects of the same culture. This conclusion, Pande argues, agrees well with all the available evidence as of now.

Evolution of Religious Ideas in the Vedic Age

However, as seen above, in his *Origins*, Pande had expressed the view that cultural development in the Vedic Age must be understood as a growing fusion of Aryan and Non-Aryan elements which produced towards the

close of the period a veritable revolution in religious ideas. We can discern 'in the Vedic period, outside the strictly Vedic pale, wandering groups of ascetics sometimes styled as Munis who were the precursors of the strange ascetics of later India'. As late as the fourth century BC, the Greeks noted the distinction between Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa, whom, still later, Patañjali described as eternal opponents. As regard the Śramaṇic world-view we might loosely say that the Śramaṇas were ascetic, atheistic, pluralistic and realists. The essential basis of their world-view seems to have been the idea of saṃsāra—of *karman* and transmigration. Thus, in the Vedic period, there existed two distinct religious and cultural traditions—the strictly orthodox and Aryan tradition of the Brāhmaṇas, and, on the fringe of their society, the straggling culture of the Munis and Śramaṇas, most probably going back to pre-Vedic and pre-Aryan origins. Towards the close of the Vedic period, the two streams tended to mingle and the result was that great religious ferment from which Buddhism originated.

However, in later years, a change came about in Professor Pande's views on the place of Śramaṇic tradition in Indian culture. As noted above, in his thesis he describes the Śramaṇa tradition as pre-Vedic and non-Vedic. At one place he observes: 'It appears that originally the Āśramas recognized in the Vedic tradition were the first two. All the while, outside the strictly Vedic pale, were wandering groups of ascetics, sometimes styled as Munis. When towards the close of the later Vedic period Brāhmaṇic values had undergone a great change, more friendly and more fruitful communion with these Munis or Śramaṇas appears to have taken place. In other words, the ideal of the ascetic appears to have come down to the Jains and the Buddhists, not from the Brāhmaṇas, but

from previously existing 'heretical' ascetic sects. As a matter of fact, the ascetic ideal was even then in the process of being absorbed by the Brāhmaṇas.

It is easy to see how the age of Buddha provided the necessary conditions of the rise of asceticism. It was an age of great spiritual vitality, when the clash of rival schools and sects and basic points of view fed the flame of spiritual quest. At the same time, it was an age of frequent and bloody wars and of much economic change. These circumstances must have created a feeling of distress and despair in the minds of many. Thus, when the circumstances were ripe, the old seed of a continuing ascetic tradition from remote protohistoric times found a suitable soil and burst into flower.

However, later on, Professor Pande came to believe that it would not be correct to hold that *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti* belong to different ethnic and historic strata. In his *Śramaṇa Tradition: Its History and Contribution to Indian Culture*⁸ he does not characterize the Śramaṇic tradition as non-Vedic and pre-Vedic and discerns the elements of *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti* both in the Harappan civilization.

The Upanishadic trends towards pantheistic speculation and preference for knowledge to ritual action commenced in the last period of the Middle Vedic Age. In the Brāhmaṇa texts, future existence—at least of a blessed character—is assured to a man only through the correct performance of sacrifice while even the gods had a definite origin in birth and acquired their immortality through sacrifice. The Upanishadic doctrine of transmigration has ever been closely and essentially bound up with a number of other ideas without which it would be impossible. These are: the idea of the soul as something distinct from the body, immortal, and 'pure' by nature;

the idea of 'Karman' as a more or less foreign and accidental factor which, nevertheless, entails a strict subjection to the laws of moral causality; and, finally, the idea that all worldly joys are worthless with a deep-seated urge for Mukti. The idea of an inflexible moral law extending far beyond the grave was quite beyond the ken of the priests of the Brāhmaṇa-books. Therefore, the sources of this doctrine must have been the Munis and Śramaṇas, who harked back to pre-Vedic times. Thus, in the Upanishadic period, there arose in a section of thinkers great dissatisfaction with the type of thought found in the Brāhmaṇas texts. These thinkers, grappling with the problem of the nature of ultimate reality, came to the conclusion that it was something inexpressible though its immediate experience was the *summum bonum* of human life. The ideal for which one must strive is the attainment of freedom (Moksha) from Samsāra.

Religious Condition of the Age of the Buddha

After discussing the Vedic background, Professor Pande has discussed the social and intellectual tendencies of the age of the Buddha and Mahāvīra in order to identify the forces which contributed towards the crystallization of Buddhism as a religious movement. By that time, in India, the age of 'migrations and settlement' was over, and the territorial element had attained supremacy over the tribal in the organization of the state. The country was divided into a number of Janapadas which included monarchies as well as republics. Some of them had attained the status of Mahājanapādas. Further, a trial of strength was taking place between the monarchies, as also between the monarchical and the non-monarchical forms of government. The contest plainly showed the decline of republics, the rise of absolutism, and the growing success of Magadhan imperialism.

The ruling class comprised the Kshatriyas and their kinsmen, some of whom had nothing except their heredity to proclaim their aristocratic status. The growth of towns and commerce and the organization of trade and craft into guilds, and the emergence of money involved critical changes in social life, including the growth of fabulously rich merchants who patronized the new religious movements. However, Professor Pande rejects the suggestion of any affiliation between the rise of Buddhism and Jainism and the emergence of a class of wealthy merchants. By this time a sharp contrast had developed between Brāhmaṇical religion which was formalistic, ritualistic, and at heart quite worldly and the new departure in the Upanishads, which tended increasingly in an esoteric and ascetic direction and in which the ritual act was often replaced by that of knowledge and sometimes by that of theistic devotion. There was a growing cleavage of ideas about the fundamental values of life, which resulted in the adoption of Moksha as the *summum bonum* in addition to the Trivarga. The scheme of the Chaturvarga thus became completed, and the Vedic religion became truly a synthesis of *Pravṛtti-dharma* and *Nivṛtti-dharma*. This change found its social reflection in the formulation of the theory of the Four Stages of Life in the *Dharmasūtras*. According to some scholars, Buddhism and Jainism rose out of this anti-ritualistic tendency within the religion of the Brāhmaṇas. But Professor Pande believes that the anti-ritualistic tendency within the Vedic fold was itself due to the impact of an asceticism which antedates the Vedas. Jainism represented a continuation of this pre-Vedic stream from which Buddhism also sprang, though deeply influenced by Vedic thought.

The diversity of social conditions was reflected in the variety of religious life. The worship of the Yakshas was

widespread. The Yakshas were spirits often connected with trees. They granted worldly desires, especially progeny and wealth. They very often possessed the character of local deities or patron saints, though some of them seem to have been associated with cosmological functions too. Some of the Yakshas appear to have been gradually absorbed in Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist pantheons. The people also worshipped various kinds of lowly beings like the shades of the departed, evil spirits and various animals such as elephants, horses, cows, dogs and crows. Popular festivals were held in honour of Indra, or Skanda, or Rudra, or Mukunda, or demons, or Yakshas or the snakes, etc. With this may be compared the 'Samajjā' which is referred to in Buddhist literature. The ideas of heaven and hell seem to have played an important part in popular eschatology. We meet with a very vivid conception of hell in Jaina literature, although such a picture is wanting in Vedic texts. The emergence and prevalence of the idea of Karma probably accounts for this difference.

The Brāhmaṇas formed a proud caste in this epoch and they placed before themselves the ideal of a priest's and teacher's life. But in practice, many Brāhmaṇas were not priests; some of them were engaged in administration, some were landlords and yet others were petty cultivators and lowly serfs.

The growth and spread of asceticism was the most characteristic feature of the new religious life then springing up in north-east India. However, according to Professor Pande, the supposition that the theory of the four Āśramas was well established in pre-Buddhist times is an assumption without proof. 'The word Āśrama does not occur in the Samhitās or Brāhmaṇas.'⁹ That the theory of the four Āśramas was not an old and settled theory in the times of the Dharmasūtras appears from the irregu-

larity of the nomenclature adopted by them in this respect. It appears that originally the Āśramas recognized in the Vedic tradition were the first two. All the while, outside the strictly Vedic pale, were wandering groups of ascetics, sometimes styled as Munis. In other words, the ideal of the ascetic appears to have come down to the Jainas and the Buddhists, not from the Brāhmaṇas, but from previously existing 'heretical' ascetic sects. The ascetics were divided into many classes. The most marked cleavage was between the orthodox and the heterodox. The Brāhmaṇa attitude was not so uncompromising towards secular life; it envisaged renunciation but only after the proper fulfilment of social duties. The difference of attitude towards castes must have been another dividing line between the orthodox and the heterodox. Orthodox opinion prohibited any one except a Brāhmaṇa or a Dvija from becoming a Parivrājaka, while in the Buddhist Saṅgha, all the four castes merged like rivers in the ocean, renouncing their former names and lineage. The orthodox view, again, frowned at any formal 'renunciation' for women while, as a matter of fact, they could and did join some of the heterodox ascetic orders. The Parivrājakas wandered alone, or banded themselves into communities under a spiritual leader—Satthā, Gaṇāchariyo, etc. Buddha's institution of an order without a supreme head was a revolutionary novelty in this respect. Mendicants who had renounced the world were intellectually active but with a spiritual seeking, and their purpose was to practise 'Brahmacharya' in the sense of 'discipline for the realization of the Most High'.

In the age of the Buddha kammavāda and kiriyāvāda with their diametrical opposites, akammavāda and akiriyāvada, seem to have been the most discussed problems. Both the Jainas and the Buddhists claim to have

been believers in kammavāda and kiriyāvāda. According to B.C. Law, there is no difference between kiriyāvāda and kammavāda and both denote the doctrine of action. But it is more likely that some difference was maintained between the two terms. Roughly, these terms signified that the miseries of man are not caused by Time, Destiny, Chance or Soul but by man's own actions, because human actions contain a binding moral force, the results of which cannot be escaped. This doctrine was thus opposed to Sassatavāda (the doctrine that the ultimate reality is śāśvata or eternal) and Adhichchhasamupada (the hypothesis of fortuitous origin), both leading to the conclusion that no action can be called moral or immoral, for either it does not occasion any change or it is not a free act. Among other philosophical theories of the age of the Buddha, reference may be made to kālavāda. It is referred to in the Atharvaveda and the Mahābhārata also. 'Struck by irresistible tragedy of time and impressed with a sense of Fatalism one spoke of time with awe and in superlatives.' Svabhāvavāda seems to have had a point of contact with Sāṅkhyan as well as Gosālian views. It recognized the theory of development through immanent forces but denied free will. Niyativāda believed in niyati or Necessity which may mean either a natural (causal) or supernatural (fatal) or moral (karmic) or logical necessity. Opposed to it was yadṛchchhavāda which denied the principle of causality itself.

The non-Vedic Śramaṇa religious bodies are known to us only through references to their teachers and tenets scattered in the vast literatures of the Buddhists and the Jains. The Vinaya refers to Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta with whom the Buddha had personal contact before his enlightenment. From the Vinaya it appears that the famous teachers of northeastern India were called

titthiyas. The term originally did not belong to any particular sect, though the Buddha sometimes used it in the sense of heretics. The religious teachers whom the Buddha described as heretics (*titthiya tīrthakara*) are: Pūrana Kassapa, Pakudha Kachchāyana, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Keśakambalin, Sañjaya Belaṭṭhīputta and Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta. The Chullavagga contains an account of a supernormal magical show by Piṇḍola Bharadvāja with regard to a sandalwood alms-bowl which a śreshṭhī of Rājagṛha got fixed on the top of a bamboo, declaring that it will be his who could take it from there with his supernatural powers. Among those who claimed such powers but proved to be unsuccessful were Pūrana Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Keśakambalin, Pakudha Kachchāyana and Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta. Their doctrines very probably did not last long, except those of the Jains and the Ājivikas.

Life and Religious Quest of the Buddha

Professor Pande made a fresh study of the life of the Buddha with a view to correlating Buddha's teachings with the major events of his life, quest and psychological experience. A complete biography of the Buddha is not found in the Pali canon. Four suttas in the Majjhima, however, describe the days of his wandering in search of Truth. In several more suttas, spread over the four Nikāyas and the Mahāvagga, there are references to his Enlightenment. The Mahāvagga further attempts to narrate the history of the days following the sambodhi, just as the Mahāparinibhānasutta pieces together fragments relating to the Buddha's last days and attempts to build a continuous narrative. Besides, there are incidental references in the Nikāyas which shed some light on the Buddha's personality. It seems that the earlier disciples of the Buddha paid much less attention to his life than to

his teachings, and were inclined to regard him as essentially a human being. Within a century, however, the situation began to change through the gradual apotheosis of the Buddha and accounts of his life were embellished and systematized in accordance with the requirements of Buddhological theories.

Certain evidence for the Buddha's life is small. Only the leading events and features can be historically delineated. The date of the Buddha's birth is now usually fixed at 563 BC. The place of his birth would have been the chief city of the Śākya, Kapilavatthu, the ancient site of which was probably near the place where the Lumbini P.E. of Aśoka has been found. The Śākya are described as proud Khatṭiyas of pure descent, though at the same time the Brāhmaṇa gotra of Gotama is ascribed to them. On the other hand, the tradition of close inter-marriages associated with them suggests some non-Aryan affinities. The administrative and the more important judicial business of the clan was carried out in a public assembly, at which young and old alike were present. The headship of the state was vested periodically in an elected chief entitled Rājan. Economic life was simple, and rested on villages surrounded by rice fields, pastures and forests. Against this background the story of Buddha's having had in his early life three different palaces for the three seasons does not appear very plausible. From the Mahāvagga narrative, the name of Buddha's father appears to have been Śuddhodana. Mahāpajāpati Gotamī is mentioned at several places in the Vinaya and the Nikāyas, but her relationship with Buddha is not explicitly specified in the latter. The miracles attending Buddha's birth and the prophecy of Asita has little claim to be regarded as authentic.

On Buddha's education the earliest records are just as silent as they are on the name of his wife or wives, a

point regarding which later traditions contradict each other exceedingly. Rāhula figures as a monk at several places in the Nikāyas, but is not called Buddha's son. At the age of twenty-nine, Buddha 'went forth' into the homeless state. Later traditions assert that the crisis came on suddenly and was caused by the first sight of old age, sickness, death and an ascetic. But it seems difficult to believe that the 'Bodhisattva' could have lived for twenty-eight years without encountering sickness, old age, death and asceticism. The silence of the Nikāyas over the story deepens the doubt. A *sutta* in the Aṅguttara tells us how through reflection over the subjects of old age, sickness and death, Buddha lost all pride of youth, health and life. It is quite intelligible that meditation on the fact of old age, illness and death should have induced him to renounce secular life. This simple tradition appears to have become transformed into the picturesque story of later times. A factor that aided the transformation may be found in the popular usage which called old age, etc. 'divine messengers' (Devadūtas). It was now supposed that the gods actually arranged for Buddha the sights of an old man, etc. so that he might reflect on the ills of life. Literary effect rather than historical fidelity dominates the whole treatment.

Even as a boy Buddha seems to have been of a serious, meditative temper. He must have early seen wandering mendicants in his home town, 'the place of the tawny-clad' (Kapilavatthu). Buddha's quest had two closely associated aspects: on the one hand, he sought the extinction of the passions and desires for this impermanent, unsatisfactory world; on the other, he wanted to attain to eternal peace. He sought the way to 'detachment, to absence of passion, to cessation, to abatement, to higher knowledge, to full enlightenment, to Nibbāna'. His quest was for 'what is good—the peerless way of desirable peace'.

The precise circumstances under which the actual Abhinishkramaṇa took place are no longer known. But there is no reason to believe that it was a sudden revolution. Buddhist theology, in the spirit of modern psychology, interprets it to have been the final upshot of a long period of anterior preparation. Then followed several years of restless wandering and seeking. The names of only two teachers under whom Buddha sought spiritual instruction are mentioned in the Nikāyas. They are Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. Under them Buddha learned to attain to the third and fourth 'immaterial trances' (Arūpa Samāpattis), respectively. The trances were, however, considered unsatisfactory by him since they did not lead to the quiescence of passions, and 'higher knowledge' (Abhiññā), and thus failed to answer his quest.

Passing through the land of Magadha, Buddha approached the town of Uruvelā. Here he set to practise effort (Padhāna). At first he sought to control the mind by a frontal assault. He is described to have gritted his teeth and pressed his tongue to his palate. He found, however, that the procedure caused excessive heat in the body and much unrest. Having convinced himself that he had as much of austerities as anyone else and yet had not attained to the goal, Buddha abandoned the ascetic path. Now through the practice of Jhāna he obtained Enlightenment which consisted in the intuitive knowledge of Reality in its twofold aspect and spent several weeks enjoying the bliss of emancipation.

According to Thomas,¹⁰ the whole story of the contest with Māra is a mythological development. Rhys Davids has attempted to see in the Māra story 'a subjective experience under the form of objective reality'.¹¹ The struggle with Māra, Professor Pande believes, was really a psychological struggle with secular temptations. According to Vinaya, Buddha remained for four weeks at the Bodhi

tree after obtaining Enlightenment. After this comes in the Mahāvagga narrative, the acceptance of Tapussa and Bhallika as lay disciples, which is followed by the description of Buddha's hesitation to preach and the final decision to engage in preaching at the entreaty of Brahmā.

According to the Majjhima narrative, having decided to preach Buddha thought of the proper recipients of his message. His former teachers Ālāra and Uddaka had died recently, but the Five Bhikkhus were still alive and at Benaras. All this information was received by Buddha apparently in a psychic manner. The Pañchavaggīyas were at first hostile but were later converted.

After this point there is no continuous narrative of Buddha's activities in the Nikāyas. The narrative in the Vinaya, however, goes further and describes the conversion of Yasa and his friends, the sending forth of the first missionaries, the conversion of Kassapa—the leader of the Jaṭilas—the delivery of the Fire sermon, the conversion of King Bimbisāra and the conversion of Sāriputta and Moggalāna—the former disciples of Sañjaya.

A systematic description of the traditional account of the days of Buddha's ministry has been given by Kern and Thomas and N. Dutt.¹² The tradition, however, is for the greater part post-canonical. The authenticity of much of the information supplied by them must remain uncertain in the absence of earlier evidence though some information about the spread of Buddha's doctrines during this period may be gleaned from the Nikāyas and the Vinaya. From them it appears that geographically the sphere of Buddha's activities embraced principally the kingdoms of Kosala and Magadha.

Reconstruction of the Original Teachings of the Buddha

There has been much controversy over the 'correct' interpretation of such points of Buddhist doctrine as

Pratītyasamutpāda and Nirvāṇa. Now the ancient canonical texts are themselves not quite agreed on these points which is intelligible enough since the texts in question are spread over a considerable period of time. The 'original gospel' assumed various forms in the course of its development. Therefore Professor Pande has tried to reconstruct the original teaching of the Buddha by removing the webs which enveloped the original sayings.

Pande begins his search for the original teachings of the Buddha with an analysis of the Four Noble Truths. That the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths was included in the original teachings of the Buddha can hardly be doubted. The weight and importance attached to it in all texts prove it, though Mrs. Rhys Davids held a contrary view. In any case her skepticism has not met general approval. Her view that the word *dukkha* used in the texts points merely to the ills of body and mind and lacks a conception of ills in the spiritual realm also does not seem to be convincing. According to Professor Pande, 'such expressions as define *dukkha* in terms of birth, disease, old age and death should. . . be understood symbolically, not literally. When the Buddhist, contemplating life, was sorely distressed to see its limitation and uncertainties, he was surely feeling what may be called spiritual discontent. . . he did not mean merely to speak of a discontent of body and mind, but rather of discontent with body and mind, and this latter is the form of all spiritual discontent'.¹³

Pratītyasamutpāda or the law of dependent origination was a great contribution of the Buddha to the philosophical thought of India. That the formula in some form or the other goes back to the Buddha himself is proved by the universally recognized importance of the idea, its equal obscurity, and its occurrence in some of

the most ancient passages of the Nikāyas. The Buddha inculcated the belief that the universe is *anichcha* (impermanent or ever-changing). At the same time, he maintained that it is *dukkha* and in startling opposition to the Upanishadic philosophy also apparently taught that it is *anatta*, i.e. without a non-changing abiding entity called *attā* (atman) or soul.

Since there is nothing permanent and everything is in a state of flux, it automatically follows that the soul as a self-subsisting entity does not exist. Soon after the *upasampadā* of the *Pañchavargīya* Bhikshus, the Buddha gave a discourse to them on the theory of *anātman* (*anatta*) and emphatically stated that the heresy of individuality is due to the misapprehension of one of the five constituents (*khandhas*) as the soul. When asked directly, the Buddha is reported to have refused to answer the question about the existence of the *ātman*, either positively or negatively. Professor Pande opines that in this regard the *Mādhyamika* approach seems to be the only correct one. When the Buddha did not speak positively or negatively about the *ātman* or the *Thathāgata*, he indicated his position most precisely. '*Ātman* and *Anātman*, existence and non-existence, do not possess ultimate adequacy. One must avoid such "extreme" or categorical characterizations and try to follow the Middle Path in Metaphysics as in Ethics.'

The Doctrine of *saṃsāra* or rebirth has a prominent place in the ancient systems of Indian thought. Most of the Indian religions adhere to it in some form or other. Professor Pande believes that the doctrine of rebirth originated among the *Munis* and *Śramanas* of the Vedic age. From them it was adopted by the Upanishadic thinkers. Buddhism accepts this concept of rebirth but, unlike Upanishadic thinkers, it rejects the notion of the transmigration of a spiritual entity. According to Buddhism, there

is the rebirth of personality or of the psycho-physical complex—the *nāmarūpa skandhas*.

Karmavāda or theory of moral determinism represents one of the prime themes in Indian philosophical speculations and social life. As noticed earlier, according to Pande 'the idea of an inflexible moral law extending far beyond the grave' was quite beyond the ken of the priests of the *Brāhmaṇa* books. But the full realization of the implications of the theory of *karman*, Pande argues, was tantamount to a complete revision of the old Vedic eschatology and was destined to usher in a silent revolution. In the period subsequent to the Upanishads, the doctrine of *karman* acquired immense significance. Buddha's contemporaries held a variety of views on the subject of the origin of *dukkha*. The most important of these was the theory of *karman* held by the Buddha himself, Mahāvīra and the philosophers of some other Śramaṇa sects.

For the way to *Nirvāṇa*, the Vinaya uses two terms, *paṭipada* (*pratipadā*) and *magga* (*mārga*) side by side. In the opinion of Pande, it will be a mistake to suppose that the Buddha preached the Way in the form of a neat and precise formula. According to the traditional view, the three sections of the Way—*sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā*—were divided into eightfold path (*Aṭṭhāṅgiko Maggo*) by the Buddha himself. Many passages from the *Nikāyas*—the most important ones occurring in the first Sermon—are quoted in support of this view. But, according to Pande, had the Buddha himself taught the *Aṣṭāṅgika Mārga* then, in view of the later fame of the idea, a more positive proof of it would have been preserved. 'In fact, it would not seem wiser', he opines, 'to attribute the formula of the eightfold path to Buddha himself in the absence of more convincing evidence. It is probable that

he spoke only of the middle way between the two extremes of sense-pleasures (Kama sukha) and austerities (Attakilamatho), while it 'crystallized' as eightfold path later.

As regards Nibbāna or nirvaṇa it is regarded as the *summum bonum* for a Buddhist. The Buddha himself deliberately avoided any positive answer to the question: 'what is nibbāna?' He regarded it as beyond any discussion (atarkāvachara) avyakṛta or akathaniya. According to the Mahāvagga, the truth or dhamma realized by the Buddha at the time of Enlightenment consisted of the paṭichchasamuppāda and nibbāna. The attainment of nirvāṇa makes one different from ordinary mortals. He becomes omniscient, all-enlightened, and released; he remains unpolluted by everything and enjoys perfect calm. According to G.C. Pande, the evidence of the Buddhist texts 'cumulatively suggests an Absolutist position and supports the Mādhyamika interpretation's. As on his death the Buddha was like a flame blown out by the wind, he could do no more for his disciples; he therefore urged them to take the dhamma for their refuge (śarana). It tends to make the trīśaraṇa formula—the Buddhist confession of faith (I go for refuge to the Buddha; I go for refuge to the Doctrine; I go for refuge to the Order) meaningless though the antiquity of the formula can hardly be doubted for it is frequently mentioned in the canon and occurs in the Bhabru edict of Aśoka.

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- Mahābhārata* has been discussed by Winterniz, M., *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, Delhi, 1990, pp. 505–08.
3. *Origins*, Preface, pp. iii–iv.
 4. Oldenberg, ZDMG, 1898, pp. 613–32. Franke, *Journal of Pali Text Society*, 1908, pp. 1–80.
 5. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 5.
 6. *Origins*, p. 251.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
 8. Ahmedabad, 1978.
 9. Kane, P.V., *history of Dharmaśāstra*, II, pt. i, p. 418.
 10. *Op.cit.*, p. 74.
 11. *Origins*, p. 381.
 12. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 23 ff; Thomas, *Life of the Buddha*, Ch. VIII and IX; Datt, N., *Early Monastic Buddhism*, I, Ch. ix.
 13. *Origins*, p. 41.

3

Buddha and Early Buddhism

S.R. BHATT

*Caratha bhikkhave cārikam
Bahujanahitāya bahujana sukhāya lokānukampāya
Atthāya, hitāya, sukhāya
Devamanussānam*

O Monks! Move around for the well-being of every one, for the happiness of every one, showering compassion on the entire world; for the good, for the welfare, for the happiness of divine and human.

Vinaya Pitaka I. 23

The advent of Śākyamuni, the Buddha, initially the light of India and Asia and now of the entire world, has been a significant event in the history of world culture and civilization. Born in a princely family with all material prosperity and physical comforts, he was awakened by the pain and suffering, finitude and evanescence of the mundane life. After intensive study, deep reflections and profound meditation, the Buddha gained insight into the nature of reality and the phenomenal world. Having attained enlightenment, he did not remain self-centred. He

was not content with his own emancipation and longed for the liberation of the suffering humanity. He showed to the humanity the sure path of Nirvāṇa, a way to eradicate suffering and to escape from the labyrinth of the cycle of birth and death (*bhava cakra*), which consisted of a symbiosis of wisdom and conduct, ethics and meditative practice. He realized the 'Four Noble Truths', and practiced them in the form of 'Noble Eight-fold Path' in his own life and subsequently enlightened people about it. That is why he was regarded as a great healer, a liberator (*bheṣajya guru* or *tāyin*). In the words of Rhys Davids, 'He was the greatest, and wisest, and best of that long line of reformers who have tried to infuse new strength into the religious life of India' (Buddhism, p. 83).

II

The Buddha has been one of the finest proponents of Indian culture. He was an inheritor of an old tradition as well as a creator of a new outlook. In his own words, 'Even so have I, O Monk, seen an ancient way, an ancient road, traversed by the supremely enlightened ones of the olden times' (*Samyutta Nikāya* II, pp. 106-7). The Buddha was a well-read and well-versed person with a critical bent of mind and subtle logical acumen. He was well-steeped in the Vedic lore and drew his ideas and inspirations from it. He was fully exposed to the rich and varied cultural milieu of his time. The point to be noted is that he was not born in an intellectual void and his ideas did not grow in a cultural vacuum or in isolation. In fact, they sprang up as resurgent thoughts protesting against the distortions in the Vedic lore which crept in later on in the vast temporal canvas of Indian history. It should be made clear that the Buddha did not condemn the Vedas but only those aberrations which

were violative of Vedic spirit and about which even the Upaniṣads raised their voice. The protest against violence in sacrifice can be cited as an example, as it is expressed in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* or *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*. Of course, the Buddha was more vocal and emphatic.

It will be pertinent to state that at the time of the birth of the Buddha, there was no existence of what we now call as 'Hinduism'. The word 'Hinduism' is a late coinage. It has been a name assigned to later Brāhmaṇic tradition but initially it meant 'Indian'. Indian culture was known as *Zendu* in some parts of Asia and the word 'Hindu' is derived from this. What we now call as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, etc., are distinct phases of the same pluralistic Indian culture. They possess the same spiritual genus and as species they differ only in emphasis. They share the same stock of culture, have a common source of ideas, beliefs and practices and, therefore, inspite of a shift in emphasis, they have no cleavages. They are like different branches stemming from the same root. Perceptive and unbiased Western indologists like Macnicol, Mr. and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Mrs. Stevenson and many others, apart from several Indian scholars, have very categorically avered this fact and have adduced evidences in support.

It can be said in the words of Dr S. Radhakrishnan that, 'Buddha did not feel that he was announcing a new religion. He was born, grew up and died a Hindu. He was restating with a new emphasis the ancient ideals of Indo-Aryan civilization' (Foreword to *2500 Years of Buddhism*, p. 68, Government of India, Publication Division). Dr S. Mukherjee in his paper on Buddhism in *The Cultural Heritage of India* states, 'It will not be incorrect to say that every Hindu is a Buddhist. Buddhism has permeated the entire religious and philosophical thought of

India and percolated into the deepest recesses of the religious mentality of the present-day Hindus' (Ed. Haridas Bhattacharya, Vol. I, p. 575, Kolkata, 1958). It was not for nothing that long before Varaha, Agni and other Purāṇas accepted Buddha as an Avatāra of Viṣṇu, the most significant Mahāyāna Buddhist text *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* itself identified the Buddha with Viṣṇu and Rāma. In the Hindu tradition, all honours due to other incarnations of Viṣṇu were also accorded to the Buddha. He was worshipped along with Viṣṇu or Śiva or as Viṣṇu or Śiva, by offering flowers, food, cloths, incense, prayers, etc. The Purāṇic pantheon and mythology were adopted in Buddhism and all Hindu gods and demi-gods were made to be engaged in the services of the Buddha. The *Gīta Govinda* of Jayadeva, the temples in Bihar, Orissa, Nepal, etc., are eloquent testimony to this absorption of Buddhism in the broad Hindu fold.

III

The Buddha was a great social reformer. He was opposed to the caste system and social hierarchy. He accepted the vocational distinctions prevalent in the society but accorded equal status to all the *varṇas*. He declared, '*Ime cattāro vaṇṇa samasamā honti. Samano Gotamo cātuvvaṇṇim suddidm paññāpeti*', i.e. 'All the four *varṇas* are exactly the same. One who is a *śramāṇa gotama* recognizes all as equally pure' (*Dīgha Nikāya* I, 99–100).

The Buddha was not ill-disposed towards the brāhmaṇas and, in fact, longed to be brāhmaṇa in the next birth. The history of Buddhist thought in India testifies the fact that most of the prominent Buddhist thinkers were brāhmaṇas. Of course, there were fierce verbal exchanges between Buddhist and non-Buddhist scholars and votaries but Śaiva Vaiṣṇava conflicts were also there not

only in words but also physically. The Buddha explicitly said that one becomes a brāhmaṇa or a śūdra not by birth but by deeds. Notwithstanding all this it must be emphasized that the Buddha, like the Vedic and Upaniṣadic thinkers, was a great champion of egalitarianism and democratic mode of thinking and living. Oecumenistic outlook was deeply ingrained in him. This gave rise to Buddhist syncretism which enabled Buddhism to coexist with other national cultures of Asia.

IV

Buddhism, like any other system of philosophical thought in India, has its springs and moorings in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic thought. As H. Zimmer has rightly remarked, 'The Buddha remained within the sphere of India's traditional philosophy' (*Philosophies of India*, pp. 530-1, New York, 1951). The *Nāsadīya Sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* explicitly refers to *sat* (from which *Satkāryavāda* evolved) and *asat* (from which *Asatkāryavāda* evolved which culminated in the theory of *pratityasamutpāda*) and proposes to transcend the two viewpoints (an idea which was formulated as *madhyama pratipad*). In the *Chāndogya* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads*, the doctrine of *Nāmarūpa* and the distinction between *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra* have been clearly propounded. The *Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣad* advocates the ideals of *Nirātmā* and *Śunya* as the *summum bonum* on life (Chapter VI) *The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha Rāmāyana* (II, 5, 6, 7 and 16) avers the same. The same advocacy is found in the *Mahābhārata*, *Śāntiparva*, 191, 23. The idea of *nissvabhāvatā* of all empirical objects is expounded in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Of course, credit goes to the Buddha in giving these ideas the most effective formulation. A.E. Gough in *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads* (p. 187) remarks that 'Buddhism is the philosophy of the

Upaniṣads with Brahman left out'. K.S. Murty writes that: 'Marya Falk and others Conclusively demonstrated' (in D.L. Snellgroves words Buddhist Himalaya, p. 284, n. 4) 'the origin of Buddhist religious experience in the general context of the Upaniṣads' (Foreword to *Bodhi-Raśmi*). The Vedāntic and the Buddhist thoughts are so very akin that some Buddhist thinkers were regarded as 'crypto-vedāntins' while some Vedāntic thinkers were regarded as crypto-Buddhists: The *Purāṇas* and some later Vedāntic thinkers have opined that conceptually the Brahman of Vedānta and the Śūnya of Mādhyamika are the same. The idea of Brahman as the source and sustenance of the entire universe is similar to the idea of *Bhūtataṭhatā* and *Dharmakāya* in Mahāyāna Buddhism. D.T. Suzuki in *Outlines of Mahāyāna* ably demonstrates this. Hajime Nakamura, a great authority on Buddhism and Vedānta opines that, 'the realization of Nirvāṇa can be explained as taking refuge in the true self of one's own. On this point the Buddha's assertion is very similar to that of the Upaniṣads and of Vedānta philosophy. But the latter's self (*Ātman*) was rather metaphysical, whereas the Buddha's self was genuinely practical [*Buddhism in the Modern World* (eds.) H. Dumoulin and J.C. Malarado, p. 18, New York and London, 1976]. The same is reiterated by Josquin péirez-Remón in his book *Self and Not-self in Early Buddhism* (Mouton, the Hague, 1980, pp. 304-5). Th. Stcherbatsky in his *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (p. 63) writes that there is but little difference between Buddhism and Vedānta. 'One need not multiply citations in support from erudite Buddhist scholars on this point. We have to properly understand and appreciate the concepts of *nairātmya* and *anātma* in the specific context in which they have been expounded, keeping in view the *Buddhavacana* and the later developments in the Mahāyāna.'

V

The history of Indian philosophical thought evinces an intense exchange of ideas (*vāda*), both constructive and critical, between and among various systems of thoughts, including Buddhism. It goes to the credit of Buddhism and Nyāya to develop an elaborate method of *vāda* for this purpose and we have many subtle and sophisticated works written on the topic. The debates in the form of *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa* or *siddhānta* among Indian thinkers belonging to different schools of thought have been very fierce but illuminating, which have resulted in mutual corrections as also enrichment. There have been mutual borrowings and thus improvement in ideas. For example, the well-known four *Brahmavihāras* professed and practiced by the Buddha are derived from the *Yoga Sūtras* of Pātañjali. It is indisputable that the Buddha was initiated in the yogic practice by Ālara Kālām and Udraka Rāmaputra. The Buddhist *vipassanā* is only a specific form of varieties of Yoga systems available to us. The Buddha immensely contributed to the propagation and refinement of Yoga. There is a close affinity between the Sāṅkhya philosophy and teachings of the Buddha not only with regard to the analysis of suffering and the way to its eradication but also about the structure of reality and transcendent nature of matter. The idea of *paramāṇu* is shared by the Buddha with the Vaiśeṣikas. In epistemology, the concepts of *Āpta*, *svaprakāśa*, *svataḥ prāmāṇya*, etc., are common to Buddhism and Mimāṃsā. The fact is that all the Indian philosophical systems developed in a mutual give and take situation and no one single system should be approached in isolation from the rest. Mutual borrowing is a healthy attitude and it has been inculcated in the Indian mind right from the Vedic times.

VI

The Brāhmaṇic and Śrāmaṇic traditions have their basis in the Vedic thought and both were prevalent and significantly interacting well before the advent of the Buddha on the scene. The contribution of the Buddha was to purge the Brāhmaṇic tradition of its ritualistic stereotypes, sacrificial violence and other impurities. He founded a religious order, i.e. *Samgha* and gave a new turn to the institution of *samṇyāsa*. For entry into the *Samgha* three vows were to be undertaken. But this apart, there were certain rules and regulations of the monastic life which were to be followed. There were positive and negative prescriptions and one who is to be initiated in the *Samgha* was taught about these by the preceptors. Those who transgressed the rules were given suitable punishments. *Pātimokkhasutta* and several other Pāli treatises deal with them in detail. The functioning of the *Samgha* was democratic. The authority of the *Samgha* was supreme and binding on all the inmates. As admission to the *Samgha* was simple, so was exit from it. A monk was always at liberty to return to his household life. In the beginning women were not admitted in the *Samgha* but later on they were also initiated in the order but with a different code known as *Bhikkhunīpātimokkha*. Separate *bhikkhuni Samgha* were established. The monks and nuns were required to lead an ascetic life of unworldliness and were asked to spend most of their time in meditation in the monastery.

VII

The Buddha was a wise and a practical person fully knowledgeable of human psychology. He not only discerned the inner cravings of human heart and intellect,

he also knew the logic and language in which he was to communicate with them. So he gave his discourses in the language in which people were conversant. But later on, Buddhist scholars took recourse to Sanskrit or mixed Sanskrit. Geographical distances also required resorting to Sanskrit which was perhaps the *Lingua franka* at that time. The story of two brāhmaṇa brothers of Puruṣapura (present Peshawar in Pakistan) recorded in the Cullavagga testifies the need to put the *Buddhavacanas* in *Chāndasa*, i.e. Vedic Sanskrit. Among the followers of the Buddha, brāhmaṇas were quite prominent and they preferred to use Sanskrit. Another reason could be the ease with which subtle and sophisticated ideas were to be expressed and communicated and Sanskrit was handy for this job for the scholiasts.

VIII

The Buddha was not in favour of believing in a Creator-God, nor did he like any cult or hero worship. He did not claim divinity or divine powers in him. This is the general impression about him. However, subsequently, in the course of time, he was deified and his worship commenced. Large size images of the Buddha were constructed. The Puraṇic pantheon and mythology were accepted wholesale and complicated religious symbolism was developed. The same Puraṇic Yakṣas, Yakṣiṇis, Dikpālas, Devatās, Nāgas, Kubera, Indra, Brahmā, Prajāpati, Gandharvas, Apsarās, Rākṣaṣas, Piśācas, etc., found a place in the Buddhist mythology. Supernatural powers were ascribed to the Buddha. This was more so in the later Buddhism. One thing is definite that the Buddha was a spiritualist and not a materialist. His silence on the question of the existence of God is to be interpreted as his non-acceptance of the idea of Creator-God.

IX

It is a widespread opinion that Buddhism became extinct in or was banished from India, the land of its origin and development. It is perhaps not a correct way of looking at the situation. Buddhism was an offshoot of Indian culture and not an upstart movement originating *de novo*. So the Indian psyche accepted and imbibed the ideas propagated by the Buddha as something worthwhile. It was quite natural, therefore, that Buddha's teachings got assimilated in the mainstream Indian culture. The interfusion was so deep and pervasive that there was no need for its separate existence in India. All aspects of 'Hindu culture' became Buddhistic by the acceptance of the main doctrinal and practical tenets of Buddhism. As Professor S. Mukherjee has opined in the paper referred to earlier, Buddhism may not exist in India as a separate sect (of course, now it does as a result of its revival by Dr Ambedkar), but Hinduism is Buddhism and Buddhism is Hinduism. The so-called decline of Buddhism is a mistaken view. It is assimilation and absorption of something which is our own and not something alien. As Dr S. Radhakrishnan has stated, 'The Buddha left his footprints on the soil of India and his mark on the soul of the country'. India is Buddhistic through and through, whether we believe it or not. It is not a matter of argumentation but of feeling.

Buddhism is alive in the deepest recesses of the Hindu mind and it cannot be extinct so long as Hinduism is extant. One has not to see the legacy of Buddhism in the national emblems in the form of *Dharma Cakra* or *śiṃhanāda*, or in the sectarian followers, but one has to look for it in the very cultural ethos of the country, in our modes of thinking and ways of living. If one wants to see cleavages and chasms one is free to do so but this does

not seem to be a healthy approach. There have been vested interests to take such a stance but there have also been sane non-divisive approaches.

X

While concluding this article, it may be said that the Buddha is one of the most revolutionary thinkers and the holiest persons ever lived on the earth. He has been a beacon light not only for India or Asia but for the entire world. His advocacy of pursuit of *Prajñā* and practice of *Karunā*, his vision of self-sameness with everyone (*Parātma samatā*), and zealous longing for eradication of suffering of others as one's own (*Parātma parivartana*) cross all barriers of race, creed, country and even humanity. His benevolent teachings of universal compassion and cosmic goodwill, his emphasis on the noble virtues of *Maitrī*, *Karunā*, *Mudita* and *Upekṣā* known as *Brahmavihāras* (i.e., living and working for totality), all these have a significant message for the present-day distracted humankind suffering from exhaustion of spirit and languishing in the narrow and rigid confinements of ego-centricism, parochialism and disastrous materialistic consumerism. In the present times, our traditional cultures are facing terrible danger of extinction under the perverting impact of the so-called modernization which is divisive, depriving and destructive. For the first time since their inception, such a large-scale threatening situation has arisen. We have not so far cared to share a common platform to meet the challenge in a decisive and global way, may be due to ignorance, negligence, self-centeredness or bewitchment with modernism, etc. A time has come for the beginning of a cultural renaissance for which the teachings of the Buddha can play a vital and pivotal role. A renewal of cross-cultural interactions under their banner

will not only help and contribute to mutual understanding, mutual empathy and mutual enrichment, it will also consolidate our common spiritual roots and resources. It will enable us to appreciate the spiritual, holistic and integral perspective as against the divisive and dichotomous world-view. If the humanity looks back to its hoary past to discern whatever is true, good and beautiful, whatever is living and beneficial in it, the wisdom of those times will help with greater intimacy and more truly to our mutual well-being.

4

G.C. Pande on Jaina Ethics

MUKUL RAJ MEHTA

Professor G.C. Pande has presented his thoughts regarding almost all Indian philosophical schools. Jainism, being an important part of Indian history, culture and philosophy, has also attracted Pande to think and state his views on it. I understand that his first work related to Jainism, appeared in April 1963 in the form of an article titled 'The Life of The Upper Classes in The Earliest Jaina Literature'. It was published by Rajasthan Jaina Sabha in Mahavir Jayanti Smarika, which was edited by Pt. Chain Sukhdas Nyayatirth. Pande's view in the article is that the earliest Jainist texts are so exclusively occupied with the life of the ascetic that it is impossible to glean from them any considerable information regarding its secular culture. There is also the additional difficulty that information about secular society is fuller in those parts of the canon which abound in myths and legends of a very uncertain chronological position.

Consequently, in order to build a composite picture of society by utilizing all the information scattered in the Jainist canon¹ would hardly be a permissible procedure; it may not give us a true picture of any particular time

or place. It must be remembered that the Jainist canon took its present shape in the period from c. 300 BC to the fifth century AD, a period of much political and, hence, probably much social change.²

A lecture on 'Role of The Idea of *Kriyavada* in Jaina Logic' was delivered by Professor Pande in the University of Rajasthan in 1974. Pande also delivered two lectures on Jainism, which were held under the auspices of Shri Raj Krishen Jain Memorial Lectures Committee, University of Delhi, on 3 and 4 February 1977. The lectures titled 'Jaina Ethical Tradition and Its Relevance' and 'The Jaina Conception of Knowledge and Reality and Its Relevance to Scientific Thought' were well attended and highly appreciated by the newly formed and fast-emerging Idological circles of Delhi.³ These lectures were published by the University of Delhi in 1977 in a book form entitled 'R.K. Jain Memorial Lectures on Jainism', of which very few copies exist today.

In February 1977, Pande delivered three lectures in the L.D. Lecture series at L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad. These lectures were published by the Institute in 1978 in a book titled *Sramana Tradition: Its History and Contribution to Indian Culture*. The first lecture deals with the *Sramanic* outlook on life and its impact on Vedic thought as developed in the *Upanisads*. The second lecture clearly brings out the salient features of the moral and social outlook of *Sramanism*. The learned scholar maintains that the *Dharma*, which *Asoka* sought to preach in his edicts, represents the quintessence of the *Sramanic* ethos for lay life. He concludes the lecture by declaring that *Sramanism* constitutes a system of universal, rational and ethical religion which is wholly non-sectarian, as applicable and relevant today as it was 2,500 years ago. The third lecture is devoted to the *Sramanic* critique of

Brahmamism. The author acquaints us with the rational *Sramanic* criticism of casteism, validity of the Vedas and the idea of God. His concluding words are memorable. He says: '*Sramanic* atheism is not a variety of irreligion. It faces the evil and suffering of life squarely and attributes it to human failings rather than to the mysterious design of an unknown being. It stresses the inexorableness of the moral law. No prayers and worship are of any avail against the force of *Karman*. It emphasizes self-reliance in the quest of salvation. Man needs to improved himself by a patient training of the will and the purification of feelings. Such purification leads to an inward illumination of which the power is innate in the soul or mind.' This is quite different from the Vedic view where illumination comes from outside, either from an eternally revealed word or from the grace of God.

Pande's introduction to the three lectures is thought-provoking and illuminating. Therein he clearly brings out the distinction between culture and civilization, and shows how they are inextricably intertwined in the historical process. Again, he successfully attempts to demonstrate the origin, development and dialectical interweaving of two attitudes of *Pravrtti* and *Nivrtti* in Indian culture.⁴

On the invitation of Prakrit Bharati Sansthan, Professor Pande delivered six lectures in the Centre for Jaina Studies, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur in 1984. These lectures were on topics like 'The Vedic Hierarchical Theory and Its Jaina Critique', 'Political Ideas and the Ethos', 'The Jaina Puranic Tradition', 'The Tradition of *Niti*' 'The Jaina *Niti* Tradition: Hemachandra' and 'Concluding Reflections'. These lectures were published in a book form entitled *Jaina Political Thought* from Prakrit Bharati Sansthan and Centre for Jaina Studies jointly in 1984. This book was well appreciated by scholars, being a rare

book of its own kind. Professor Pande says regarding his approach on the subject that, 'By Jaina political thought I mean political thought consistent with the basic principles of Jaina religion and philosophy. The political ideas expressed in avowedly political works by Jaina authors claim to belong to this category but do not exhaust it. Reflection on political reality and ideals in the light of the Jaina tradition indeed constitute an inexhaustible vein because it includes within itself creative possibilities.'

Pande says, 'It may be objected that my definition of Jaina political thought is too wide. A good deal of political thought being purely secular and technical would be consistent with Jainism or for the matter of that with any religion.'⁵

In this article I will mention some of the thoughts of Pande regarding Jainism on the basis of his one comprehensive article entitled 'The Jaina Ethical Tradition and Its Relevance'. The origin of the Jaina tradition has been generally attributed in critical scholarship to a reforming or protestant movement from within the earliest Vedic tradition. Pande had argued nearly 55 years ago (at the age of 24) that we ought to accept the existence of an ascetic tradition in India prior to the sixth century BC, a tradition which was contemporary with but independent of the Vedic tradition.⁶ Since then, several scholars have tended to identify this hypothetical non-Vedic ascetic tradition with the Jaina tradition prior to *Mahavira* and *Parsva*.⁷ The resultant is only a reaffirmation of Jaina tradition under the aegis of supposedly historical scholarship. Pande says, 'Personally, I would like to sound a note of caution from the point of view of critical history. I have no doubt that the Jaina tradition goes beyond *Parsva* but how far and in what shape, remains wholly speculative. Vedic texts do refer to ascetics who appear

to have been different from the usual seers and sages but we cannot identify them further. The important thing to note in this context is that the Vedic tradition accepted asceticism only gradually and with some reluctance.'

Pande says that it is thus fair to assume that while the older Vedic tradition emphasized the values of social obligations and their fulfilment through ritual and sacrament preparing man for wisdom, ultimately there existed by its side another tradition, less known and fugitive, the tradition of Sramanism which was characterized by its doctrine of *Samsara* and its attendant attitudes of pessimism and mendicancy. Now an analysis of the earliest portions of the Jaina canon reveals that Sramanism, thus characterized, could well summarize the original *Nirgrantha* doctrine. In this sense, it would be correct to say that the Jaina tradition gives us the earliest and most authentic version of an ancient Sramanic stream of thought which can be distinguished from the well-known orthodox Vedic tradition. How challenging the situation was, we must seek to realize through an effort of the imagination in view of the habit acquired by our later experience of treating such contradiction as part of a syncretic harmony where the orthodox and the heterodox, Vedic and non-Vedic tradition cooperate as elements of a larger and catholic Indian tradition. Theory and practice of Jaina ethics would not be intelligible unless it is placed in this socio-historical milieu. The *Nirgranthas* challenged the absoluteness of social obligations, relating them to the lower, egoistical nature and passions of man. Against these social obligations, they placed the obligation of man to follow his own spiritual nature.

The Jainas, however, strongly held that action has reality and relative freedom and that it needs to be regulated by principles which can be discovered through both spiri-

tual intuition and the tradition of wisdom in which such an intuition has found expression.

Regarding the analysis of Action, Professor Pande states that the Jaina view is said to be the affirmation of the soul, affirmation of action, affirmation of the world.⁸ Action or *Kriya* has its source in the innate spontaneity or power (*virya*) of the soul. This purely spiritual power of the soul provides the apperceptive focus (*upayoga*) to the mental activity which includes diverse conative states and impulses and their resultant disposition and effects. Mental activity, in turn, induces physical motion and the result is the inflow of material particles, in particular, of the infinite and ubiquitous subtle particles of *Karman* which contact the soul and cover up its parts in diverse ways.⁹ This is the process of Yoga and Bandha.¹⁰ From the innate freedom of the spiritual will to its getting helplessly caught in the meshes of *Karman*, this is the process of action which generates *Samsara*. Right conduct is the reversal of this process, leading from bondage to freedom.

It follows, thus, that action is a real complexity of spiritual, mental and physical elements with a variable degree of freedom in such a manner that the complex may be tending towards its erosion or enhancement.¹¹ In as far as the soul forgets its true nature and follows the directive of desires and passions, it moves downwards and outwards into the vortex of matter and into greater ignorance, bondage and suffering. At every level, action remains the expression of the soul's energy and its power to cause a real change (*Parinama*) to itself and its environments.¹² When the soul acts through a passion-tainted mind, it gets involved in the obstructive accumulations of matter but it can start shedding this burden and move inwards and upwards.

Action is conceived as twofold, as motion (*Parispanda*) and as change of state (*Parinama*).¹³ The soul, in its state of freedom, has an innate upward motion¹⁴ and a pure change of state in terms of the operation of its infinite qualities of power, knowledge and bliss. In the state of bondage, the soul is the cause of its own good and evil mental transformations and the motions of the physical body are appropriated by it. The basic activity of the soul is its casual functioning in relation to its own states, the making of the soul of itself through its own functioning.¹⁵ In all its psychic activity through which the soul determines itself, it functions through its own power and remains within a process of self-determination though its resultant accumulation of matter functions as a concomitant causal factor.¹⁶

At the same time, action effects a real change in the world. Although action simultaneously connects the soul and the world, the soul need not abandon its autonomy wholly. The reality of action and the autonomy of the soul in this regard are, thus, fundamental Jaina tenets and form the basis of Jaina ethics. Although common sense does not doubt the everyday experience of the reality of free will and of human action affecting the environment, a number of schools and sects in the days of *Mahavira* and also later questioned the truth of such assumptions and advocated naturalistic, deterministic and illusionistic views. The Jainas vigorously contested these ideas.

Regarding the doctrine of *Karman*, Pande says that the general answer to the moral question accepted by all the non-materialistic schools was in terms of the law of *Karman*. The doctrine of *Karman* extended the casual law to the moral realm. It held that good and evil deeds have a necessary causal connection with the experience of

happiness and unhappiness. Since this is intended in a more than psychological sense there was obviously need for a mediating agency which would connect the *Karman* with its result which might be greatly separated from it in time and space. Brahmanical systems tended to postulate God as the agency which rewards or punishes good and evil deeds. Jainism, like Buddhism, however, attributed an unseen power to *Karman* itself which brought about its results at the appropriate time. One implication of this doctrine is that the distinction of good and evil must be held to be objective and independent of subjective relativity. Another implication is that action must be held to create an unconscious and persistent force which remains connected with the psyche of the agent and has the capacity of directing it into situations appropriate to its own fruition and controlling the affective reactions of the experience arising from such situations. Beginning as a state of the mind or *Bhavakarman*, action generates a bodily resultant, *Dravyakarman* or *Pudgalakarman*.¹⁷ The fact that good and evil are originally distinct states of the mind is commonly accepted by both the Jainas and the Buddhists.¹⁸ The distinction is not one of obedience or disobedience to a divinely proclaimed law but one of innate quality which may be subjectively perceived in terms of emotional direction. The Jainas and the Buddhists, however, differ in relation to the nature of the force generated by action. The Buddhists think of it as an unconscious psychic force, a latent disposition—*Vasana* or *Samskara*—which is responsible for the projection of the world that is appropriate to the psyche. It is in the idealistic school of Buddhism that this doctrine becomes fully consistent and reaches its highest effectiveness. The Jainas, however, think of the resultant of psychic action in terms of an accumulation of matter which is absorbed

by the soul. This matter is subtle and invisible consisting of extremely minute particles which form infinite aggregate (*Vargana*). These particulars attach themselves to different points on the location of the soul.¹⁹ These Karmic material aggregates are of eight basic types (*mula-prakrit*) and mature on different occasions.²⁰ Their maturing either obscures or distorts the faculties of the soul.

This materialistic interpretation of *Karman* is quite distinctive of the Jaina tradition. It has been condemned as primitive and, then again, admired as scientific. The infinite will or *Virya* of the pure spirit is reduced and transformed in the state of bondage to the threefold Yoga, viz., physical, mental and vocal activity which constantly depends on the operation of material factors. There can be no doubt that this way of looking at *Karman* as involving an unconscious force arising out of the soul's willingness, but limiting its freedom, linking together the psychic and physical processes and determining the course of experience in terms of its affective dimension, is a plausible hypothesis seeking to explain the facts of moral life.²¹

Free will and determinism are, however, so interlocked that the complete rejection of either involves the other in difficulties. The Jaina answer to the paradox of action is itself dialectical. To be is to change and yet persist²² and the soul is as much subject to this law as matter. The soul and matter are directly the causes of their own changes and are, in this sense, free from heteronomous determination or interaction with something absolutely distinct.²³ Nevertheless, they have a beginningless association and their changes provide occasions for the changes of each other. In this sense, just as reality involves change as well as persistence, action involves autonomy as well as heteronomy. The distinction of two levels—*Vyavahara-naya*

and *Niscaya-naya*—is accepted but both are accepted as real. The soul's association with matter is as real as its dissociation in liberation. While an erroneous action strengthens this bondage, the right action tends towards liberation. In the state of liberation this duality of right and wrong action is ended and replaced by a kind of action which does not produce any Karmic results.

The effort at withdrawal from *Samsara* constitutes the next level. This effort, as is well-known, is twofold. It involves restraint or *Samvara* and rejection or *Nirjara*. This process, again, may be practised in a whole time and wholehearted manner, or under the constraint of ordinary worldly life, thus giving rise to the two streams of morality, that of the householder and that of the ascetic. Above these two lies the level of *Paramartha* or *Niscaya-naya*. To this level belongs the life of the perfected ones where the soul shines forth in the glory of its innate omniscience and wholly passionless and selfless spontaneity. If the soul is externally entangled at the first level functioning as a *Bahiratman*, and seeks to withdraw into itself as an *Antaratman* at the second level, it can only be described as functioning spiritually and yet cosmically at the third level, the level of *Paramatman*. The meaning and relevance of ethics varies at these three levels of the soul.

According to Pande, the Jainas formulate quite clearly that desire and aversion, pleasure and pain, are not pure psychic elements. On the contrary, they depend on bodily structures and objects and their presence misdirects the psyche into the ways of spiritual evil. Since sensuous desire and pleasures are radically evil, the moral quest becomes a negative spiritual quest. To understand the evil implied in psychophysical activity and experience and seek to abandon it, this becomes the objective of the

wise man. But the Jainas go beyond mere askesis and consider bodily life as an ultimate evil which must be shed through the destruction of *Karman* or *Nirjara*. *Nirjara* is attained by external asceticism including the mortification of the flesh and the practice of virtues, study, renunciation and meditation.

Speaking about the spiritual development, Pande says that moral life in the usual sense is only a prelude to spiritual transcendence. Training in the practice of virtues, the strenuous abandonment of all natural life, total transcendence into the pure perfection of the spirit—these are the three stages of ethico-spiritual development. The Jainas have mapped out this entire development into fourteen stages called the *Gunasthanas*. *Gunas* stand for specific characteristics of the Jivas as constituted by faith, knowledge and conduct while *Sthana* indicates a stage of purity. *Gunasthanas*, thus, stand for particular stages of purity through which the character of the soul evolves. False belief is rejected in the second stage while self-control becomes habitual from the sixth. Passions are left behind beginning from the eleventh stage and activity finally in the last stage. The four causes of bondage—lack of right belief, lack of self-control, passion and activity—are gradually shed in this process. The order in which these factors are abandoned is not necessary since the order of the *Gunasthanas* need not be chronological.

In the ultimate analysis, the concept of the good is the concept of what ought to be attained while the concept of evil is the concept of what ought to be abandoned or avoided. This knowing and avoiding are together termed 'comprehension' or *Parijna*. The good ultimately is the spirit, and the evil, the contact of the spirit with matter. Out of this contact arise desires and passions, delusion, egoism, activities motivated by them and violence. All

these constitute and generate evil. On the other hand, non-violence, restraint and self-control, equanimity between self and others, rational discrimination, dispassion, etc., constitute virtues. All these could be described under the subjugation of the body, senses and the mind and detachment from their bondage.

Further, Pande says that such a notion of morality does not distinguish it from spirituality. It is often assumed that morality characterizes social behaviour while spirituality relates to man's inner personal life. Alternatively, one could say that morality regulates man's relations with other men and is an essential stand of the social order. Spirituality, on the other hand, characterizes man's relation with himself or with God. Jainism conceives the operation of moral rules to extend to man's relations with subhuman and superhuman living beings as well as to his dealings with himself at different levels.

Regarding *Caritra* and *Jnana*, Pande says that Jainism rejects the notion of revelation as the source of moral knowledge just as it rejects sensation and calculation as the means of discovering what is good for man. The source of morality or *Caritra* is in knowledge and faith which are the natural powers of the soul. The source of evil is the *Karmic* obscuration of these powers. The ultimate form of this knowledge is *Kevala-jnana* and from that arises the tradition of scriptural knowledge or *Srutanjnana*. Of these *Srutanjnana* is verbal knowledge, both conceptual and indirect. As per this view, the right action depends on right knowledge, i.e., what we ought to do comes to be indirectly a function of what there is. In fact, the function of knowledge is only to remove the obstruction in the way of action taking place in accordance with the nature of its subject as well as its direct and indirect subjects. Dharma or moral law is nothing

but the natural form of action or *Caritra*. *Caritra* is action and being in accordance with nature.

From the Jaina *Tattva* point of view, Pande's vision is that of the nine *Padarthas*; sin and virtue are held to be reducible to *Asrava* and *Bandha* which are psycho-spiritual relations and processes. *Asrava* and *Bandha* are only the *Vailbhavika paryayas* of the *Jiva* while *Samvara*, *Nirjara* and *Moksa* are its *Svabhava paryaya*. Soul and matter are the only two substantial reals. All the other categories, *Padarthas* or *Tattvas*, are only their relations and changes produced by such relations. One might go further and say that the soul is the only moral and spiritual category. When the soul acts independently by its own nature, it acts rightly. When it acts under the influence of matter, it acts wrongly and dependently and enters that self-perpetuating cycle of evil which is called *Samsara*.

Ethics in Jainism, thus, is squarely grounded on Jaina metaphysics. It rejects the inevitability and ultimacy of sensuous values and does not accept ordinary common sense or social opinion as the basis of moral judgement. Jaina ethics is not the abstraction of an actual social ethics. Nor does Jaina ethics have a theological basis as in the case of the Vedic tradition. The contrast with Buddhism, again, is worth mentioning. For the Buddhists right and wrong are dispositions of the will and are discoverable by anyone in terms of the emotional tone which accompanies the acts of the will. Ethics here has a purely psychological basis. The *Akusala hetus* or wrong motives are parallel to the *Kasayas* of the Jainas but whereas the Jainas look forward to the soul realizing its true nature, the Buddhists deny the soul itself and are left with a classification of psychic states on the basis of their intrinsic nature as good and evil.

Explaining the concept of *Himsa*, Professor Pande states that the forcible, and distorting impact of the activity of one substance upon another is the basic meaning of violence. Matter does violence to the soul by obscuring its faculties and leading it in time to participate in a similar species of causal activity in relation to other souls. This activity, being an activity of the soul, has a necessary moral character while being of the nature of forcible intervention in the being of other souls, regardless of their feelings or nature becomes ethically evil. This is *Himsa* an activity of the soul induced by matter and heedless of the true nature of the soul and of the sameness of this nature for all the souls.

Pande justifies the Jaina rejection of God by describing their spiritual viewpoint. He mentions that freedom, immortality and God represent the three necessary presuppositions of morality. Freedom and immortality are obviously well preserved in Jainism. God, however, is rejected, His place being taken up, partly by *Karma* and partly by the perfected soul in the state of omniscience and functioning as a moral teacher. The theory of *Karma* postulates a sufficient causal connection between present good and evil actions and their distant consequences in terms of happiness and unhappiness. This connection in the absence of an all powerful divine agency remains mysterious to the understanding. Of the two functions of God for the moral life, viz., ensuring a just order where men get their desserts and presenting a realized moral ideal of perfection, while the first function is thus reserved for *Karma* in Jaina theory, the second is performed by the soul itself in its ideal of perfect state, exemplified objectively in the lives of the saints. The normal danger of the acceptance of God in theistic religion is that it slackens the moral will and effort on account of the sense

of sin or diffidence or the desire to rely on God and place one's burden on Him. This danger is altogether avoided by Jainism which makes a clarion call for total self-reliance 'You are your own friend. Why do you seek a friend from outside?'

Regarding *Anuvrata* and *Mahavrata*, Pande says that if the Jaina monk seeks to live by a total denial of property, sex, egoistic family relationships and violence, the Jaina laity has always been a prosperous and powerful community where rulers, ministers and merchants have lived a complete and successful life. The doctrine of *Anuvratas* is consistent with the bodily and social needs of men and also serves to train them towards the *Mahavratas* in due course of time. Of all the *Mahavratas*, the first and the greatest is *Ahimsa*. It has been called the ultimate essence of *Dharma* or righteousness by the Hindus, Buddhists and the Jains alike. And yet it remains undisputed that the Jains have laid the greatest stress on it.

Regarding *Ahimsa* and *Vrata*, Pande's view is that the Jaina doctrine of *Ahimsa* is distinguished by its apparent extremism arising from the peculiar Jaina doctrines of the soul and *Karman*. *Ahimsa* has been described as the chief of the *Vratas*. *Vrata* again has been defined as a deliberately adopted rule laying down what is to be done and how it is to be done, thus excluding what is not to be done. The *Vrata*, thus, becomes in effect an avoidance or a *Virati*. It has been described as a psychic state consisting in withdrawal or *Nivrttiparinama*. It is not, however, wholly a negative concept. Deliberately engaging in good action in accordance with a rule also falls within the scope of *Vrata*. That is why *Vratas* are not subsumed within *Samvara*. *Vratas* include positive actions (*Parisandatmaka*). From the standpoint of *Niscaya-naya*, *Vrata* is really a withdrawal of the will from alien objects

and willing the self and dwelling within it. Externally, it implies compassion on beings while subjectively, it means the abandonment of the passions. In this sense, *Vrata* is the same as the purification of conduct—*Caritra*. According to the range of the objects to which the *Vrata* applies, it is divided into the two categories of *Mahavrata* and *Anuvrata*. Thus, *Ahimsa* as an *Anuvrata* implies withdrawal from gross violence and behaviour, whereas as a *Mahavrata* it implies withdrawal from all evil of the nature of violence at any level—mental, vocal or physical—whether done personally or caused to be done by another or approved.

Himsa has been defined as destruction of life through *Pramada*. The emergence of *Pramada* of *Raga*, *Dvesa*, etc., itself has also been called *Himsa*. Such psychic states are truly suicidal and with this violence to one's own nature we have the starting point of all violence to others. The excessive attention given by the Jainas to details of bodily behaviour is due to their doctrine that souls are to be encountered almost anywhere. This has even been ridiculed and it has been asked, 'There are living beings in water, on land, in the sky; the whole world is agitated by the waves of living beings, how can the monks be free from *Himsa*?' This query has been answered by drawing a distinction between gross and microscopic living beings. The microscopic beings are not easily injured and it is other kind of living beings which need to be protected.

Regarding Jaina vegetarianism, Professor Pande states that apart from the control of violent emotions or actions towards other human beings, the principle of *Ahimsa* in Jainism implies vegetarianism. There can, however, be no doubt that the use of meat for the sake of pleasure or habit or normally is clearly contrary to the teachings of Buddha as well as *Mahavira*. It is also clear that the Jaina

monks strenuously avoided the use of meat on principle.²⁴ Nor can there be any doubt that Jainism has been a principal factor in the spread of vegetarianism in India.

Professor Pande concludes his article, giving his views on Jaina *Ahimsa* from the social point of view, saying that it is obvious that the practice of *Ahimsa* presupposes a person and a context where the loss of material things, social position or even life would be acceptable in view of a superior consciousness and its ideals. This is a context where the egoistic and acquisitive attitude are subordinated to the attitudes of transcendence, acceptance and giving up. Now the political context is inherently different. The state is not a person but an impersonal machinery charged with the duty of maintaining order and security and authorized to use violence as an ultimate resort. The spread of pacifism can become effective only if human nature is sufficiently educated morally and spiritually not to seek the settlement of disputes even at the expense of others. In other words, unless the Jaina ideal of equality between oneself and another is distributively realized in a society, the ideal of non-violence cannot be effectively adopted collectively. *Darmasya tattvam nihitam guhayam*.²⁵

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. As for example in Dr. J.C. Jain, *Life in Ancient India* as depicted in the Jain Canons (Bombay, 1947).
2. Mahavir Jayanti Smarika, p. 22.
3. Sanghasen Singh, *Buddhist Studies*, University of Delhi.
4. *Shramani Traditon: Its History and Contribution to Indian Culture*, Preface by Nagin J. Shah, Director.
5. *Jaina Political Thought*, Approach, p. 1.
6. *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*.
7. Dr. H.L. Jain: *Bharatiya Samskriti Mein Jaina Dharma ka Yogadana* (1962).
8. Ayaranga, 1.1.5—'Se ayavai logavai, Kammavai, Kiriyaavai'
Cf. Silanka's comment on this, 'Tatha ya eva karmavai sa eva

Kryavadi, yatah Karma yoganimittaim badhyate, yogasca vyaparah, sa ca Kryarupah..... Kryam atmaparinati-rupam.' (Bombay, 1935), p. 20.

9. Cf. 'Ogadha-gadha-nicido puggala-Kayehim savvado logo suhumehi badarehiya Appaoggehim joggehim'. (*Pravacanasara*, 11.76). The question has been raised, how can *amurta* soul be bound by *murta* karma-pudgalas? In answer, the contact of soul and matter in experience is adduced by Kundakunda. Amrtacandra goes to the heart of the matter and syas that the bondage is really in terms of psychological identity: आत्मनो नीरुपत्वेन स्पर्शशून्यत्वान्न कर्मपुद्गलैः सहास्ति सम्बन्धः एकावगाहभावावस्थितकर्मपुद्गलनिमित्तोपयोगाधिरुढरागद्वेषादिभावसम्बन्धः कर्म-पुद्गल-बन्ध-व्यवहार-साधकरत्वरत्येव। (*Pravacanasara*, p. 216). The tainting (*uparaga*) of the soul by the passions is *bhava-bandha*, the attachment of more material particles to the pre-existing ones in the soul on this account is *dravya-bandha*; *Pudgala-jiva-bandha* is the 'copervasion' (*anyonyavagaha*) of spirit and matter: यस्तु जीवस्यौपाधिको मोहरागद्वेषपर्यायैरेकत्वपरिणामः स केवलजीवबन्धः यः पुनः जीव-कर्म-पुद्गलयोः परस्पर-परिणाम-निमित्तत्वेन विशिष्टतरः परस्परमवगाहः स तदुभयबन्धः। (*Ibid.*, p. 219).
10. Akalanka on *Tattvarthasutra* (6.1-2: *Kayavanmanah-karmayogah, sa asravah*)—'*Viryantaraya-jnanavarana-ksya-Ksayopasamapeksena atmanatmparinamah pudgal-enaca svaparinamah vyatvaycnaca niscayavyavahara-nayapeksaya kryata ti karma. Kriyaparinaminah atmanah trividha-vargana lambanapeksah pradesa-parispandah*'. (*Tattvarthavartika*, Vol. II, pp. 504-505); Bhagavati, 3.3-names of types of Kriya Kayiki, Adhikaraniki, Pradvesiki, Paritapaniki and Pranatipatiki. It adds that Kriya arises पमायपच्चया जोगनिमित्तं च।
11. '*Atmaparinamena yoga-bhava-laksabena kriyata iti karma. Tadatmanasvatantrikarane mulakaranam. Tadudayapaditah pudgala-parinamah atmanah sukhaduhkhabaladhanahetuh audarikasairadih Isatkarma nokarmetyucyate*'. (Akalanka, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 488).
12. 'परिणामादो बन्धो परिणामो रागदोसमोहजुदो (*Pravacanasara*, 2.88).
13. Sometimes Kriya is identified with *Parispanda* and contrasted with *Parinama* which is called the alternative modality (*Bhava*) of substance (*dravya*)-Akalanka, op. cit., II,

- p. 481. Kundakunda identifies *Karma*, *Parinama*, *Kriya* (*Pravacanasara*, 2.29-30).
14. 'Siddhyatamurdhva-gatireva'....(Akalanka, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 490).
 15. *Pravacanasara*, II, 92-99.
 16. *Samayasara* (3.96). Later (3.122) it goes so far as to say—
"तम्हा जीवोऽकत्ता गुणाय कुवन्ति कम्माणि"।
 17. Cf. *Samayasara*, 3.88-91-; Cf. Amrtacandra ad *Pravacanasara*, 2.30.
 18. The Buddhists use the word *cetana*, while the Jainas speak of *Bhava*.
 19. *Pravacanasara*, 2.86:
शापदेसो सो अप्प तेसु पदेसेसु पुग्गलाकाया।
पविसति जहायोम्मं विट्ठति हि जंति बज्झति॥
 20. These are *Jnanavarana*, *Darsanavarana*, *Vedaniva*, *Mohaniya*, *Ayus Nama*, *Gotra*, and *Antaraya*. These are subdivided into 148 *Uttara prakrtis*—See Glasenapp, *The Doctrince of Karman in Jaina Philosophy*, pp. 5ff (Bombay, 1942).
 21. Cf. '...we can say that the Sankhya-Yoga (the Vedantin also included) admit only material *Karman* and not its spiritual counterpart as well while the Buddhist admits only the spiritual counterpart and not the material *Karman*. *Karman*, in the ultimate analysis, is a link between spirit and matter and lasts as long as the worldly existence.' (Nathmal Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 208).
 22. 'Utpada-vyaya-dhrauya-yuktam sat' (*Tattvartha*, 5.30).
 23. Cf. *Samayasara*. 3.81-83.
 24. Professor S.B. Deo, *History of Jaina Monachism*, p. 173, agrees with the commentators.
 25. This paper is based on the article 'The Jaina Ethical Tradition and Its Relevance' by Professor G.C. Pande.

5

G.C. Pande's Thoughts on Kashmir Śaivism

NAVJIVAN RASTOGI

Endowed with multi-faceted intellectual equipment G.C. Pande ranks among the foremost original Indological thinkers of the twenty-first century. Almost all the branches of Indology, e.g., history, culture, art, philosophy, poetics, aesthetics, besides poetry and Western philosophy have become richer by the touch of his creative and sharp intellect. I deem it a privilege on having been asked to participate in this collective enterprise dedicated to evaluate his enduring and vast contribution. This paper endeavours at critically structuring Professor Pande's insights pertaining to the Kashmir Śaivism.¹

We discern four broad directions of the thoughts of Pande on Kashmir Śaivism. The first one pertains to the foundational philosophical concerns; second, to the synthesis sought by the Kashmir Śaivism with the Indian philosophical tradition; third, to the peculiarity brought about by the tantric origin and the fourth to the constitutive essential features of the Kashmir Śaivism. The critico-comparative analysis contextualized by concurring and conflicting schools of thought or appropriating meta-

physical reductions to the non-philosophical areas will fall under the fourth category. All these undercurrents have been enormously enriched by Pande's profound historical and ahistorical insight into the Oriental and Occidental thought which has proved invaluable towards refining our current understanding of the Kashmir Śaivism.

FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES

In Pande's valuation, Kashmir Śaivism emerges as an excellent illustration of monistic theism or, for that matter, theistic monism.² In fact, this description in itself is a close resonance of the Kashmir Śaivists' self-presentation in terms of *Īśvarādvaitavāda* or *Parameśvarādvayavāda* or *Śivādvaitavāda*. However, the question we are confronted with, is how do we look at Kashmir Śaivism—as a branch of theology or as a type of philosophy. The question may be phrased differently also: whether it is a dogmatic system or a rational explanation of the scriptures, *āgamas* in this case. Many scholars from the West treat it as a theology with varying descriptions from 'personal theology' to 'philosophical theology'. But Pande differs and this is what is important for us. He says that Christianity itself is not a theology in the original scripture. Reference to personal experiences does occur, but nowhere does it crystallize into a system. The idea of theology becomes formalized under the Church (Christianity) or the State (Islam). This has not happened here and definitely not in the context of Kashmir Śaivism. The explanation of scripture or the structural evolution of the revealed truths cannot be circumscribed into a rigorous theological frame. The āgamic hermeneutics comprises three stages: (i) scripture (*āgama*), (ii) analysis (*vyākhyā*) and (iii) rational/

logical examination (*ānvīkṣikī*). Same is the case with Vedānta also: (i) scripture (*upaniṣad*); (ii) *Brahmasūtra* (*vyākhyā*) and (iii) *Bhāṣya* (*ānvīkṣikī*). In all fairness, therefore, a system based on scriptures such as Kashmir Śaivism is not a theology.³

For Pande, Kashmir Śaivism is philosophy. In this he is backed by tradition too. Somānanda, the first proponent of the system, uses the word *drṣṭi*, a synonym of *darśana*, while naming his treatise as *Śivadrṣṭi*. Mādhavācārya in his famous compendium, *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, calls it *Pratyabhijñādarśana*. Jayaratha, the illustrious commentator of the *Tantrāloka*, specifically refers to the scholars from Somānanda down to Abhinavagupta as 'rationalists and interpreters'.⁴ Really speaking, the labelling of this system as philosophy seems to be quite in line with Pande's definition of Philosophy.⁵ In his perception, philosophy is dialectic. Philosophy is always a critique of opinions—whether contemporary or gathered over a period. The process involves three steps: (i) these opinions must be held; (ii) they must be accessed by the thinker in his personal experiences and (iii) the facts on which they are grounded must be validated by examination. In other words, it constitutes an attempt towards investigation into the very foundation of those opinions and, therefore, moving beyond those presuppositions. The two aspects of dialectical reasoning are present in equal measure in Nāgārjuna, Śaṅkara and thinkers of the Kashmir Śaivism: (i) determination of the opinions/hypotheses of the *prima facie* standpoint intended to be investigated and then (ii) unravelling of their inconsistencies. Whatever be the philosophical model, it unexceptedly begins with a hypothesis. Kashmir Śaivism is a sort of spiritual philosophy. The reality, which it seeks to attain, cannot be established by reasoning. It is *aprameya* in the sense

that it is beyond the range of intellectual reach. This source of knowledge is called *āgama* (scripture).⁶

This reliance of Kashmir Śaivism on *āgama* drives us to another connected thesis by Pande. Behind every presupposition or fundamental thesis held by a philosophy, there is always a world-view or cultural perspective at work. In most traditional philosophies, this world-view has largely depended upon some religious tradition. In Indian tradition, philosophy is an outcome of an interaction between two connected components, *ānvīkṣikī* (=logic, which is described as *hetu-* or *nyāya-vidyā* also depending on the context) and *adhyātma-vidyā*. The former is marked by its emphasis on the reflective and rational aspect of philosophy and the latter by its relation to human and transcendental subjectivity. In this sense, the Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, Buddhism and Pratyabhijñā—all these philosophies are at once spiritual and logical (*āgamānusārī* and *nyāyānusārī*). To quote Pande, 'On the one hand, their foundations derive from spiritual verities received traditionally but realizable personally, and on the other, they undertake a systematic logical analysis of their basic concepts. So the *Śaiva Śāsana* or *Śāstra* is designated as *dṛṣṭi*, *darśana* or *dṛk* as well as *naya*'.⁷ Pande's orientation is clear. All these Indian varieties of idealism, though logically structured, are species of spiritual idealism, not of rational idealism, because they do not regard human reason, on the basis of the empirical data or *a priori*, as an ultimate cognitive faculty. Their reliance on some tradition of spiritual insight drives them to discover their identity culled through traditional wisdom and personal realization by eradicating the doubts about its very possibility and chances of drifting astray (*asambhāvanā* and *viparītabhāvanā*).⁸ Apparently the concern about the philosophical identity of the Kashmir Śaivism may look trivial

but it has far-reaching consequence in the context of philosophical values.

SYNTHESIS WITH INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION

Viewed from the perspective of synthesis of the Kashmir Śaivism with the underlying spirit of Indian traditional thought in general, we notice that what distinguishes Indian tradition from other religions and philosophical world-views in the world is its spirituality immanent as their essence in the culture and philosophy. Its central focus has been the inward reflection of the consciousness. The essence of spiritual pursuit lies in internalizing self-consciousness reflected in the flux of experiences, discovering the subject, the self, without getting lost into mental constructs and objects thereof.⁹ Its realization constitutes knowledge in the primary sense. Vasugupta, the author of the *Śivasūtras*, begins his work identifying the self with consciousness rather than with the substantive conscious subject.¹⁰ Expatiating upon the purpose of Vasugupta, Utpala declares in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā* that man's ultimate accomplishment is to discover such knowledge as to obtain its meaningfulness in the self-referring activity of the consciousness.¹¹ While Pande by drawing upon the *Yogasūtra*¹² likens this state with the self-resting of the witnessing subject, Abhinavagupta¹³ looks upon the same as realization of pure ideality by the witnessing self by invoking the same *Yogasūtra*.¹⁴ This is that state which frees the individual from the cycle of desire-action-enjoyment by establishing him within the self.

Although Pande's immediate concern, in the context, is to dilate upon 'spiritual science and yoga', he repeatedly alludes to the thesis of Kashmir Śaivism by way of

conceptual reductions. Whereas on the one hand, according to Pande, self-discovery is exploring knowledge, it is, on the other hand, also trying to find out its permanent existence, i.e., the notion of consciousness is intertwined with that of being. The next stage in the pursuit of permanence is generally represented by the notion of the other world. Despite the belief that the other world is dependent upon action and worship (*upāsana*), it was widely conceded that other worldly dispensation was solely action-determined and was as transient as the worldly state. The direct fallout of this idea was that all religious practices instrumental in harnessing the other world were deemed inferior to the search for self. It came to be generally accepted that the real import of immortality for a man is nothing but dwelling in the self (*svarūpavasthāna*). This perhaps spells out the reasoning behind terming *mukti*, *kaivalya*, *nirvāṇa* as immortality or immortal abode (*amṛtapada*).¹⁵ Man's journey to the other world, its causes, the divinity, its worship, death and immortality subsumed within consciousness, are transformations or modes of consciousness. Pande relies on the first aphorism of the *Pratyabhijñā-hṛdaya*¹⁶ to prove that in the world of free entities, consciousness is not a dependent attribute (*dharma*); rather it holds the key to the entire order of being. Pande, therefore, reduces spirituality, as a quest for consciousness, to be the essence of Indian culture.¹⁷

This leads to another, though unstated, conclusion. The non-duality, as visualized in the Kashmir Śaivism, is a sort of integral totality and in this it replicates—tantrico-philosophically—Vedic integralism (*pūrṇatvavāda*).¹⁸ Behind life and death, to be able to visualize an uninterrupted linkage between the manifest form and the formless un-manifest is what constitutes the foundation

of Vedic integralism. The conflict between the inner and the outer is foreign to the consciousness of the seers. The propensity of all sciences towards *Brahmavidyā* happens to be a part of natural flow. Pande says feelingly, 'आरम्भ में नाना रूपधारी देवताओं में परम तत्त्व की उपासना और अन्त में एक परम तत्त्व में सभी नामरूप का मूल देख सकना यह एक ही प्रक्रिया के दो छोर हैं।'¹⁹ On this point of view, the world is not devalued, nor this enounced, for in all imperfections of this life the absolute perfection alone seems to shine through.

By the time we reach the early post-Vedic era, a lot of parallel traditions—both orthodox and heterodox—emerge and thanks to their interaction several schools gradually come up seeking a synthesis of diverse traditional view-points. The most ancient Vedic seers are seen alive with a constant sense of divine compresence and realizaton. This state bears close comparison with that of *anupāya* in Kashmir Śaivism or *Sahaja* in the Mahāyānī Siddha school.²⁰ No doubt, the resurgence of Vedic spirituality in the form of *anupāya* or *Sahaja* was an outcome of the efforts towards elimination of duality between spiritual vision and worldly deeds brought about by Vedic *dhī* and *ṛta* or their Buddhist counterparts, *prajñā* and *dharma*. This was by all means a path of spontaneous vision and absolute integrality.

Pande's observation unwittingly has a ring of far-reaching importance about it. The Indian philosophical history has been struggling with the question whether the origin of the tantric stream is different from and independent of the origin of the Vedic stream. Indological scholars have sharp disagreement as to its precise answer. However, current analysis is indicative of Pande's unequivocal inclination in favour of the shared unity of origin between these two strands of thought. This is the reason the totalistic vision of Kashmir Śaivism is the tantric transfiguration of the Vedic integralism.²¹

Now this is easier for us to appreciate that the substantive Indian spiritual tradition is a product of give and take between Vedic and Śramaṇa cultures.²² The efforts towards homogenizing the two are patently visible in the *Gītā*, *purāṇas* and *tantras*, the communicative media of spiritual current. Though Pande is intimately conversant with the vast tantric literature and, more than that, with its even greater categorial diversity, usual connotation of the term Tantras for him gets confined to Kashmir Śaivism. The *Gītā* propounds the real unity of *karma* and *akarma* and the liturgical/ritual action is deemed to culminate into Karmayoga and Karmayoga into Jñānayoga. By conceiving knowledge as being attainable by worship (*upāsana*), the *purāṇas* have gone in for a new type of liturgical substitute of sacrifice (*yajña*). The *tantras* are the votaries of unity between knowledge and action in the form of intrinsic freedom. In *bhakti*, as propounded in the *tantras*, action and renunciation get mutually reconciled, whereas in the *tantras*, similar homology between worldly activity (*pravṛtti*) and withdrawal therefrom (*nivṛtti*) is effortlessly achieved through transfiguration of *pravṛtti*.²³ Cast in a different conceptual mould, this is what is conveyed by the myth of matrimony or conjugal union of Śiva and Śakti. Oblivious of this reality, when energy is treated as insentient, the entire historical accomplishment is reduced to inanimatism (*jadavāda*). Pande's statement 'चेतना का अनुसंधान तब तक पूर्ण नहीं हो सकता, जब तक सृष्टि के कारण को उसकी इच्छा में न देखा जाए—सप्रेक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय।' ²⁴ is a reiteration of precise Kashmir Śaivite position and is evidently based on the *Śivasūtra*.²⁵ Transcendental knowledge (*parā vidyā*) or spiritual science is a matter of self-realization but its path is ultimately revealed by *āgama* or scripture. If gnosis is perceptual and Yoga happens to be its innate instrumentality, then

by virtue of their being a teaching or instruction (*upadeśa*) in nature, the scriptural science and Yoga become conducive to that yoga of realization. The *Upaniṣads* and *Mahāyāna-sūtra*, the *āgamas* of Pratyabhijñā and Tripurā, the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*—all these treatises are repository of this tradition of knowledge.²⁶

We now have a clear view, as is amply evident from the observations of Pande, that the trend that started with Aurobindo in interpreting Indian culture as spiritual tradition and which attained a high degree of order and sophistication in the works of Kaviraja who blended theory with experience providing it with an academic context²⁷ reaches its height in Pande's subtle analysis representing its encyclopaedic development marked by historical/philosophical/intercultural and axiological emphasis. Identifying the peak of synthesis attained by Kashmir Śaivism with the root fundamentals of Indian culture is the natural outcome of such an approach.

TANTRIC CONTEXT

With tantricism of the Kashmir Śaivism we enter into the third phase of Pande's thoughts.²⁸ Though he unravels a broad spectra of tantric notions and schools, it is the Kashmir Śaivism that epitomizes tantric philosophy for him, as we have noted earlier. One of the primary characteristics distinguishing Kashmir Śaivism from main currents of Indian speculation—both orthodox and non-orthodox—lies in its tantricity. Defining tantra Pande says, 'Tantricism is nothing except the ritualistic and symbolic aspect of worship considered as a means of communion with a deity.'²⁹ Moving further, he enlarges his definition by supplanting 'the ritualistic and symbolic' with the 'science of word',³⁰ which we may also take as 'science of *mantra*'. Thus, the essence of *tantra* is *mantra* and its

result is visualization of the deity. What Pande wants to emphasize is that while overtly the tantric mode of worship is common to that in Vedic and Puranic currents, 'it goes beyond their overt form to their inner essence.'³¹ Drawing upon the *Śāradātilaka*, a work attributed to Lakṣmaṇagupta, Abhinavagupta's preceptor, Pande equates *nāda* (resonance), the first emanation of God, with mantra.³² He endorses his contention with the aphorism of Vasugupta, '*cittam mantrah*'.³³ Repetition (*japa*) of mantra, a continuous flow of ideation, reveals itself in the form of adept's self-awareness by divesting it of its associated images and logical structures.³⁴

The fundamental principle on which *tantra* is based is that the human consciousness is permeated by the creative universal consciousness which goes on manifesting itself in a natural rhythm of outgoing and influx as in an echo, a reflected form or self-introspection. For deity-realization to actualize, it is imperative for the human consciousness to master this rhythm and follow it to its origin. The ultimate reality is defined as a source from where this world arises, whereby it is sustained and whereinto it merges back. Thus, in the Absolute as supreme consciousness, there is an innate power or energy that keeps on expressing *itself* alternately swinging between expansion and contraction, rise and withdrawal. This rhythmic self-presentation is what has been named as *sphurattā* (vibration) or *spandana* (pulsation).³⁵ Cosmic totality and its each individual element is nothing but vibration of that Supreme Energy and all particularized energies and pulsations are multiple modes of that absolute, cosmic, universal energy and its self-expressive rhythm.³⁶ Will, knowledge and action constitute three steps by which consciousness expresses its creativity.³⁷ This 'will' (*icchā*) in itself is simply an overflow of bliss

(*ānanda*), which is what defines consciousness. Thus, the entire process of self-recognizing, self-expressing and self-affirming is essentially creative. Due to the voluntaristic emphasis of such a magnitude, Kashmir Śaivism stands out in a class of its own separate from other gnostic systems such as Buddhism, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. As a consequence, tantric Sādhana or praxis too does not limit itself to the quest of detached witnessing consciousness alone but seems to integrate itself with the rhythm of the universal mind, because it is within supreme ideality that the witnessing has any meaning. It is within the fold of the absolute spirit that apperceiving and creating (*prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, Śiva and Śakti) are the moments of that indivisible reality. The aim of human aspiration is not the attainment of the fulcrum of pure subjectivity or I-ness; it is also realization of that divinity which constitutes inner source of his being.³⁸

ESSENTIAL FEATURES

Conceiving Kashmir Śaivism as a spiritual philosophy naturally calls for an in-depth analysis of its essential characteristics, i.e., how it proposes to distinguish itself from other philosophies. In this context, Pande takes the benedictory verse of Abhinavagupta's *Vimarśinī* on Utpaladeva's *Kārikās* as embodying Kashmir Śaivism in full.³⁹ The benediction⁴⁰ runs as under:

निराभासात् पूर्णादहमिति पुरा भासयति यत्
द्विशाखामाशास्ते तदनु च विभङ्क्तं निजकलाम्।
स्वरूपादुन्मेषप्रसरणनिमग्नस्थितिजुषस्
तदद्वैतं वन्दे परमशिवशक्त्यात्मनिखिलम्॥⁴¹

The entire reality, which is one, is identical with Parama Śiva and Śakti. Out of its own being it creates, sustains and withdraws the world within. He is devoid of manifestation, yet is not 'void' (*śūnya*). First of all, there emerges

I-ness (*ahamībhāva*) and then from that the duality—subject/object, word/concept or meaning, and Śiva/Śakti. It is difficult for a person outside Kashmir Śaivism to comprehend such a real. For *nirābhāsāt* is acceptable to a nihilist and *pūrṇāt* to a Vedāntin, but *ahamīti purā bhāsayati* is anathema for both. Emergence of *aham* is in a peculiar situation—should it be construed as the rise of bondage or end thereof. In the absence of duality, there cannot be knowledge, nor could 'I-ness' characterize Śakti. Theoretically, duality arises in the state of Sadāśiva, Śiva and Śakti emanating beforehand. How, then, do we account for *Anuttara* or *Nirābhāsa* turning into a synthesis of Śiva and Śakti or *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*.⁴²

In this system the ultimate reality, which is variously styled as Parama Śiva, Maheśvara or Anuttara is essentially of the nature of consciousness (*saṃvit*). Its approach is radically idealistic in the sense that the objects of awareness are also essentially consciousness in nature. But it does not mean that they are illusory or unreal. They constitute imperfect or limited self-expression of consciousness and, are technically termed as *ābhāsa* (*ā=apūrṇa bhāsa*). The supreme consciousness, though plenary, universal and eternal by itself, is intrinsically ever creative and dynamic. It has two integral components, *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*. In the first aspect it is the shining or witnessing of its own content and in the second, it is self-reflection or self-affirmation. The term 'self-affirmation', Pande's rendering of *vimarśa* into English, is meaningful. To explicate, in Pande's own words, 'consciousness is both passive and active, registering a content and apperceiving it as self-expression.'⁴³ This notion of consciousness is at variance with the same in Sāṃkhya where *Puruṣa* can only apperceive (*sākṣī*) and *Prakṛti* can only act. Extending Pande's logic, this may also be con-

trasted with Vedānta where Brahman only witnesses (*sākṣī-caitanya*) but has no content to witness, all appearances being superimposed on it (*adhiṣṭhānacaitanya*). In Kashmir Śaivism, *saṁvit* is essentially self-awareness and is infinitely creative, creation being nothing but self-affirmation of the consciousness.⁴⁴

Ātman, Brahman, Parama Śiva or Cit—they differ in name only. Ever since the Upaniṣadic declaration 'That thou art' proclaimed the unity of individual or human self with the ultimate universal reality, the concept of *ātman* has proved to be most central and challenging notion of Indian philosophy. The controversy surrounding *ātman* too has remained essentially metaphysical in approach. 'Whether the self is a distinct real, whether its reality is substantial or transcendental, individual or cosmic'⁴⁵—these are three questions, according to Pande, over which the metaphysicians have been defining their stand. In answer to these questions, Kashmir Śaivism holds Self to be real, universal, transcendental and yet because of its manifesting the individual self within and from itself, remains one with the latter.

The question regarding *dharmin* and *dharma*, or substance and quality, etc., may either be regarded as irrelevant or at the most, metaphysical because Self (substance/holder) and consciousness (state of being/quality/property) are indivisible and one. However, if there be any compulsion, it will have to be regarded as the cognizing subject or agent.⁴⁶ But it will be such an agent as will not be the substrate of agential activity or doership (*kartrtva*) but will, rather, be identical with it. This, according to Pande, necessarily leads to another query. If the essence of human self is considerably cognitive or of the nature of consciousness, could that knowledge be treated as rational or logical.⁴⁷ In the whole Indian tradi-

tion even those who hold the self to be essentially cognitive rule out its character as consisting of determination (*adhyavasāya*) or intellectual activity. For Śaṅkara, this knowledge is non-attributive and undifferentiated. In Bhartṛhari, though the whole thought is informed by word, the word in its original form is identical with *Paśyantī vāk* which in a way is equated with intuitive knowledge. In Kashmir Śaivism, *Vimarśa* constitutes essence of *Prakāśa*,⁴⁸ yet *vimarśa* and intellectual construct (*vikalpa*) are not deemed one. If *prakāśa* is *saṁvit* or awareness, *vimarśa* represents its dynamism or self-affirmative activity.⁴⁹ In every instance of consciousness, in every act, Śiva alone is revealed—knowing, willing, acting, remembering, what is not known is His knowledge, awareness, real nature. This mode of knowing makes for authentic recognition (*pratyabhijñā*): तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वम् तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति।⁵⁰

The spiritual *Sādhana*⁵¹ in Kashmir Śaivism does not brook any difference between the destination-stage (indeterminate consciousness = *Maheśvara*) and the instrument-stage (*upāya* stage representing refineable determinate, pure-determinate, indeterminate knowledge characterized, respectively, by sense of duality, duality-cum-unity and unity). Śiva is called *Śaktimān* only in the context of power—*cit*, *ānanda*, *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā* are His powers. Instrumental or redemptive knowledge carries all these powers of Śiva. Thus, *icchā-śakti* evolves in *Śāmbhava-upāya*, *jñāna-śakti* in *Śākta-* and *kriyāśakti* in *Āṇava*. Hence, *upāya* does not have separate being from 'upeya'—उपायजालं न शिवं प्रकाशयेत् घटेन किं भाति सहस्रदीधितिः⁵² Pande firmly believes that 'the reflection over what you are will definitely reveal more and more what you are'.⁵³

The system holds that the Universal Self, by rendering Himself as the base unfolds the world, lying within

thereon.⁵⁴ The manifested world has the same relation with the ultimate reality as the reflected form with the reflecting medium, i.e., mirror. That is to say, the unity of the manifested world with the Universal Self is real, whereas the distinction is a matter of subjective apprehension.⁵⁵ The absolute in its aspect as the ground of manifestation is called 'light' (*prakāśa*), and as the power of unfoldment 'judgement/consciousness' (*vimarśa*). What is the precise relation of emanation or the emanated world with the cosmic consciousness? The answer is: relation of identity. For, this consciousness acts as the support of the reflected forms and also as the recipient thereof. Thus, in this system, all categories ranging from Śiva to Earth figure in the supreme consciousness as do thoughts within our mind. Owing to its will the ultimate reality unfolds itself, as if externally, without any assistance from material cause whatsoever.⁵⁶ The objective world is technically designated as *ābhāsa*, because it is made to shine (*ābhāsyate*) by the universal mind and also because it shines (*ābhāsate*).

In this context, the Śaiva thinkers, following the Pāñcarātra school, subscribe to the doctrine of two strata of creation—pure and impure, transcendental and phenomenal. These two are popularly known as *śuddha adhvā* and *aśuddha adhvā* (lit. pure route and impure route), respectively. Two justifications loaded with philosophical undertones are forthcoming to substantiate two levels of creation. If God is the creator with all desires fulfilled (*āptakāmasya kā sprhā*), then in creation the role of *karma* and *nairghrṇya* becomes defunct and if *karma*, anyhow, remains a factor which becomes condition for the creation, what is then the need of God?. To resolve this dilemma, the Śaivas talk of pure, trans-sequential, timeless creation. The karmic creation is impure creation which directly pertains to the deluded soul. The latter is not a

direct creation; rather, it is creation by proxy managed by pure subjects duly appointed by the God in this behalf. The other justification is that whenever God wills, his idea rooted within is ventilated, yet it continues to retain its unitary link with God, i.e. consciousness. This is what constitutes the pure order of creation—from Śiva to Śuddhā Vidyā (pure wisdom).⁵⁷ Parama Śiva, the absolute, is devoid of any appearance (*nirābhāsa*) but is full and perfect. From him the creation starts. The first ever beginning is that of *aham* (*nirābhāsat pūrṇād ahamiti purā bhāsayati yat*). In ontic terminology, this state represents Śiva and Śakti categories. As a result of bifurcation into subject and object Sadāśiva stage comes into play, e.g., *aham idam*. The experience of this stage is comparable to the faint apprehension in determinate perception. This is simple voluntary indistinct perception (apperception). This is *Pratibhā* (intuition/genius);⁵⁸ this is what has been termed *Paśyantī* (seeing). By His sheer volition the object of desire (*idam* =this) is accomplished. It is perennial creation of the God, who is consciousness. When he actualizes, what has been pulsating within, comes into being, e.g., *idam aham*. This is *Īśvara* category. Owing to power of action, the next stage is characterized by equilibrium of *ahantā* and *idantā*, though both elements remain hinged on the single subjective substrate. This is *Śuddhā Vidyā*, constituting the threshold between pure and impure creations. Whenever God wills to express himself as action, he chooses to come out of the pure order. The implication is obvious. Without the diminution of God into an individual subject, this familiar world of pragmatic discourse will not come into being, populated by the objects differentiated by *Apohana Śakti* (power of concealment). According to Pande, this is *Āṇavamala* (innate ignorance).⁵⁹ He remembers Kaviraja who says

that without closing your eyes you cannot look within: तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् । This is what is described as immanent creation.

We concur with Pande's observation that it is through a stringent critique of non-dualistic philosophies such as Vedānta, Buddhism and Bhartṛhari that the Kashmir Śaivism seeks to establish itself as a rationalist system.⁶⁰ It adopts the methodology and ontology of Sāṃkhya as an ingredient but discards its dualism. In so doing it follows the Vedāntic procedure to a great extent. Pande surmises that due to proximity of the Śaiva monism with the ancient Vedānta as found in the *Upaniṣads* and *Brahmasūtra*, it has not attracted such exhaustive treatment as has Sāṃkhya. Approaching Kashmir Śaivism through the critique of Advaita Vedānta would have been a more viable strategy,⁶¹ but since both the traditions are *āgamānusārī*, i.e., they derive from their spiritual or scriptural tradition, such a method loses much of its utility.⁶² Interestingly, Pande's view finds endorsement in Abhinavagupta.⁶³ It, of course, needs be said that the Vedānta too reaches non-duality or *Brahmādvaita* by dialectical reasoning. It is through the grasp of dialectical difficulties in the notion of reality as propounded by the Naiyāyikas who swear by common sense: संविदेव भगवती नः शरणम् (every *pratīti* corresponds to a real), the Vedāntins arrive at non-duality.⁶⁴ In these reductions, they primarily depend upon Śruti and occasionally on logic as per necessity. Nevertheless, under the influence of Mahāyāna on the Vedāntic dialectic, both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara leave behind the dynamic and creative absolute of the *Upaniṣads* and *Brahmasūtra* and instead resort to Māyā. For Pratyabhijñā, on the contrary, essence of consciousness lies in its Vimarśa or activity. Both Śaṅkara and Mahāyāna regard all *kriyā* as *vikriyā* (distortion, appear-

ance); hence its entry into eternal reality is barred. In Pratyabhijñā, the eternal, the continuous, must express itself in created activity.⁶⁵ Abhinavagupta⁶⁶ and Kṣemarāja⁶⁷ specially underline this gap between the two lines of thought.

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers were rather hard-pressed to take recourse to logic and inference. Abhinavagupta regards the Buddhist as the principal opponent, because the latter has no faith in the existence of the soul.⁶⁸ Since there has been no direct clash of the Kashmir Śaivists with Buddhists, their fight with the Buddhists happens to be twofold. On the one side, they critically examine the Buddhist doctrines, and on the other, they hunt for inconsistencies and weaknesses in the Buddhist attacks on the notions of God and Self and the conceptual and rational arguments employed by the Nyāya in defence of them. In this, just as the Vedāntins find Bhāṭṭa view as compatible with their stand (व्यवहारे भाट्टनयः), the Śaiva too look upon Nyāya as suitable to common sense.⁶⁹ Viewed realistically, in structuring the reality, the Buddhist logicians affirm centrality of the mind or *citta* which brings them closer to the Pratyabhijñā philosophers as compared to the realism of the Naiyāyikas. Moreover, Somānanda and Utpaladeva do not show any leniency in assailing the Nyāya theories of causation, and efficient instrumentality of God. Hence, this apparent show of generosity by the Kashmir Śaivists towards Nyāya in a pragmatic realm seems to have subtler implication than meets the eye. The acceptance of five-tier syllogistic process, consequent projection of the entire *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā* (the seminal text of Śaiva logic) as constituting *parārthānumāna* and treatment of the notions of action, relation, universal, etc., as practically real and efficacious is tantamount to accepting finality of the Naiyayika positions in the ordi-

nary life.⁷⁰ By implication, those reals (such as action, relation, universal, etc.) which fail the rigorous logical scrutiny by the Buddhists and yet are necessary for the worldly transaction, acquire acceptability in the Śaiva context after passing through the Śaiva logical frame.⁷¹

Despite its initial fidelity to scripture, the Buddhism starts gradually moving away from the authority of *āgama*. By the time of Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, who play the role of standard *prima facie* opponent (*purvapakṣin*) for the Kashmir Śaivism, *āgamas* lose their relevance and we are left with only two sources of knowledge, perception and inference.⁷²

Pande looks into the ideological clash between Buddhism and Kashmir Śaivism with great vision. Both the systems proceed with the dead conflicting presuppositions. On the one side is the world of changing impersonal *dharma*s, and on the other is the universe surcharged with dynamicity of I-consciousness. On the one side are the God, the Self, and endurance/permanence of subject and object. As opposed to it, on the other side, there is no God, no Self, no subjective or objective endurance. The Buddhist theory of reality is fundamentally dialectical and, for once, same is the case with the Kashmir Śaivism. The Buddhist real is identified in terms of functionality or efficacy. There are no wholes, no substances, no underlying properties, nor any properties except function.⁷³ This theory was developed as a criticism of the view of the Sāṃkhya, Nyāya and Vedāntā. The Buddhist theory of change comes into being with the rejection of *satkāryavāda*, *asatkāryavāda* and *vivartavāda*. If at all there is causation, it can only be explained as *pratītya-samutpāda* ('law of dependent origination'), i.e., causation is an ordered succession of events. Neither a thing produces anything as a dynamic agent, nor is a thing born or

produced from anything. There is no mutual interaction, nor continuity between the events. Being relative every event is dependent. Appearance or apprehension of motion or endurance in the flux of similar static moments is a sheer illusion. Pragmatic entities or continuity are mental constructs superimposed upon real.⁷⁴

The Śaiva critique, as already noticed, starts with common sense (Nyāya), but ends up with fundamentally different metaphysical conclusions.⁷⁵ In the first philosophical treatise of the system, *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*, Somānanda argues that cognitions such as 'I know this', 'He knows me' (*ahamidam jānāmi/saḥ mām jānāti*) require more than one moment. In an other argument Somānanda points out that discontinuity in the subject caused by momentariness militates against the law of *karman*. This, however, reflects the standard argument from the orthodox side. But Somānanda's further argument is philosophically important. It is this that cognition (*viññāna*) as cognition (*vidyārūpa*) is 'timeless, not ephemeral'. A sizable section of Buddhists too regard ideal constructs (*prajñāpti*) and transcendental objects (*asaṃskṛta dharma*) as devoid of temporality. But generally temporality of empirical or pragmatic cognitions is a matter of practical convention (*samvṛti*).⁷⁶ In another argument, Somānanda notes that means of knowledge such as perception and recognition, etc., also negate momentariness. We can recognize only that object which lasts more than a moment and/or continue to perceive till that cognition is not contradicted or sublated. However, the Buddhist, in his rejoinder, declares recognition or determinate perception (*vikalpa*) to be an illusion resulting from similarity.⁷⁷

According to Pande, arguments on both sides are based on the differing perceptions of reality. While the Śaiva arguments address empirical objects at the macro (*sthūla*)

level, the Buddhist do the same at the micro (*sūkṣma*) level. For Buddhists, reality consists of *svalakṣaṇa* corresponding to sense-datum and not the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *saṁghāta* or *santāna*, which are empirical macro objects. Causation takes place at the micro level of *svalakṣaṇa*. The Buddhists state that a moment, a point instant, can act or function only by ceasing.

In the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśinī*, Buddhism is taken to task at a much deeper level. No insentient object can happen or act until it is prompted by a sentient subject or prompter. All activity, therefore, is ultimately expression of active impulse. Essence of being consists in its shining in the consciousness and not in its functionality or efficacy. The doctrine of dependent origination only highlights inter-dependence of cause and effect. Causation is necessarily an ordered succession. Now, for the Śaiva, dependence only means a relationship between the sentients. If causation were a necessary succession, then the Śaivists ask whether this succession is identical with the relata or different from them. If it is the former, causation will be impossible and if the latter is the case, the causative force will be 'will', nothing else, because notion of necessity can arise in will alone.⁷⁸

Any discussion about causal relation or ordered succession leads to the wider question pertaining to the nature of relations. Here again, the Buddhist reasoning is dialectical. On the one hand *svalakṣaṇa* is viewed as a causally efficient moment, then on the other, relations too, like substance, quality, action, universal, etc., are conceived as logical constructions. Thus, causality, being action or relation, would be a beginningless ideation, a *priori* concept, which would be applicable to *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* but not to *svalakṣaṇa*. Attention may be drawn to the fact that the Śaiva defence of relation and other notions too

is based on the dialectical assumption of unity that permeates multiplicity.⁷⁹ Creation means differentiation which cannot eradicate the unitary character of the creator who is both immanent and transcendent. Kashmir Śaivism and Buddhism both agree on one point that whereas the conceptual synthesis is traced to the apperceiving mind or *citta*, differentiation is sourced to the phenomena. But they are radically different, points out Pande, in the sense 'that the Śaiva regards the categories as articulating rather than distorting the nature of phenomena',⁸⁰ as maintained by the Buddhists. This is so because the determining will of the empirical world is actually the will of that God who is one with I-consciousness immanent in all the experiences. This further implies that though the objects and subject are essentially divine, they do not shine so thanks to the divine concealing power called *Māyā*. This once again highlights the Śaivists' similarity with the Buddhists that the phenomenal world produced by the transcendental illusion always comes up as a veiler of truth (*samvṛti*). But the difference is that whereas the Śaiva philosopher takes to analyze the experience for discovering essence of being in self-consciousness and the defining character of that self-consciousness to be universal, trans-temporal and infinite, the Buddhist does the same in quest of essencelessness of finite being, finitude wrought by delusive power of mind. The Śaiva philosopher seeks to expand his finite self-consciousness so as to touch his infinite divine consciousness. The Buddhist wants to withdraw from his delimited self-consciousness so as to reach the ineffable transcendental stuff.⁸¹

In some sense, both Pratyabhijñā and Buddhism are idealist systems and both share certain fundamental common features. For the Kashmir Śaivists, matter and

externality are regular phenomena within the māyic world. Being concretization of Śiva's power they are real, but their intrinsic being remains obscured due to Māyā. For Yogācāra as well, reality is pure, infinite and eternal consciousness in essence⁸² and may be compared to the Śiva category (*Śiva-tattva*).⁸³ Differentiation is not innate to *vijñāna* (consciousness); rather it is superimposed by *avidyā*. For both, the objects of empirical world grasped in perception and inference are real only in the practical sense, because they are veiled by transcendental illusion and it is absolutely imperative to pierce through this covering in order to attain our intrinsic nature. For both they are the objects of consciousness. The only difference is that in Kashmir Śaivism the universal subject or self-consciousness is immanent in every finite entity and cognitive act whereby it steers clear of the difficulties posed by 'solipsism and psychologism'.⁸⁴ Otherwise, the principle of self-consciousness is as transcendental as that of *vijñāptimātratā*. By extending this commonality further, one finds the Buddhist concepts of *āvaraṇa*, *avidyā* and *vāsanā* are quite close to the Śaiva concept of *malas*.⁸⁵ We may add that notions of *avidyā*, *māyā* and *vikalpa* fall in the similar category as, in some sense, they are the extensions of the concept of *mala*.

It may be in place to go back to the respective definitions of reality in the two systems. Whereas the Pratyabhijñā defines reality as 'shining or figuring in consciousness' (*prakāśamānatā*),⁸⁶ the Buddhist defines it as 'functionality or causal efficiency' (*arthakriyākāritā*),⁸⁷ but this stand of Buddhist enjoys only pragmatic validity, since transcendental objects (*asaṃskṛtadharma*s) are said to be everlasting. On the other side, consciousness not only illumines objects, but also flows out as action due to which objects are what they are. The whole activity,

including even that of the insentient objects, is a manifestation of that consciousness.⁸⁸

It is precisely the point where the core difference between the two systems comes to the fore. In *Pratyabhijñā*, ultimate reality is not only conscious, but also consists of powers,⁸⁹ *inter alia*, such as *cit*, *ānanda*, *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*. Non-dual awareness is supreme, but it is at the same time creative and dynamic. As against this, the supreme reality in Vedānta and Yogācāra, though non-dual, goes beyond will or action. In their view it is ineffable transcendence and they look out for the cause of this manifold and changing world in beginningless *vāsanā* or *māyā*, which does not negate the empirical reality, instead constitutes it.

It is time that attention is drawn to the enormous potential that a comparative study of Kashmir Śaivism and Buddhist logic as well as philosophy holds. Midas touch of ingenuity and equipment of scholars like Pande is earnestly awaited in this direction. At this point of time, this is difficult to quantify the exchange of thought between the two, but there is no doubt that the Buddhists' impact has gone extremely deep into the Śaiva logic and metaphysics. It is instantly illustrated by the *Pratyabhijñā* adoption of the technical terminology of the Buddhist logic and attempt to redefine them in a spirit consistent with the core thrust of the system. *Svalakṣaṇa*(-ābhāsa), *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*(-ābhāsa), *arthakriyāsāmarthya*, *tādātmya*, *tadutpatti*, *svabhāvahetu*, *kāryahetu*, *vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpakabhāva*, modes of *anupalabdhi*, etc., are some such concepts that buttress our approach. In regard to even such concepts that have universal application in Indian philosophy as *anumāna*, *arthakriyā*, it employs Buddhist technique and methodology.⁹⁰ In a similar strain, Abhinavagupta defines *apoha* and in so doing follows the

synthetic approach of Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti. According to Ratnakīrti, the primary meaning is of the nature of positing or injunction. But this injunction or positing is characterized by *apoha*, because words fail to convey any meaning without contradistinguishing.⁹¹ Defining *vikalpa*, in the *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛtti-vimarśinī* Abhinavagupta precisely endorses the above contention.⁹² Like Dharmakīrti, Śaiva philosophers too reject difference between *pramā* and *pramāṇa* and, instead, uphold *vyavasthāpaka-vyasvasthāpya-bhāva* between the two. In this connection, Abhinavagupta cites the *Pramāṇavārtika*.⁹³ But whereas in *Pratyabhijñā* function (*vyāpāra*) is the essence of valid knowledge, Buddhists altogether reject causal function due to their belief in the doctrine of flux (*kṣaṇikavāda*). The texts of the Kashmir Śaivism serve as indispensable source of information for light on and consequent reconstruction of several missing pages of the history of Buddhist philosophy. Abhinavagupta alludes to several philosophical sub-schools in his *Vivṛti-vimarśinī*. It will be immensely interesting to watch⁹⁴ that Abhinavagupta highlights difference of opinions between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, talks of the constraints of the latter and also why he remembers *Dharmakīrti* as authentic (*prāmāṇika*) with great reverence as compared to Dignāga.⁹⁵

Buddhism and Nyāya both do not regard language as the original source of truth by itself. If for Buddhists language is simultaneously the source of pragmatic knowledge and transcendental illusion, for Naiyāyaka it happens to be of the nature of communication⁹⁶ and its authenticity totally depends upon the reliability of the speaker or employer of language. On the contrary, Mīmāṃsakas find significative power of language inherent in the very nature of language. Word is eternal and

has innate capacity to reveal the truth. This is why the Vedas are considered eternally given.⁹⁷ This view was later refined and developed in the philosophy of Grammar and Śaivāgamas. Despite mutual divergence of opinion the two systems converge on two points—one, words and meanings are bound by a necessary connection and two, there are several subtler forms behind each uttered word. While words, according to the Buddhist and Naiyāyika, are transient and convey primary or conventional meaning alone, they are considered a-temporal along with their inherent significative⁹⁸ power according to Mīmāṃsakas, Grammarians and Kashmir Śaivists.⁹⁹ *Varṇa* (phoneme) in Mīmāṃsā and *sphoṭa* in Grammar School, are eternal elements of word. The Grammarians posited *Śabda-brahman*, Word-absolute, as a sole source of all words and meanings and identified it with *Paśyantī* (=perceiving word). Kashmir Śaivists moved further by distinguishing *Parā Vāk* from *Paśyantī* and propounding the former's unity with consciousness-power (*citśakti*) or *vimarśa*.¹⁰⁰ The ultimate source of language is rooted within self-consciousness or self-affirmation of consciousness whereby spontaneity, creativity and expressiveness of consciousness is occasioned. The innate symbolism of language is neither eternal nor conventional, rather it is latent in the expressiveness of self-consciousness. Here we come face to face with the foundational insight of the Śaiva metaphysicians of Kashmir. Language in its deepest dimension is not conventional but natural, natural reverberation of consciousness.¹⁰¹ To present *vāk* as *vimarśa* or *vimarśa* as *vāk* is to say that language does not primarily symbolize any external, insentient, material world but 'psychical meanings'.¹⁰² This world is exactly the same as we render our experiences. This experience-making invariably involves referencing to self or consciousness.

Pande states in one of his article. 'It is the unity of psychic reality which makes communication ultimately possible since then it becomes a process of self-expression and self-recognition.'¹⁰³ Elsewhere also, he reiterates his position: 'If language in its ordinary use is necessary part of *Vyavahāra* 'rightly understood it can be a ladder for mystical self-realization. Language is both *prapañca* and *mantra*.'¹⁰⁴

Certain observations at this juncture may be found useful towards bringing out the inner logic of Pande's formulation of the linguistic theory of Kashmir Śaivism. Here *vāk* is distinguished from other systems by its stress on the agential dimension as compared to the linguistic dimension. 'Speaking' (*vakti*) here is tantamount to 'doing the act of speaking' (*vācam karoti*). This 'doing' or 'acting' is internal to the knowing-self logically culminating into self-affirmation. This *vāk* is reduced to self-referring gnostic agent-hood (*ātmavimarśanakartṛtā*).¹⁰⁵ Besides, *śabdana* (verbalizing/sounding) stands for *śabdana-kriyā* and not for *śabda* (word).¹⁰⁶ Abhinavagupta partly concedes ground to the Buddhist in viewing 'sounding-function' (*śabdana-kriyā*) as inherently contra-distinguishing (*apohaṇātmaka*)¹⁰⁷ and partly advances Bhartṛhari's line of thinking in considering the worldly transactions as being effected due to 'superimposition' (*adhyāsa*) of the denoter on the denoted.¹⁰⁸ The sounding-function or 'signifying activity' (*abhilapana*) is integral to subjective autonomy and is represented by reflection (*vimarśana*) in its universal mode and by linguistic construct in its particular mode. The word and sounding-function (the denoter and the denoting-function) are two different things. While word is an epistemic object, sounding function happens to be reflective activity which aims at conveying former's meaning. It is from this angle that

'word-meaning' (*śabdārtha*) is depicted as 'word-function' (*śabda-kriyā*), reducing word and meaning both to be reflectional in nature.¹⁰⁹

In the background of the aforesaid discussion, one may be able to appreciate better the rationale behind the enormous importance accorded to āgama in Śaiva metaphysical scheme as presented by G.C. Pande. Revelation is possible because it is expression of something, which is already contained in the supreme reality itself.¹¹⁰ At the level of *Madhyamā* self-expressiveness of consciousness gets mixed up with logic and conceptualization. Buddhists have convincingly demonstrated that imagination or intellectual constructing has no basis in the structure of reality.¹¹¹ The Śaiva distinguishes *vimarśa* from *vikalpa*, *cidrūpā-pratyavamarśa* and *vikalparūpa-pratyavamarśa* respectively, in typical Śaiva parlance, yet unlike Buddhist, regards logical constructions as being grounded upon reality with the only difference that *vikalpa* presents reality in a pragmatic form diverting attention from its intrinsic being. In such a scenario, if a philosophy is āgama-based and āgama is construed as translation or descent of *Parā* into *Vaikhari*, the problem arises how to coherently resolve the gap between original revelation and the historically available revelation. The available philosophical doctrines obviously relate to the historically available āgamas. This makes revelation suspect. Śaivas, according to Pande, use the instrumentality of *Sattarka* in order to obviate such a contingency.¹¹² Śaivas view *Sattarka* as part of the process of self-affirmation of consciousness or that of the process of comprehending āgamas: अंगीकृतस्तु सत्तर्को योगांगेषु तथापि च।¹¹³ In *Śāktopāya* which is intimately connected with awakening of mind (*cittasambodha*) or refinement of thought constructs (*vikalpa-saṁskāra*) or gnosis (*jñāna*), *Sattarka* assumes a lot

of value. *Sattarka*, translated as right logic or logic proper, means visualization of truth through reality-oriented reflective thinking. It is somewhat akin to Vedānta which also hints at the possibility of self-realization from hearing alone for the seekers at a higher plane. This *Sattarka* is equated with *Suddhā Vidyā*, which signifies pure knowledge¹¹⁴ and is God's will in essence. Now this *Sattarka* takes us to the Absolutic self-affirmation by eliminating the intervening gap between the original revelation and temporally available revelation.

Thus Pande, with reference to non-duality of word and sounding-function, word and meaning, concludes in his characteristic manner: 'वैदिक साहित्य में जिसे वाक् और मन का, अथवा वाक्-प्राण का मिथुन कहा गया है, उसे वैयाकरण शब्द और प्रत्यय का अनुबोध, बौद्ध गण शब्द और विकल्प की अन्योन्यहेतुकता, एवं काश्मीरी शैव आचार्य प्रकाश और विमर्श का तादात्म्य बताते हैं। वाक् को चेतना की अर्थरूप में आत्मप्रकाश की शक्ति कहा जा सकता है।'¹¹⁵ Pande finds this thesis extending up to aesthetics. As he perceives it, the infinite universe of *rasa* (which in itself consists of the suggested meaning) proceeds from this unity of word and meaning exactly as the world of experience does from the union of Śiva and Śakti.¹¹⁶ Moving further, Pande transcends beyond his immediate context when he envisions the potential road map for national reconstruction and cultural renaissance symbolized by the celestial union. In the words of Pande himself: 'राष्ट्रीय सफलता शिव और शक्ति के मिलन के बिना संभव नहीं है। आचार और व्यवहार में इसका अर्थ होता है प्रवृत्ति और निवृत्ति का कर्मयोग के रूप में समन्वय। अनुभूति के क्षेत्र में इसका अर्थ होता है विषयों का आत्मा लोक के रूप में परावर्तन जो उनके रूप के असंश्लिष्ट दर्शन को संभव बनाता है।'¹¹⁷

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. We come across Professor Pande's views on Kashmir Śaivism sporadically scattered over his several publications in differing contexts. In this connection, the second part of his *Foundations of Indian Culture*, भारतीय परम्परा के मूल स्वर, साहित्य सौन्दर्य और संस्कृति and सौन्दर्यदर्शनविमर्शः merit special mention. In these works, we gain access to the direct formulation of his views on—or contextually given particular thesis of—the Kashmir Śaivism and also to the indirect formulation during the course of his generalized treatment by appealing to or drawing upon the Kashmir Śaivist texts and sources in support of his opinions. These indirect formulations help us understand directions of his thoughts. For his structured thoughts, attention will be drawn to two unpublished sources. The first is his paper titled 'Reflection on Pratyabhijñā and Buddhism' contributed to the *Perspectives on Abhinavagupta, An Anthology of essays in Memory of Professor K.C. Pandey*. The second is my notes from the K.C. Pandey Memorial Lectures delivered by G.C. Pande at the Abhinavagupta Institute of Aesthetics and Śaiva Philosophy, University of Lucknow on 5–7 August 1998.
2. 'Kashmir Śaivism represents the most remarkable system of monistic theism.'—*Foundations of Indian Culture*, Vol. II: *Spiritual Vision and Symbolic Forms in Ancient India* (FIC), New Delhi, p. 140; also '... in its essential theistic monism'—vide 'Reflection on Pratyābhijñā and Buddhism (Reflection)' in *Perspectives on Abhinavagupta*, ed. by the present author (under publication).
3. Vide 'Essential Features of Kashmir Śaivism' (EFKS), K.C. Pandey Memorial Lecture on 5.8.1998.
4. तर्कस्य कर्तारो व्याख्यातारश्च.....। —*Viveka on Tantrāloka* 1.10, ed. R.C. Dwivedi and Navjivan Rastogi, vol. I, Delhi, 1987, p. 30.
5. Cp. लोकशास्त्रप्रसिद्धानां मतानां यद्विवेचनम्।
आत्मप्रतीतिसिद्धानामथवा यद्विमर्शनम्॥
सर्वविद्याद्यतत्त्वानां न्यायतत्त्वविमर्शनम्। — EFKS.
6. किञ्चिदागम्यते तत्त्वमुभयत्रापि सिद्धवत्।
शैवादिदर्शने तद्वि मुख्येनागम इष्यते॥ — *ibid*.

7. Reflection; also vide:
किं तावत् दर्शनं नाम विद्यायाः शैवसूरिभिः।
दृग्दृष्टिनयसिद्धान्तव्यपदेशैर्विवक्षिता ॥ — *EFKS*.
8. *Reflection*.
9. भारतीय परम्परा के मूल स्वर (BPMS), G.C. Pande, Delhi, 1981, p. 30.
10. चैतन्यमात्मा। — *Śiva-sūtra* (Ś.Sū), KSTS, 1.1 (cited by Pande, *ibid.*).
11. Cf. आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्तिकाचितिकर्तृता—
तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः ॥ — *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā* (IPK), KSTS, 1.5.12.
12. तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम्। — *Yogasūtras* (Y.S.)1.3 (cited by Pande, BPMS, p. 30).
13. Vide, *Īśvarapratyābhijñāvimarśinī* (I.P.V.), ed. K.C. Pandey and K.A.S. Iyer, Delhi, 1986, I, p. 245.
14. द्रष्टा दृष्टिमात्रः। — Y.S. 2/20 (cited, *ibid.*).
15. BPMS, p. 30.
16. चितिः स्वतन्त्रा विश्वसिद्धिहेतुः। — *Pr.Hr.* 1, cited by Pande, *ibid.*, pp. 30, 58.
17. चित्तिरेव चेतनपदादवरूढा चेत्यसंकोचिनी चित्तम्। — *ibid.*, 5, cited by Pande, *B.P.M.S.*, pp. 30, 58. Pande is quite fond of this aphorism from *Pr. Hr.* and alludes to it quite often. Cf. *EFKS*; also cp. *Dhammapāda* 1.1: 'मनोपुब्बंगमा धम्मा मनोसेट्थ मनोमया।'
18. BPMS, p. 41.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 47–48.
20. *FIC*, p. 144.
21. Vide *FIC*, p. 146.
22. BPMS, p. 56.
23. BPMS, p. 57.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 57; also cp. स ऐक्षत इति।.....ईक्षणं ह्यत्र तावद् द्वितीयाभावात् स्वविषयमेवेष्टम्, स एव चाहंपरामर्शः। ...अस्य तु जडत्वेन परामर्श शक्तत्वं नास्ति। — *Bhāskarī* on *I.P.V.*, I, p. 14.
25. इच्छाशक्तिरुमा कुमारी। — Ś. Sū. 1.13 (cited by Pande, *ibid.*, p. 57).
26. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
28. Vide *FIC*, pp. 153–59: sub-essay entitled 'Tantric Alchemy' under the chapter—'Smṛtis, Purāṇas and Tantras'.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
30. 'Tantra is the Science of Word applied to gain communion with the Divine.' — *ibid.*

31. Ibid.
32. The verse he refers to (pp. 155, 159) is *Śāradātilaka* (Śā. T.) 1.7:
 सच्चिदानन्दविभवात् सकलात् परमेश्वरात् ।
 आसीच्छक्तिस्ततो नादो नादाद् बिन्दुसमुद्भवः ॥
 The colophon and the *Padārthādarśa* commentary of Rāghava Bhaṭṭa regard the Śā.T. as a work of Lakṣmaṇagupta. But quite a few scholars do not agree. See present author's *The Krama Tantricism of Kashmir*, Vol. I, Delhi, pp. 147–49. Lakṣmaṇagupta was Utpaladeva's disciple and Abhinavagupta's preceptor in Pratyabhijñā and Krama schools.
33. Ś. Sū, KSTS, 2.1.
34. Vide FIC, p. 156 (end note 8). Pande's treatment is an exact echo of Kṣemarāja, the commentator of Ś.Sū.: "चेत्यते विमृश्यते अनेन परं तत्त्वम् इति चित्तं....तदेव मन्त्रयते....इति कृत्वा मन्त्रः। अथ च मन्त्रदेवताविमर्शपदत्वेन प्राप्तसामरस्यम् आराधकचित्तमेव मन्त्रः। — *Śiva-sūtra-vimarśinī* (Ś.Sū. Vi.), KSTS, p. 23.
35. Pande draws our attention to the *Spandakārikā* (Sp.K.) vide FIC, pp. 156, 159 (end note 9). Perhaps he has this statement of Kṣemarāja in mind: 'स्फुरत्तासारस्पन्दशक्तिमयशंकरात्मक-स्वस्वभावप्रतिपादनायैव चेदं शास्त्रं समुचितस्पन्दाभिधानं महागुरुभिर्निबद्धम्।....वस्तुतस्तु न किंचिदुदेति व्ययते वा, केवलं स्पन्दशक्तिरेव भगवत्यक्रमापि तथातथामासरूपतया स्फुरत्युदेतीव व्ययत इव चेति।' — *Nirṇaya* commentary by Kṣemarāja on *Sp.K.*, ed & tr. Jaidev Singh, Delhi, 1980, pp. 6–7.
36. एकैव सा महाशक्तिस्तया सर्वमिदं ततम्। — Cited by Pande, EFKS (source unidentified). Cp. *SpK*.1.19:
 गुणादिस्पन्दनिष्पन्दाः सामान्यस्पन्दसंश्रयात् ।
 लब्धात्मलाभाः सततं स्युर्ज्ञस्यापरिपन्थिनः ॥
37. 'In fact desire, knowledge and will represent three stages....' FIC, p. 156. Here, 'will' seems to be a printing error in place of 'action'.
38. Ibid., p. 157.
39. EFKS.
40. IPV, ed. K.A.S. Iyer and K.C. Pandey, Delhi, 1987, Vol. 1. p. 1.
41. 'I bow to that Absolute, which is unity of Paramaśiva and Śakti; the unity, which from its ultimate state, first of all manifests the Pure Ego 'I' and through its will, divides its power into two; the ultimate, state, which being without any manifestation, is self-contained and is responsible

- for creation and dissolution through the play and suspension respectively of its Power'. — Tr. K.C. Pandey, IPV, Vol. 3, p. 1.
42. Vide EFKS. Here a clarification will be in place. Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, etc. as 'categories' (*tattva*) are deemed different from Śiva, Śakti, as constitutive principles of the ultimate reality. As will be seen later, Śiva and Śakti corresponding to *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, happen to be more pivotal concepts.
43. FIC, p. 140.
44. Ibid., p. 141.
45. Ibid., p. 160.
46. Cf. तदेवं परत्वेन प्रधानतया अभिसंधाय आत्मा चेतन इति वक्तव्ये धर्मान्तराध-
रीकरणाय विमर्शधर्मोद्धुशीकरणाय च 'आत्मा चैतन्यम्' इति उक्तम्। — IPV, I,
pp. 248–9.
47. Vide साहित्य, सौन्दर्य और संस्कृति (Sā. Sau. Sa.), G.C. Pande, Allahabad, 1994, p. 25.
48. Cf. स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्श विदुरन्यथा। — IPK, 1.5.11.
49. Sā. Sau. Sa., p. 26.
50. Vide EFKS. Pande's treatement seems to imbibe the spirit of Abhinavagupta's following observation: प्रतिभाति घटः इति यद्यपि विषयोपश्लिष्टमेव प्रतिभानं भाति तथापि न तद्विषयस्य स्वकं वपुः अपितु संवेदनमेव तत् तथा चकास्ति 'मां प्रति भाति' इति प्रमातृलग्नत्वात्। तथा च वेदः 'तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति।' — IPV, I, pp. 349–50.
51. In other words, this may be described as tantric pursuit of 'intellectual knowledge' (*bauddhajñāna*), as against 'innate knowledge' (*pauruṣajñāna*).
52. Cited, EFKS; Bhāskarakaṇṭha also cites this verse. Vide IPV, I, p. 48.
53. EFKS.
54. स्वेच्छया स्वभित्तौ विश्वमुन्मीलयति। — P. Hr. 2.
55. निर्मल मुकुरे यद्वत् भान्ति भूमिलतादयः।
अमिश्रास्तद्वदेकस्मिंश्चित्राथे विश्ववृत्तयः॥ — T.A. 2.4
56. चिदात्मैव हि देवोऽन्तःस्थितमिच्छावशाद्बहिः।
योगीव निरुपादानमर्थजातं प्रकाशयेत्॥ — IPK 1.5.7.
57. K.C. Pandey Memorial Lecture on 7.8.98 relating to aesthetics.
58. A note seems necessary here. In the philosophy of Grammar Pratibhā may be viewed as one with Paśyantī, but in the Śaiva monism, Pratibhā is identical with Parā (supreme/-ultimate), and not with Paśyantī. We come across two

Pratibhā-related equations. Deemed as the root cause of poetry, Pratibhā corresponds to Śakti category, the stage above Sadāśiva. Mammaṭa does call it Śakti (शक्तिव्युत्पत्तिरभ्यास इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे). The *Tantrāloka* and *Parātrīṃśikā* describe it as *pratibhācamatkr̥ti*. In his *Locana*, in the concluding verse of the first chapter, Abhinavagupta hails *Parā Vāk* as Pratibhā: यदुन्मीलनशक्त्यैव विश्वमुन्मीलति क्षणात्।

स्वात्मायतनविश्रान्तां वन्दे तां प्रतिभां पराम्॥

In the other formulation, *Pratibhā* is identified with the Supreme Subject, Maheśvara, in his immanent aspect. This implies entire creation and its foundational grounding in the transcendental awareness

या चैषा प्रतिभा तत्त्वदार्थक्रमरूपिता।

अक्रमानन्तचिद्रूपः प्रमाता स महेश्वरः॥ — *IPK*, 1.7.1.

59. Technically, *āṇava mala* is viewed slightly differently. The innate ignorance becomes operative ever since the pure creation comes into being. Even in the emergence of Śiva category *Tirodhāna Śakti* remains active—Śiva category consists in negation of *Vimarśa* and rise of *Prakāśa* or, in other words, rise of I-consciousness and denial of this-consciousness. Apparently, though, *Tirodhāna Śakti* and *Apohana Śakti* convey the same meaning, yet they do so with reference to differing contexts. As against *Tirodhāna Śakti* which is ontological, *Apohana* is essentially cognitive. The ontic diminution of the universal being may be traced to *Tirodhāna*, whereas the cognitive or epistemic to *Apohana*. However, the basic spirit of Pande's observation is not impacted.
60. Reflection.
61. EFKS.
62. Reflection.
63. vide पारमेश्वरषु तावदागमेषु शैववैष्णवरहस्येषु वेदान्तेषु च स्पष्टमेवोक्तोऽयमस्मदुक्तोऽर्थः। — *IPVV*, vol. 3, p. 405.
64. EFKS.
65. Reflection.
66.ब्रह्मवादे मायां शक्तीकृत्यसिध्यत्येष जनः। — *IPVV*, vol. 3, p. 405
67. स्वतन्त्रशब्दो ब्रह्मवादवैलक्षण्यमाचक्षणश्चित्तो माहेश्वर्यसारतां ब्रूते। — *Pr. Hr.*, KSTS, p. 5.
68. आत्मन एव सद्भावे ये विप्रतिपन्नाः....त एव इह मूलविपक्षाः। — *IPVV*, KSTS, vol. I, p. 112.

69. Reflection.
70. इत्येव पंचायवात्मकमिदं शास्त्रं परव्युत्पत्तिफलम्। नैयायिकक्रमस्यैव मायापदे पारमार्थिकत्वम् इति ग्रन्थकाराभिप्रायः 'क्रियासंबंधसामान्य' (ई.प्र.का. २.२.१) इत्यादि उद्देशेषु प्रकटीभवति। — *IPV*, I, p. 43; Also see, *IPV*, II, p. 140.
71. एकानेकरूपस्य क्रियादेः बाह्यादेः विरुद्धधर्माध्यासदूषणेन अनुपपन्नमानस्याप्यवश्यं समर्थनीयं वपुः। — *IPV*, II, p. 32; also see 'The Pratyabhijñā and the Logical-Epistemological School of Buddhism' (PLSB), R. Torella, in *Ritual and Speculation*, ed. T. Goudriaan, Albany, 1992, p. 339.
72. Pande seems to throw a veiled hint by drawing attention to this issue, though he does not develop it that subscribing to the authority of *āgama* itself constitutes an extremely cogent distinctive feature of the Kashmir Śaivism. We will see somewhat more of it in the sequel.
73. Vide Reflection.
74. Vide *ibid*.
75. *Ibid*.
76. *Ibid*.
77. ...इति सादृश्यात् भवन्ती प्रत्यभिज्ञा न ऐक्यं वास्तवं गमयितुमलम्। — *IPV*, I, p. 115.
78. Vide Reflection.
79. *Ibid*. Cp. *IPK* 2.2.1:
क्रियासंबंधसामान्यद्रव्यदिव्यकालबुद्धयः।
सत्याः स्थैर्योपयोगाभ्यामेकानेकाश्रयाः मताः॥
80. Reflection.
81. *Ibid*.
82. *Ibid*.
83. Śiva and Śiva category are two different concepts. Originally, Śiva and Parama Śiva were not distinguished. In fact, the notion of Parama Śiva, standing for the absolute reality, came into vogue when Śiva was conceived as a category (*tattva/padārtha*) with particular emphasis on *prakāśa* aspect. Thus, *Śivatattva* is the first emanation in the categorial scheme of the system. But the way ultimate reality is conceived in *Yogācāra* as *Vijñāna*, it is akin to Śiva or Parama Śiva and not *Śiva-tattva*.
84. Reflection.
85. *Ibid*.
86. Cp. अर्थस्य स्वरूपं। प्रकाशमानता प्रकाशाभिन्नत्वम्। — *IPV*, I, p. 203.
87. Cp. अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यलक्षणत्वाद्वस्तुनः। — *Nyāya-bindu* 1.15.

88. प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनं हि विज्ञानवादवत् प्रकाशाभिज्ञा आभासा एव गम्यन्ते। — सौन्दर्यदर्शनविमर्शः, G.C. Pande, Varanasi, 1995, p. 100.
89. Śiva is defined as *Śaktimān* (one who is possessed of Śakti). Śakti here means *vimarśa* or its various formulations such as *visarga*, *kaulikī*, etc. Śakti also stands for its innumerable articulations. The cluster of five powers (*śaktipañcaka*) is foremost among them, which is being discussed above.
90. PLSB, pp. 329–330. Mark Abhinavagupta's definition of inference: अनुमानजा तु प्रतीतिः आभासान्तरात् कार्यरूपात् स्वभावरूपाद्वा आभासान्तरे प्रतिपत्तिः। — *IPV*, II, p. 84.
91. Cp. नास्माभिरपोहशब्देन विधिरेव केवलोऽभिप्रेतः। नान्यव्यावृत्तिमात्रम्। किन्तु अन्यापोहविशिष्टो विधिः। — *Apoahasiddhi*, ed. A.L. Thakur, Patna, 1957, pp. 59–64.
92. निषेधमनस्य हि अतद्रूपं विषयो, विधिभागस्य तु तद्रूपम्, विविधं हि कल्पनं विधीयमाननिषिध्यमानतयेति विकल्पनम्। — *I.P.V.V. KSTS*, II, p. 281.
93. एवं यतो नीलप्रकाशः ततो 'नीलमिदम्' इति परामर्श इति एकरूपेऽपि हेतुफलभावः, यथोक्तं 'तदवशात्तदव्यवस्थानात्...' (Pra. Vā. 3.308) इति। किंच इह व्यपाररूपमेव फलं व्यापाराश्च व्याप्त्रियामाणात् व्यपार्यमाणाद्वा अनन्याकार एव सिद्धः इति अभेदः प्रमाणफलयोः विमशबलेन च। — *I.P.V.* II, pp. 74–75.
94. 'By restoring the historical resonances between Helārāja's text and the texts of the two Buddhist philosophers, I hope to illuminate some of the more elliptical aspects of the *Prakīrṇaparakāśa* and perhaps account, in some measure, for the respect in which Dharmakīrti, and not Dignāga, was held by the Kashmir Śaiva Schools to which both Helārāja and the great Abhinavagupta belonged.' — *Bhartṛhari And The Buddhists*, Radhika Herzberger, Holland, p. 1986, p. 12.
95. प्रामाणिकोऽप्यार्यधर्मकीर्तिरार्यदिग्नागग्रन्थानुरोधात् तत्पक्षपातादेवम् अभिधत्ते, न पुनरस्य स्वरुचिरपेति। — quoted, *ibid.*, p. 3.
96. FIC, p. 180.
97. अतएव च नित्यत्वम्। — *Brahma-sūtra* 1.3.29, cited by Pande, FIC, p. 180.
98. संकेतिक शक्ति के स्थान पर अभिव्यंजक शक्ति कहना परम्परा के अधिक अनुकूल और कम भ्रामक होगा। — *BPMS*, p. 95.
99. FIC, pp. 180–81.
100. केचित् पारमेश्वरं विमर्शशक्तिमेव शब्दमूलं वदन्ति। — भक्तिदर्शनविमर्शः, G.C. Pande, Varanasi, 1991, p. 30; तथा च प्रत्यभिज्ञायतम्। *ibid.*, note 58, p. 36; Cp. *IPK* 1.5.13; चिति प्रत्यकमर्शात्मा परा वाक् स्वरसोदिता। स्वातन्त्र्यमेतुन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परामात्यनः॥

101. FIC, p. 181; Cp. व्रत्यवमर्शश्च आन्तराभिलावात्मकशब्दनस्वभावः तच्च शब्दनं संकेतनिरवेक्षमेव अविच्छिन्नचमत्कारात्मकम् । — *IPV*, I, p. 252
102. FIC, p.182.
103. 'The Life and Death of Language,' G.C. Pande, in *Diogenes*, 51, pp.193–94.
104. FIC, p. 182.
105. वक्ति विश्वम् अभिलपति प्रत्यवमर्शेन इति च वाक् अतएव चिद्रूपतया स्वात्मविश्रान्तिवपषा उदिता सदानस्तमिता नित्या अहमित्येव । — *IPV*, pp. 193–94.
106. वचनं हि शब्दनं न वागिन्द्रियजन्यः शब्द इत्यर्थः । ...श्रुतिगोचरीकार्या या शब्दनक्रिया शब्दोत्थापिका क्रिया ब्रूते जल्पति वक्ति इत्येवं । — *I.P.V.V.*, 275.
107. सर्वा प्रमेयेषु प्रतिपत्तिरपोद्घाभासारोपनिषेधव्यापारान्तःकारिणी निश्चयप्रतीतिरूपत्वात् । — *ibid.*, p. 207.
108. तदयं वाचकस्वरूपाध्यास एव वाच्यत्वं, तदध्यासश्च वाचकत्वमुत्थापयति । — *ibid.*, p. 267.
109. वाच्यं शब्दलक्षणं कर्म । निर्वर्त्यमर्थलक्षणं च प्राप्यं येषां, तथाविधा अपि शब्दार्थाः शब्दक्रियाश्च उक्ताः ।...श्वेतगुणसत्ताशब्दाश्च प्रमातृभूमिपतिताः प्रमात्रा विमृश्यमाना विमर्शं लोलीभूताः पूर्वापरीभूतेन विमर्शरूपेण उपबृंहिताः श्वेतते-भवति-ब्रूते इत्यादिक्रियारूपभाजः । — *ibid.*, p. 278; also see काश्मीर शिवाद्वयवाद की मूल अवधारणाएँ. Navjivan Rastogi, Delhi, 2003, pp. 78 ff.
110. आगमस्तु नाम आन्तरशब्दनरूपो दृढीयस्तमविमर्शात्मा चित्स्वभावस्य ईश्वरस्य अंतरगड. एव व्यापारः प्रत्यक्षादेरपि जीवितकल्पः । — *IPV*, II, pp. 84–85; also, आगमस्त्वपरिच्छिन्नप्रकाशात्माकमाहेश्वरविमर्शपरमार्थ किं न पश्येत् । — *ibid.*; p. 213.
111. EFKS.
112. *Ibid.*
113. This citation by Pande from an anonymous source could not be traced to the *Tantrāloka* and other texts.
114. सत्तर्कः शुद्धविद्यैव सा चेच्छा परमेशितुः । — T.A. 4.34.
115. BPMS, p. 95.
116. FIC, p. 275.
117. BPMS, p. 118.

6

प्रो० गोविन्दचन्द्र पाण्डे द्वारा प्रणीत
'वैदिक संस्कृति': एक अनुशीलन

शशिप्रभा कुमार

सर्वप्रथम मैं भारतीय दार्शनिक अनुसन्धान परिषद् एवं इसके पदाधिकारियों की आभारी हूँ कि उन्होंने भारतीय संस्कृति, इतिहास एवं दर्शन के मूर्धन्य मनीषी, विचक्षण व्याख्याता एवं अनवद्य कृती प्रो० पाण्डे के चिन्तन एवं लेखन को आधार बनाकर इस राष्ट्रीय संगोष्ठी की परिकल्पना की। यद्यपि प्रो० पाण्डे के वर्चस्वी चिन्तन को किसी प्रमाण की परिधि पर्यवेक्षणीय नहीं, न तो उनके यशस्वी लेखन को समालोचना की सीमा सन्तरणीय है और न ही उनके प्रतिष्ठित प्रकाशन को मुझ जैसे किस्सी सामान्य अध्येता की प्रतिक्रिया अपेक्षणीय है, तथापि भारतीय दार्शनिक अनुसन्धान परिषद् के इस प्रकल्प की प्रशंसा करनी होगी जिसके अन्तर्गत हम पाठकों को प्रो० पाण्डे की विचारभूमि में गहनतया प्रविष्ट होने का सुअवसर सुलभ हो सका।

प्रो० पाण्डे का समग्र कृतित्व इतना व्यापक, विविध एवं बहुमुखी है कि प्रथमतः यह निश्चय करना ही दुष्कर था कि मैं उनकी किस कृति पर अपना वक्तव्य प्रस्तुत करूँ किन्तु जब मैंने उनकी 'वैदिक संस्कृति' को विवेच्य बनाया तो उसके पीछे निम्न दो कारण प्रमुख रहे:

(क) भारतीय दर्शन की एवं विशेषतः वैदिक दर्शन की छात्रा होने के नाते मेरी अपनी सहज अभिरुचि, एवं

(ख) इस कृति का फलक जो प्रो० पाण्डे के चिन्तन एवं लेखन के सात पक्षों की ओर इंगित करने में सक्षम है तथा जिनके आलोक में उनके 'सप्तरश्मि' कृतित्व की एक रुचिर आभा प्रस्फुटित हो उठी है। उसका एक संक्षिप्त रेखाङ्कन करने का प्रयास प्रस्तुत प्रपत्र का प्रतिपाद्य है।

'वैदिक संस्कृति' ग्रन्थ हाथ में लेते ही उसका नव्य-भव्य आकार-प्रकार लेखक की सहज सौन्दर्यानुस्यूत अभिवृत्ति को रूपायित करता प्रतीत होता है। जब मैंने इस ग्रन्थ को पढ़ना आरम्भ किया तो दो सप्ताह तक अन्य समस्त अध्ययन-लेखन स्थगित कर इसमें तल्लीन हो गई। विभिन्न पाश्चात्य एवं पौरस्त्य पद्धतियों से परिष्कृत तथा प्राचीन और अर्वाचीन सन्दर्भों से संवलित प्रो० पाण्डे की चिन्तनधारा इस ग्रन्थ में सहज स्रोतस्विनी सी प्रवाहित होती प्रतीत होती है। जैसा कि ग्रन्थ के शीर्षक से ही स्पष्ट है तथा स्वयं प्रो० पाण्डे ने अन्यत्र कहा भी है—'इसमें वेदों की रचना-तिथि, आर्य जाति का प्रश्न, वेदों के अनुवाद की विधि, वैदिक देवताओं का स्वरूप, यज्ञ का वास्तविक अर्थ, उपनिषदों की एकवाक्यता, भौतिक और आध्यात्मिक पक्षों का सम्बन्ध और वैदिक युग में विज्ञान का विकास—इन सभी विषयों पर विचार किया गया है।'¹

वस्तुतः वैदिक अध्ययन के क्षेत्र में अद्यावधि प्रायशः दो सर्वथा एकान्तिक दृष्टियाँ उपलब्ध होती हैं:

- (क) ऐतिहासिक—जिसमें वेद के मूल मर्म एवं परिप्रेक्ष्य की सर्वथा उपेक्षा की गई।
- (ख) आध्यात्मिक—जिसमें आधुनिक एवं तुलनात्मक शोधदृष्टि का कथमपि अनुपालन नहीं किया गया।

उल्लेखनीय है कि इस दृष्टि से प्रो० पाण्डे की उक्त कृति वैदिक अध्ययन के सन्दर्भ में एक सर्वथा अभिनव एवं अपूर्व अध्याय है जिसमें इन दोनों ही पद्धतियों का सन्तुलित एवं सार्थक समन्वय हुआ है। 'वैदिक संस्कृति' न केवल पाश्चात्य और भारतीय विद्वत्ता का आलोचनात्मक रूप से संश्लेषण करती है बल्कि वेदों के गहनतर स्तर की पड़ताल करती है और दिखाती है कि किस प्रकार वैदिक काव्य को अर्थपूर्ण ढंग से अनूदित किया जाता है।²

भारत की मूल, सनातन, शास्त्रीय परम्परा में गहरी पैठ और अधुनातन तुलनात्मक प्रविधियों की पूर्ण पहचान प्रो० पाण्डे के लेखन को ऐसी सशक्त सार्थकता प्रदान करती है जो अतुलनीय है। प्रतिभा एवं पाण्डित्य तथा अन्तर्दृष्टि एवं बहुज्ञता का मणिकाञ्चन संयोग उनके कृतित्व में सर्वत्र समन्वित है। वैदिक वाङ्मय में वर्णित श्रोत्रिय³ आचार्य की परिकल्पना मानो उनमें मूर्तिमती हो उठी है; समग्र श्रुत या अधीत ज्ञान को उन्होंने न केवल अद्भुत रीति से आत्मसात् किया है अपितु उसका बोध, आचरण एवं प्रचार करते हुए अपनी विद्या को अर्थवती बनाया है:

अधीतिबोधाचरणप्रचारणैः दशाश्चतस्रः प्रणयन्नुपाधिभिः।⁴

भारतीय संस्कृति की अन्तर्निहित अजस्र ऊर्जस्विता के अनन्य आराधक प्रो० पाण्डे अपनी कीर्तिकरी कृति 'वैदिक संस्कृति' के आमुख में अपना मन्तव्य स्पष्ट करते हुए स्वयं कहते हैं:

'मेरा प्रयास नवीनतम सामग्री, तत्त्वार्थजिज्ञासा और सर्वाङ्गीणता की दृष्टि से ग्रन्थ की रचना का है, क्योंकि संस्कृति का स्वरूप जीवन और विचारों के विभिन्न पक्षों में अन्तर्निहित अव्यक्त सूत्रों को पहचानने से ही पता चलता है। इस संरचना-संवयन या त्सुजामेनहांग (Zusammenhang) में ही एक समग्र दृष्टि, मूल्य-परिप्रेक्ष्य या आधारीय विचार संस्थान के रूप में संस्कृति का मौलिक स्वरूप प्रतिभासित होता है। वैदिक संस्कृति को परिभाषित करने वाला यह ऋतसत्यात्मक सूत्र क्या है और किस प्रकार वह एक ऐतिहासिक युग की सभ्यता में प्रकाशित हुआ एवं परम्परा का उत्स बना, इसी को व्यक्त करना इस ग्रन्थ का मूल उद्देश्य है।'⁵

स्पष्टतः लेखक का उक्त आत्मनिवेदन लेखकीय स्तर पर उनकी मूल मान्यता एवं समग्र दृष्टि का सूचक है। कहने की आवश्यकता नहीं कि पुरातत्त्व, इतिहास, दर्शन एवं संस्कृति-विषयों पर आपकी परिमार्जित प्रज्ञा इस कृति को शास्त्रीयता का आधार प्रदान करती है तो आपकी सहज काव्यप्रतिभा एवं बहुभाषाविज्ञता इसमें काव्य की कमनीयता का आधान करती है। इस पृष्ठभूमि में 'वैदिक संस्कृति' ग्रन्थ में प्रो० पाण्डे के कृतित्व की निम्न सात छवियाँ मुखरित होती हैं:

(1) इतिहासकार, पुरातत्त्ववेत्ता—पारम्परिक भारतीय मनीषा वेदों को शाश्वत, नित्य एवं अपौरुषेय ज्ञान स्वीकार करती रही है जिसका प्रत्यक्षतः तार्किक अनुशीलन एवं इदमित्थंतया ऐतिहासिक परिशीलन सम्भव नहीं है। प्राचीन काल से इस विषय पर प्रभूत आलोडन—विलोडन होता रहा है किन्तु अद्यावधि कोई सुनिश्चित निष्कर्ष निर्णीत नहीं हो सका। प्रो० पाण्डे ने अपनी गहन पारम्परिक वैदुषी एवं व्यापक ऐतिहासिक अनुभव के आधार पर जो सन्तुलित सन्मति व्यक्त की है, वह इस दृष्टि से अतीव महत्त्वपूर्ण एवं उद्घरणीय है:

‘इस प्रकार वेद न स्थूल वैखरीरूप शब्दमात्र हैं, न स्वयम्भू ज्ञानमात्र। वे ज्ञान—विज्ञान को व्यक्त करनेवाली विपुल ग्रन्थराशि हैं जो किसी रहस्यात्मक अर्थ में नित्य या अनादि, अपौरुषेय या ईश्वरकृत मानी जाने पर भी उपपत्तितः अलौकिक प्रेरणा और अन्तर्ज्ञान से अनुप्राणित मनीषियों की रचनायें हैं, जो एक सुदीर्घ युग की ज्ञान—साधना प्रकट करती हैं। वे न केवल भारतीय परम्परा के मूलाधार हैं अपितु मानवीय इतिहास मात्र में मानवीय आत्मोपलब्धि और विमर्श के ऐसे प्राचीनतम दस्तावेज हैं जिनकी भाषा और विचार आज भी हमारे लिए सर्वथा अजनबी नहीं है। यदि इतिहास का मूल अर्थ बाह्य और परोक्ष घटनाओं का कार्यकारणात्मक अनुमान न होकर मानवीय चेतना के अभिलेखों की आत्मजिज्ञासा से प्रेरित परीक्षा है,⁶ तो वेद का परिशीलन आद्य मानवीय इतिहास का सबसे महत्त्वपूर्ण अध्याय हो सकता है जिसकी तुलना मिस्र एवं मेसोपोटामिया के अलावा हिब्रू जाति और चीन की प्राचीनतम अभिलेखिक सामग्री से ही हो सकती है।⁷

‘वस्तुतः एक मूल आर्यभाषा, जाति और संस्कृति की कल्पना कर उसके प्रसार को आक्रमण, संघर्ष और विजय का इतिहास समझना और इस इतिहास के दस्तावेज के रूप में वेदों को समझना न सिर्फ अप्रमाणित कल्पनायें हैं बल्कि वैदिक इतिहास को एक भ्रामक परिप्रेक्ष्य में रखना है।⁸....दूसरी ओर वेदों को नित्य, अभ्रान्त और सम्पूर्ण ज्ञान का प्रतिपादक स्वीकार करना एक पारम्परिक वैदिक धारणा मात्र है, इतिहासकार के लिए स्वीकार्य सत्य नहीं। सभी धर्मों के मूल में किसी न किसी प्रकार का लोकोत्तर आर्षज्ञान प्रतीत होता है पर उसके प्रकाशक नाना नबी, ऋषि, मुनि, सन्त आदि नाना युगों में उन युगों की भाषा और सन्दर्भ में अपने विशिष्ट ज्ञान का उपदेश देते रहे हैं। इस प्रकार वेदों में भी

लोकोत्तर ज्ञान और लौकिक धारणाओं को सन्दर्भ सापेक्ष वाक्यों में गुम्फित मानना चाहिए।⁹

जैसा कि स्पष्ट है, उक्त उद्धरणों में प्रो० पाण्डे की सन्तुलित दृष्टि और परम्परा-बोध एवं ऐतिहासिक शोधवृत्ति का समन्वित संप्रयोग अवभासित होता है। इसी भाँति वेदों के रचयिता, रचनाकाल और आर्यों की खोजविषयक उनके अन्य विचार भी इतिहासवेत्ता की पैनी पकड़ और तत्त्वचिन्तक की गहरी पैठ के परिचायक हैं।

(2) संस्कृति-संव्याख्याता—प्राचीन भारतीय इतिहास और संस्कृति के अध्यापक के रूप में सुपरिचित प्रो० पाण्डे भारतीय संस्कृति के सुलझे हुए व्याख्याता के रूप में सर्वतः समादृत हैं। आपकी *फाउण्डेशन ऑफ इण्डियन कल्चर* नामक द्विभागीय कृति विश्व-क्षितिज पर सुप्रतिष्ठित हो चुकी है। इस ग्रन्थ के विषय में आपने अपनी संस्कृति सम्बन्धी अवधारणा को स्पष्ट करते हुए लिखा है, 'इस ग्रन्थ में भारतीय संस्कृति को मात्र भौगोलिक और जातीय घटकों के आधार पर ऐतिहासिक संयोग से उत्पन्न सामग्री के रूप में नहीं लिया गया है बल्कि उसे सनातन सत्य की खोज की परम्परा के रूप में माना गया है। इस प्रकार संस्कृति इतिहास में अपूर्ण रूप से अभिव्यक्त सनातन और तात्कालिक, आध्यात्मिक और आधिभौतिक गवेषणाओं के सम्मिश्रण के कारण संस्कृति में भी नानास्तरीय सम्मिश्रण मिलता है। संस्कृति के मौलिक तत्त्व और स्थायी संरचना को उसकी ऐतिहासिक विकृतियों से अलग रखना आवश्यक है। संस्कृति का तात्त्विक बोध उसके ऐतिहासिक ज्ञान से असम्पृक्त न होते हुए भी उससे अभिन्न नहीं है।' ¹⁰ इतिहास और संस्कृति का तथा सनातन और अधुनातन का ऐसा संश्लिष्ट किन्तु सुस्पष्ट विवेचन प्रो० पाण्डे की महनीय विशेषता है। उनका विचार है कि संस्कृति आदर्शों का समुच्चय है अवश्य, किन्तु जब वे आदर्श जीवन में अवतरित होकर इतिहास का रूप धारण करते हैं, तभी संस्कृति सजीव होती है और समाज को आधार प्रदान करती है। आपकी धारणा है कि संस्कृति समाज की आत्मचेतना का प्रतिबिम्ब होती है, अनेकशः आपने अपने इसी मन्तव्य को मुखरित भी किया है, 'संस्कृति समाज की पहचान है और प्राण भी।यह ध्यातव्य है कि जहाँ प्राकृतिक पदार्थ चेतना मात्र की अपेक्षा करते

हैं, सांस्कृतिक पदार्थ आत्मचेतना की अपेक्षा करते हैं। यही प्रकृति और संस्कृति का अन्तर है। प्रकृति नैसर्गिक मानव-चेतना के लिए प्रदत्तवत् होती है। संस्कृति उसके आत्मबोध की वृत्ति होती है। इससे मानव-चेतना एक अनन्त पर्येषणा अथवा साधना की ओर झुकी रहती है।¹¹

'संस्कृति आत्मचेतना की एक वृत्ति है जिसे मूल्यान्वेषी कह सकते हैं। मूल्य आत्मसत्य का अवभास है जो कि नाना उपाधियों के माध्यम से नाना भूमियों में व्यक्त होता है। महापुरुषों के प्रातिभ दर्शन से मूल्योपलब्धि सांकेतिक रूप में परम्परा का अंग बनती है। मानव चेतना ही मूलतः ऐतिहासिक है, वही एकमात्र सत्ता है जो प्रतिक्षण अनुभव और किया से बनती है और बदलती है। समस्त सांस्कृतिक विश्व इतिहास में पिरोया हुआ है।'¹²

उक्त उद्धरणों के सन्दर्भ में देखा जाये तो वैदिक संस्कृति वैदिक समाज और इतिहास की आत्मचेतना की अभिव्यक्ति मानी जानी चाहिए और लेखक ने उक्त कृति में सर्वत्र इसी दृष्टिकोण को प्रकट किया है।

(3) भाषाविद् एवं अनुवादक—प्रो० पाण्डे की अनेकभाषाभिज्ञता सुविदित है—संस्कृत, पालि, हिन्दी, अंग्रेजी, फ्रेंच, जर्मन, बुद्धचीनी, ग्रीक, लैटिन और फारसी आदि विविध भाषाओं का आपको व्यावहारिक या आरम्भिक ज्ञान है। आपके लेखन की त्रिवेणी तीन भाषाओं में तरंगित हुई है—संस्कृत, हिन्दी और अंग्रेजी। इसमें कोई सन्देह नहीं कि भाषा संस्कृति की संवाहिका होती है, अतः भाषिक ज्ञान संस्कृति की अन्तरात्मा को पकड़ने में सहायक होता है। स्वयं प्रो० पाण्डे का अभिमत है कि 'जैसे प्राकृतिक पदार्थों का ज्ञान प्रत्यक्ष से आरम्भ होता है, ऐसे ही संस्कृति का ज्ञान भाषाप्रधान संकेतों और प्रतीकों के ज्ञान से आरम्भ होता है। अपने को समझने के प्रयास में हम अपनी संस्कृति को समझते हैं और इस प्रक्रिया में हमारा अन्तरालाप और आत्मविमर्श सांस्कृतिक भाषा और परम्परा से जुड़ जाता है।'¹³ इस पृष्ठभूमि में देखा जाये तो स्पष्ट होगा कि विविध भाषाओं एवं उनके प्रतीकों का व्यापक बोध प्रो० पाण्डे की सांस्कृतिक समझ को इतना गहन एवं विकसित बना गया है कि आपने जितनी अन्तरङ्गता से वैदिक संस्कृति का विवेचन किया है, उतनी ही अभिन्नता से बौद्ध दर्शन का विशदीकरण किया है। आपकी इसी भाषिक शक्यता का प्रतिफलन है कि वैदिक संस्कृति के अन्तर्गत सूक्तों

का अनुवाद¹⁴ इतना प्रभावी सिद्ध हुआ है। उदाहरणार्थ—स्थालीपुलाक न्याय से निम्न दो अनुवाद द्रष्टव्य हैं—

(क) मत्स्वा सुशिप्र मन्दिभिः स्तोमेभिर्विश्ववर्षणे सचेषु सवनेष्वा ॥

ऋ० 1/9/3

हे सुन्दराधर! आनन्दित हो आनन्दप्रद

स्तुतियों से, हे विश्वजनीन।

साथ आओ इन सवनों में ॥¹⁵

(ख) देवानां भद्रा सुमतिर्ऋजूयतां देवानां रातिरभि नो निवर्तताम्
देवानां सख्यमुपसेदिमा वयं देवा न आयुः प्रतिरन्तु जीवसे।

ऋ० 1/89/2

देवताओं का कल्याणकारी अनुग्रह

सरलता चाहनेवाले देवताओं का वरदान

हमारी ओर मुड़े

हम देवताओं का सख्य पायें

देवता हमें दीर्घ जीवन के लिए आयु दें ॥¹⁶

(4) कवि एवं सर्जक—वैदिक संस्कृति के प्रणेता एवं वैदिक सूक्तों के प्रामाणिक अनुवादकर्ता प्रो० पाण्डे मात्र भाषा के बाह्य कलेवर के पारखी ही नहीं, अपितु उसकी अन्तरात्मा के सहृदय संवेत्ता भी हैं, स्वयं मौलिक कविता करनेवाले प्रतिभासम्पन्न कवि भी हैं। प्रसिद्ध अलङ्कारशास्त्री भामह का निम्न कथन सर्वथा सटीक है कि पाण्डित्य तो गुरुजनों के उपदेश से कोई मूढ़ भी अर्जित कर सकता है किन्तु कवित्व तो जन्मजात प्रतिभा का फल है और वह विरले जनों को ही सुलभ होता है:

गुरुपदेशादध्येतुं शास्त्रं जडधियोऽप्यलम्।

काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित्प्रतिभावतः ॥¹⁷

इसमें कोई सन्देह नहीं कि प्रो० पाण्डे उन दुर्लभ जनों की श्रेणी में हैं जिन्हें काव्यत्व का यह वरदान दैवी अनुग्रह से सहज रूप में उपलब्ध हुआ है। इसीलिए 'वैदिक संस्कृति' ग्रन्थ के अनुवाद-अंश के आरम्भ में ही वे वेद के काव्यत्व का प्रतिपादन करते हैं और इस दिव्य काव्य का सरस भावानुवाद प्रस्तुत करते हैं जिसमें यत्र-तत्र उनकी सहृदयता एवं सहज काव्यप्रतिभा प्रस्फुटित हो उठती है तद्यथा—

यर्त्ते यमं वैवस्वतं मनो जगाम दूरकम् ।
तत्त आ वर्तयामसीह क्षर्याय जीवर्से ॥१॥
यत्ते दिवं यर्त्पृथिवीं मनो जगाम दूरकम् ।
तत्त आ वेर्तयामसीह क्षर्याय जीवर्से ॥२॥

—ऋ० 10/58/1-2

जो तुम्हारा मन दूर वैवस्वत यम को चला गया ।
उसे लौटाता हूँ यहाँ बसने जीने के लिए ॥
जो तुम्हारा मन दूर आकाश, पृथ्वी को चला गया ।
उसे लौटाता हूँ यहाँ बसने जीने के लिए ॥¹⁸

तथा—

जिनामि वेक्ष्मे आ सन्तमाभुं प्र तं क्षिणां पर्वते पादगृह्य ॥४॥
न वा उ मां वृजर्ने वारयन्ते न पर्वतासो यदहं र्मनस्ये ।
मर्म स्वनात्कृधुकर्णो भयात् एवेदनु द्यून्किरणः समजात् ॥५॥
दर्शन्नवर्त्र श्रुतपाँ अग्निन्द्रान्बाहुक्षदः शर्शवे पत्यमानान् ।
घृषु० वा ये निनिदुः सखायमध्यू न्वेषु पवर्यो ववृत्युः ॥६॥
अभूर्वोक्षीर्व्यु आर्युरानड्दर्षन्नु पूर्वो अर्परो नु दर्षत् ।
द्वे पवस्ते परि तं न भूतो यो अस्य पारे रजसो विवेष ॥७॥
गावो यवं प्रर्युता अर्यो अक्षन्ता अर्पश्यं सहर्गोपाश्चरन्तीः ।

—ऋ० 10/27/4-7

वही तुम आज पास
जिस तुम्हारे आने पर हम लौटते घर
जैसे पंछी वृक्ष में घोंसलों को ॥
घर गये ग्रामवासी
पैरवाले, पंखवाले
लौटे श्येन भी लालची ॥
भगा दो वृकी को, वृक को
चोर को भी तरंगिणि ।
सुख से हो सकें वार ॥
रंगों का चितेरा गाढ़े
काला प्रकट तुम ।
ऋण सा हटाओ, उषा ॥¹⁹

स्पष्टतः ऋचाओं के उक्त अनुवाद स्वतन्त्र रीति से पढ़े जाने पर मात्र अनुवाद प्रतीत नहीं होते, क्योंकि उनमें कवि-हृदय का स्पन्द है, भावना का स्पर्श है और लेखनी का लालित्य है। स्वयं प्रो० पाण्डे के शब्दों में—'I have tried to render Vedic poetry into Hindi, seeking to capture its transcendental vision of life expressed through metaphor of natural forms and a theory of multiple correspondences.'²⁰ 'आर्षकाव्य की धारा' शीर्षक के अन्तर्गत प्रो० पाण्डे ने ऋग्वेद के जितने भी सूक्तों का भावानुवाद किया है, उन सबमें उनके कवि-रूप की छवि झलकती है।

(5) समाजशास्त्री—जैसा कि पूर्वोक्त है, प्रो० पाण्डे के मतानुसार संस्कृति समाज की आत्मचेतना का प्रतिबिम्ब होती है, अतः वैदिक संस्कृति का प्रतिपादन करते हुए उन्होंने अपने इस मन्तव्य को प्रमाणित किया है। यही कारण है कि उन्होंने पूर्व वैदिक समाज की आध्यात्मिकता एवं उत्तरवैदिक समाज की कर्मकाण्डपरक चेतना इन दोनों का विशदीकरण पूर्ण निष्ठा और मार्मिकता के साथ किया है। निम्न दो उद्धरण द्रष्टव्य हैं:

'संस्कार, आश्रम और वर्ण नामतः और लक्षणतः उतने प्राचीन नहीं हैं जितने वे वस्तुतः थे। उदाहरण के लिए ऋक्संहिता में चार वर्णों का एकत्र नाम उल्लेख होने पर भी वर्ण शब्द का वहाँ प्रयोग नहीं है। ब्रह्म, क्षत्र और विशः का अनेकधा उल्लेख होते हुए भी उसके लिए वर्ण शब्द का प्रयोग नहीं किया गया है। फिर भी परवर्ती जाति की अवधारणा से उसे मुक्त कर उसका प्रयोग समाज के प्रधान अंगभूत वर्ग के लिए किया जा सकता है और इससे मूलभूत वैदिक समाज-विभाजन की दृष्टि स्पष्ट होती है। ऐसे ही यद्यपि चातुराश्रम्य का समुचित विकास सूत्रों में मिलता है, यह अनुमान भ्रान्त नहीं है कि पहले दो आश्रम प्राचीन वैदिक युग से प्रचलित थे और तीसरा उत्तरवैदिक काल में स्पष्टतया मिलता है। इसी प्रकार संस्कारों की व्यवस्था और लक्षण सूत्रकालिक होते हुए भी तदात्मक प्रथायें प्राचीन हैं। संस्कार आदि लक्षण परवर्ती होते हुए भी विकास की शर्तों के अन्दर प्राचीन सामाजिक लक्ष्यों का निर्देश करने में समर्थ हैं।'²¹

‘इस विवरण में यह ध्यान देने योग्य है कि यज्ञार्थक कर्मों के वास्तविक देश—काल से उनके वे देश—काल भिन्न हैं जिनमें उनका होना माना जाता है जैसे कि जो प्रत्यक्ष रूप से अध्वर्यु गाड़ी की ओर जाता है और उस पर चढ़ता है, अप्रत्यक्ष रूप से वह अन्तरिक्ष मार्ग से जाता है और त्रिलोक के ऊपर द्युलोक तक चढ़ता है। प्रत्यक्ष रूप से वह ध्यान उठाता है। परोक्ष रूप से वह देवताओं की प्रेरणा से कार्य करता है। यह कहना चाहिए कि जो प्रत्यक्ष घटित है उसका वास्तविक अर्थ परोक्ष है। कहा गया है कि **परोक्षप्रिया देवाः**। यह सांङ्केतिकता और परोक्षता ही आजकल की भाषा में कर्मकाण्ड का मिथ्याकल्पनात्मक पक्ष है। वस्तुतः यह उसका परोक्ष आधिदैविक और आध्यात्मिक पक्ष है। प्रत्यक्ष में घटना छोटी सी है—पुरोडाश के लिए गाड़ी से अध्वर्यु कुछ अनाज लाता है किन्तु कल्पना यह है कि वह देवताओं के बीच देवलोक के अनन्त भण्डार या भूमा से सामग्री लाता है।²²

जैसा कि स्पष्ट है, उक्त एवं अन्य अनेक ऐसे ही सन्दर्भों के आधार पर प्रो० पाण्डे ने अपनी समाज विषयक दृष्टि एवं वैदिक चिन्तन की उस परिकल्पना को ही प्रकट किया है जिसके अनुसार समाज—विज्ञान धर्म—विज्ञान है, मात्र समुदाचार विज्ञान नहीं है।

(6) शोधकर्त्ता—प्रो० पाण्डे की सभी समालोचनात्मक कृतियों की भाँति ‘वैदिक संस्कृति’ में भी शोध—सन्दर्भों की विपुलता एवं शोध—पद्धति का प्रचुर प्रयोग उपलब्ध होता है। काल, भाषा एवं विषय की दृष्टि से इतने व्यापक फलक को लक्ष्य कर लिखी गई प्रस्तुत कृति के प्रत्येक अध्याय के अन्त में समेकित सन्दर्भ—सामग्री का यदि एकत्र सन्निवेश किया जाये तो विदित होगा कि तत्सम्बद्ध पक्षों पर प्रकाशन—समय तक उपलब्ध कोई भी स्रोत अनुलिखित न रहा होगा। इस आधार पर निर्विवाद रूप से कहा जा सकता है कि यह ग्रन्थ वैदिक अध्ययन के क्षेत्र में विश्वकोष की भाँति उपादेय सिद्ध होगा; साथ ही इस दिशा में भावी शोधकर्त्ताओं के लिए यह कृति अपनी विपुल सन्दर्भ—राशि के कारण एक मानक ग्रन्थ सिद्ध होगी, इसमें सन्देह नहीं। ग्रन्थ की प्रामाणिकता का अनुमान इसी से लगाया जा सकता है कि किसी भी विवादास्पद विषय पर लेखक सभी सम्बन्धित बिन्दुओं/पक्षों को तटस्थ रूप से

सन्दर्भसहित उपस्थित करने के पश्चात् ही अपने कथ्य को प्रस्तुत करता है। उल्लेखनीय है कि आज की विद्वत्परम्परा में अपनी महनीय प्रतिष्ठा के कारण प्रो० पाण्डे का वचन स्वयं आप्तवचन की श्रेणी में ही आयेगा, किन्तु वे कहीं भी इस स्थिति का अनावश्यक लाभ लेने को उद्यत नहीं हैं। एक विनीत शोधकर्ता की भाँति सर्वत्र प्रामाणिकता की परीक्षा ही उनका एकमात्र ध्येय रहता है और अपनी वैयक्तिक प्रतिबद्धता को वे कभी इसमें आड़े नहीं आने देते। इस दृष्टि से वैदिक संस्कृति के प्रथम अध्याय में वेदों के रचना-काल के विषय में संकेतित विविध विप्रतिपत्तियाँ एवं उसके परिशिष्ट रूप में संलग्न द्वितीय अध्याय के अन्तर्गत आर्यों की भाषाशास्त्रीय खोज तथा संस्कृत भाषा की सर्वप्राचीनता आदि स्थल अनुसन्धेय हैं।²³

(7) दार्शनिक एवं चिन्तक—‘वैदिक संस्कृति’ के आधार पर प्रो० पाण्डे के कृतित्व की पूर्वोक्त छह छटाओं का आकलन करने के पश्चात् कहा जा सकता है कि इन सबमें अन्तर्निहित वैचारिक तारतम्य का जो तत्त्व है, वस्तुतः वही उनके लेखकीय गौरव का श्लाघ्यतम पक्ष है। तदनुसार उनकी चिन्तन-भूमि के विविध आयामों में एक केन्द्रीय बिन्दु है—भारतीय प्रज्ञा एवं परम्परा के प्रति एक सहज प्रतिबद्धता जो कथमपि अस्वाभाविक, एकांगी या पक्षपातपूर्ण नहीं है। पारम्परिक पुरातन पद्धति से शास्त्राभ्यास में प्रशिक्षित प्रो० पाण्डे अधुनातन शोध-विधाओं में भी पारंगत हैं, आपने पौर्वात्य एवं पाश्चात्य दोनों परम्पराओं का तलस्पर्शी वैदुष्य अधिगत किया है। किन्तु कारयित्री एवं भावयित्री दोनों प्रकार की प्रतिभाओं के पुञ्ज प्रो० पाण्डे का बहुआयामी व्यक्तित्व जिस एक अन्तःसूत्र में सम्प्रोत है, वह है उनकी गहन दार्शनिक अभिवृत्ति।

विवेच्य कृति *वैदिक संस्कृति* में उनकी इस दार्शनिक दृष्टि से साक्षात्कार मुख्यतः निम्न स्थलों पर होता है—

(क) वेदों की मात्र ऐतिहासिक व्याख्या करनेवाले विद्वत्समाज में ‘आर्य’ और ‘दास’ का जो तथाकथित विरोध स्वीकृत एवं प्रचारित है, उस सम्बन्ध में स्वयं इतिहासकार प्रो० पाण्डे का दार्शनिक मन्तव्य उद्धरणीय है—‘आर्य का मौलिक या नैरुक्तिक अर्थ जो रहा हो, उसका रूढ़ अर्थ समाज में ऊँची स्थिति और प्रतिष्ठा दिखाता है, वह किसी जनसमुदाय

का नाम, प्रजातीय या जनजातीय, नहीं प्रतीत होता। अतः 'आर्य' और 'दास' के परस्पर विभाग से यह निष्कर्ष नहीं निकाला जा सकता कि दास आर्येतर प्रजातियों की सामान्य आस्था थी।....

'वेद में दास और देव का संघर्ष पौराणिक देवासुर-संग्राम का ही रूपान्तर है। यह संघर्ष मानवजातियों के बीच संघर्ष नहीं है। दास को अयज्वा, अव्रत आदि कहना असुरों की सुविदित यज्ञ-विरोधिता के अनुरूप है। देवता ज्योतिर्मय हैं, इसलिए दास कृष्णवर्ण हैं। आर्य और दास का भेद धार्मिक और अधार्मिक का विरोध है। "इन्द्र ने आर्य के लिए ज्योति प्रकट की, दास को गिरा दिया" यहाँ सायण के अनुसार आर्य का अर्थ है "कर्म का अनुष्ठान करने वाले लोग"। स्पष्ट ही दास कर्महीन जन हैं, उनका गिरना विस्मयजनक नहीं है। यह सही है कि दास का वर्ण के रूप में उल्लेख करते हुए उसे नीचे फेंका हुआ बताया गया है, पर यहाँ सामाजिक अभिप्रेत न होकर पृथ्वी के नीचे के लोग से तात्पर्य है जहाँ आसुरिक शक्तियों का सहज निवास है। "उभा वर्णा वृषिरुग्रः पुपोष" में "आर्य" और "दास" वर्ण अभिप्रेत हैं। कभी स्वामी या ऋतचारी के रूप में देवता भी आर्य कहे गये हैं, जैसे-इन्द्र के लिए कहा गया-"यथावशं नयति दासकार्यः"। कभी आर्य मनुष्य मात्र के लिए प्रयुक्त है और मानवीय एवं आसुरिक शक्तियों के रूप में मिलता है, यथा-दासा च वृत्रा हतमार्याणि। यहाँ आर्य और आर्येतर जातियों के मानवीय विरोधी अभिप्रेत नहीं हैं, बल्कि मानवीय और अमानवीय शत्रु अभिप्रेत हैं।'.....

'इस कल्पना का कोई पुष्ट आधार नहीं है कि प्रजातीय सम्मिश्रण सिर्फ भारतीय प्रदेशों की विशेषता थी जिनपर एक विशुद्ध आर्य जाति आक्रमण कर छा गयी। इस प्रकार की कल्पना का आधार यह विश्वास है कि एक भाषाभाषी समुदाय एक विशुद्ध समुदाय भी है जो स्वयं असिद्ध ही नहीं बल्कि विदित तथ्यों के विरुद्ध है। इस सन्दर्भ में यह विशेष रूप से स्मरणीय है कि भारतीय पुरातात्त्विक साक्ष्यों के आधार पर आर्य और आर्येतरीय समुदायों को अलग नहीं पहचाना जा सकता।'²⁴

वस्तुतः वैदिक वाङ्मय में आपाततः प्रतीयमान विसंगतियों और विरोधाभासों का सार्थक एवं युक्तिसंगत व्याख्यान तथा समाधान उसमें अन्तर्निहित तात्त्विक सूत्रों को समझे बिना सम्भव नहीं है और प्रो० पाण्डे

की सहज दार्शनिक दृष्टि ने सर्वत्र ऐसे स्थलों का सप्रमाण विवेचन कर अपनी कृति को एक स्थायी सन्दर्भ—ग्रन्थ का गौरव प्रदान किया है।

(ख) पूर्व वैदिक युग की आध्यात्मिकता का वर्णन करते समय वैदिक संस्कृति के लेखक ने वैदिक 'देवता' तत्त्व का जो स्वरूप—निरूपण किया है उसमें स्पष्टतः उनकी दार्शनिक मननशीलता अभिव्यक्त होती है तद्यथा—'यह निस्सन्देह है कि देवताओं को शुभ्र, ज्योतिर्मय, अमर, अतिमानवीय शक्तियाँ माना जाता था। वे प्रकृति और मानव—जीवन के विविध क्षेत्रों की अध्यक्षता करती हैं और उपासना से प्रसन्न होकर मानव—हित का संपादन करती हैं। उनका नाम और रूप से बहुत्व उनमें किसी प्रकार का विरोध या संघर्ष आपादित नहीं करता। उनमें एक समष्टिगत सहकारिता एवं तात्त्विक एकता का अनेकत्र उल्लेख मिलता है। आधुनिक पश्चिमी विद्वान् यह मानते हैं कि प्रारम्भ में वैदिक देवता नाना ही माने जाते थे और उनकी कल्पना प्राकृतिक शक्तियों को देखकर एवं भाषा की लाक्षणिक शक्ति से उत्पन्न हुई। यह प्राकृतिक बहुदेववाद ही कालान्तर में विचार के विकास से एकदेववाद में परिणत हुआ। किन्तु यह धारणा भारतीय देववाद की मौलिक विशेषता की अनदेखी करती है जो कि देवता को तत्त्वतः एक, किन्तु नाम—रूप से अनेक मानती है। अनेकता में अन्तर्निहित एकता का भान इस दृष्टि की विशेषता है। इसने नाना जातियों और सम्प्रदायों में प्रतिष्ठित देवताओं की उपासना को एक सार्वभौम धर्म में समन्वित करना सम्भव बनाया। स्वधर्म—निष्ठा और विश्वजनीय बन्धुता दोनों ही इस प्रकार अविरोधी बन जाती हैं।....'

'यदि केवल उपलब्ध संहिता—पाठ के अनुसार वैदिक धर्म को समझने का प्रयास किया जाये तो यह निस्सन्देह है कि इसमें एकरसता के स्थान पर उच्चावच अभिप्राय और सन्दर्भों की झलक मिलती है। अतएव व्याख्याकारों के लिए यह अनिवार्य हो जाता है कि वे अपने मत के समर्थन के लिए मूल सामग्री को अनुकूल चयन के आधार पर स्थापित करें और परवर्ती सन्दर्भों से उसे समर्थित करें। ऐसे ही देवता एक हैं अथवा अनेक, इसमें भी मौलिक एकत्व को कार्यार्थ स्वीकृत नानात्व के साथ समन्वित किया जा सकता है जैसे एक ही मनुष्यता अनेक मनुष्यों में प्रकट होती है और अनेक मनुष्य फिर एक राष्ट्र के रूप में देखे जा सकते हैं।'²⁵

उक्त उद्धरणों के सन्दर्भ में देखा जाये तो स्पष्ट होता है कि प्रो० पाण्डे यहाँ उसी दार्शनिक मान्यता का प्रतिपादन कर रहे हैं जिसके अनुसार भारतीय चिन्तन द्विस्तरीय नहीं, अपितु अन्ततः एकस्तरीय है। उसमें द्वित्व या बहुत्व का निषेध नहीं, अतिक्रमण है। बहुत्व से द्वित्व एवं एकत्व ही यहाँ प्रतिपादन पद्धति है।

(ग) 'ऋत' का वैदिक सम्प्रत्यय गहन वैचारिक विकास की सम्भावनाओं से समेकित है। वैदिक चिन्तन में ऋत के अनेकानेक अर्थ एवं अवधारणायें मिलती हैं—उन सबका सूत्रात्मक रूप में संकेत करते हुए प्रो० पाण्डे ने पाश्चात्य दार्शनिक चिन्तन से उसकी तुलना भी की है और उसकी तार्किक रीति से परीक्षा भी की है—'वैदिक सृष्टिविद्या का मूलाधार ऋत की अवधारणा है।.....व्यक्त जगत् में नाना पदार्थ और घटनायें जिस एक अदृश्य महासूत्र से व्यवस्थित हैं, वही ऋत है। पश्चिमी चिन्तन में **आर्केटाइप** या **लेक्स नातुरालिस** "प्राकृतिक नियम" की कल्पना ऋत या धर्म की कल्पना से तुलनीय है।.....प्रकृति का नियम, आचार—व्यवहार का नियम और अनुष्ठान का नियम, ये तीन ऋत के मुख्य रूप हैं। तीनों मिलकर प्राकृतिक और मानवीय जगत् को व्याप्त करते हैं उसे एक नियत, व्यवस्थित और सार्थक इकाई बनाते हैं।'।

'आधुनिक दृष्टि से इस प्रकार का चिन्तन सदोष है क्योंकि इसमें द्रव्यगत, विधिगत और ज्ञानगत तत्त्वों का सम्मेलन देखने में मिलता है।इस प्रकार कारक, विधायक और अनुमापक हेतुओं के व्यापार अलग—अलग प्रकार के हैं। इनसे सम्बद्ध नियम भी प्राकृतिक, वैज्ञानिक नैतिक—विधिक और तार्किक स्तरों के होने के कारण परस्पर विविक्त हैं।

'यह आधुनिक धारणा प्राचीन ऋत और धर्म की अवधारणाओं से संगत नहीं है। ऋत में कारकता, ज्ञापकता और विधायकता तीनों ही संगृहीत हैं।'।

'आध्यात्मिक सत्य और सांस्कारिक विधि के रूप में ऋत वेदों में प्रतिपादित और अनुष्ठानों में रूपान्वित है। प्राकृतिक नियमों के रूप में ऋत भौतिकविज्ञान का प्रतिपाद्य है। किन्तु उस रूप में ऋत का प्रतिपादन वेद में है अथवा नहीं, यह प्रश्न स्वाभाविक है। अधिसंख्य मत यही है कि वेद का प्रतिपाद्य पुरुष—विज्ञान का आत्मविज्ञान है न कि प्रकृतिविज्ञान। प्रकृतिविज्ञान के साध्य लक्ष्य—सापेक्ष और अनैकान्तिक होते हैं जबकि आत्मविज्ञान परमार्थ का साधक होता है।'²⁶

वस्तुतः वैदिक चिन्तन के विकास में 'ऋत' की परिकल्पना अतीव केन्द्रीय बिन्दु रही है—तदनुसार प्राकृतिक घटनायें, मानवीय कर्म और अनुष्ठानिक कर्म—ये सभी अन्ततः परस्पर सम्बद्ध एवं सुनियत हैं।

(घ) उल्लेखनीय है कि वैदिक संस्कृति नामक ग्रन्थ में एक अध्याय उपनिषदों का परिशीलन विषय पर आधारित भी है। सर्वविदित है कि उपनिषद् भारतीय तत्त्वचिन्तन और आत्मविद्या के मूल स्रोत हैं, अतः उनका निरूपण करते समय लेखक की दार्शनिक अभिवृत्ति और भी मुखर हो उठी है तथा इस प्रक्रिया में औपनिषदिक सर्वात्मवाद और साक्षी चैतन्य आदि बिन्दुओं पर उनकी लेखनी निम्न रीति से प्रकाश डालती है:

‘सर्वात्मत्व—विज्ञान से सब मोह और शोक उत्तीर्ण हो जाते हैं। यही वास्तविक समता की अनुभूति है। एक आत्मा की अनुभूति जगत् की सब अनुभूतियों को छोड़कर निविड एकान्त में मन के उपराम होने पर ही नहीं होती प्रत्युत जागतिक जीवन के बीच में भी होती है। यह एकत्व की अनुभूति जीवन में मुक्त अवस्था में भेद—प्रतीति के साथ विद्यमान रहती है।’

‘आत्मज्ञान एक शाश्वत समस्या है। ज्ञान विषय का होता है और आत्मा विषय से भिन्न विषयी है। इसलिए जिसका ज्ञान होता है, वह आत्मा नहीं होता है, किन्तु यह प्रश्न उठता है कि आत्मा क्या सर्वथा अज्ञात है तो वह विचार या उपलब्धि का विषय कैसे बन सकता है? आत्मा के विषय में ये दो विरुद्ध विप्रतिपत्तियाँ बनी रहती हैं। एक ओर तो आत्मा को किसी विषय के साथ विषयरूप में समझना, दूसरी ओर आत्मा को नितान्त अज्ञात मानना। आत्मा अप्रमेय है, साथ ही वह समस्त प्रमाण—व्यवहार की पूर्वापेक्षी है।.....आत्मा विज्ञान का विषय नहीं है क्योंकि वह प्रत्यक्ष का विषय नहीं है और प्रत्यक्ष का विषय न होने के कारण वह अनुमान का भी विषय नहीं है।.....इस प्रकार विषय के रूप में आत्मा को अवधारित करने का प्रयत्न आत्मसत्ता के विलोप में पर्यवसित होता है।’

‘विषयों की सत्ता प्रत्ययों से सिद्ध होती है और प्रत्ययों की सत्ता प्रत्ययदर्शी साक्षी पर निर्भर करती है। इस अनिवार्य, अनपाह्य, प्राकृतिक प्रत्ययसाक्षी का ज्ञान विषय के ज्ञान के समान नहीं होता किन्तु अज्ञान का भी विषय नहीं होता क्योंकि वह अज्ञान का भी साक्षी है।

प्रतिबोधविदित यह पद विशेष रूप से आलोचनीय है। इसका अर्थ है प्रत्येक बोध में विदित। हम नील देखते हैं, पीत देखते हैं, मधुर या तिक्त, शत्रु या मित्र जानते हैं। इन सभी में हमारा अपना ज्ञान पहले विद्यमान रहता है। प्रतिबोध का एक और अर्थ भी सम्भाव्य है, वह है—प्रत्यग्बोध अर्थात् आन्तरिकबोध, बाह्य विषयों से हटकर अपनी ओर मुड़ती हुई चेतना।²⁷

स्पष्टतः उक्त विवेचन में प्रो० पाण्डे की दार्शनिक दृष्टि एवं वैचारिक गाम्भीर्य सर्वथा सुव्यक्त है।

(ड.) यहाँ यह निर्देश करना नितान्त अपरिहार्य है कि विवेच्य कृति **वैदिक संस्कृति** का अन्तिम अध्याय उपसंहाररूप है; यद्यपि उसका शीर्षक **वैदिक विज्ञान** है, किन्तु वस्तुतः वहाँ विज्ञान का अभिप्राय मूल वैदिक दृष्टि से ही है तथा उसको विशद करने की प्रक्रिया में स्वयं प्रो० पाण्डे की तात्त्विक दृष्टि ही निरूपित हुई है, तद्यथा:

'यह सुविदित है कि वेद शब्द का अर्थ ही ज्ञान या विद्या है। यह ज्ञान या विद्या वेदों में एक अखण्ड रूप से प्रतिपादित है। उसे लोकोत्तर—साक्षात्कारमूलक अभ्रान्त और सम्पूर्ण सत्य माना जाता है। इस ज्ञान के विधिपक्ष से लौकिक अभ्युदय या कामनापूर्ति अदृष्ट हेतुओं के द्वारा होती है और उसके पारमार्थिक पक्ष को हृदयंगम करने से मुक्ति होती है।.....'

वैदिक विज्ञान को मूल रूप से सृष्टिविद्या या **कौसमोलॉजी** कहा जा सकता है। प्रसिद्ध वैज्ञानिक एवं दार्शनिक व्हाइटहैड ने कहा कि चिन्तन का प्रत्येक युग अपनी एक निराली सृष्टि—ज्ञानात्मक धारणा पर प्रतिष्ठित होता है। भौतिकी के प्रसिद्ध ज्ञाता बौम ने इसका समर्थन किया है। उनका कहना है कि प्रत्येक युग में एक आधारभूत दृष्टि रहती है, जो यह निर्धारित करती है कि मूल पदार्थों का क्या स्वरूप है और वे किन नियमों के द्वारा व्यवस्थित होते हैं। मूल तत्त्व और उनकी मौलिक व्यवस्था ही सृष्टिप्रक्रिया का आधार है। बौम ने आधुनिक और प्राचीन दृष्टियों का यह भेद बताया है कि आधुनिक दृष्टि सब पदार्थों को विखण्डित और विश्लेषित करती हुई उन्हें देश, काल और गति के नियमों से यन्त्रवत् संहत मानती है। प्राचीन दृष्टि एक जगत्व्यापी अखण्ड व्यवस्था को खोजती थी।.....'

वैदिक दृष्टि सृष्टि के मूलतत्त्व को खोजती हुई अपने प्राचीन युग में ही इस निष्कर्ष पर पहुँची थी कि देव शक्तियाँ ही विश्व की मूल विधारक शक्तियाँ हैं और ऋत ही मूल व्यवस्था है। देवशक्ति ज्योतिः स्वरूप है। एक ही ज्योति बाहरी जगत् और मानवीय सत्ता में अनुस्यूत है। पिण्ड और ब्रह्माण्ड की समानरूपता एक महत्त्वपूर्ण वैदिक चिन्तन का सूत्र था।²⁸

वैदिक विज्ञान के इस पिण्ड-ब्रह्माण्ड विषयक मूल सूत्र को समझ लेने पर निश्चय ही वैदिक चिन्तन का मर्म हृदयङ्गम हो सकता है क्योंकि वही वैदिक संस्कृति का मूलाधार है और वही वैदिक दर्शन का सर्वप्रमुख सिद्धान्त है। प्रो० पाण्डे ने अपनी कृति में यत्र-तत्र इस बिन्दु को अभिव्यक्ति दी है—उन सब स्थलों का संकेत न तो इस सीमित प्रस्तुति में सम्भव है और न ही अपेक्षित। उसके लिए तो जिज्ञासु को स्वयं उनकी रचना से अपरोक्ष संवाद स्थापित करना होगा। अतः उक्त स्वल्प संकेत-सूत्रों के आधार पर यदि मैं यहाँ उपस्थित एवं अनुपस्थित पाठक-वर्ग तक प्रो० पाण्डे की 'वैदिक संस्कृति' का मूल स्वर सम्प्रेषित करने एवं उनकी उत्कण्ठा को उद्बुद्ध करने में यत्किञ्चित् सफल हो सकी हूँ तो स्वयं को 'कृतकृत्य' समझूँगी। यहाँ यह स्पष्ट कर देना भी अनिवार्य है कि मैंने यथासम्भव स्वयं को पृष्ठभूमि में रखते हुए प्रयास किया है कि प्रो० पाण्डे के शब्दों को ही माध्यम बनाकर उनके चिन्तन को प्रस्तुत करूँ। इसीलिए उक्त रेखाचित्र की सहायता से मैंने उनकी केवल एक कृति का दिग्दर्शन मात्र निदर्शन के रूप में किया है—उनका चिन्तन इतना गहन एवं लेखन इतना व्यापक है कि उसे एक लघु प्रपत्र में समेटना मेरी स्वल्प सामर्थ्य से परे है।

अन्त में, प्रो० पाण्डे के ही शब्दों में उनकी रचनाधर्मिता के मूल मन्तव्य को व्यक्त करना चाहूँगी:

'I have tried for more than half a century to discover the original forms of Indian tradition that have, over time, been distorted by stereotypes and western misconstructions. These original forms of insights and imagination are of perennial significance. Their strength is evident in the way they have

continued to be re-interpreted and re-expressed anew, inspiring original thought and creative imagination in every age.'²⁹

अर्थात् 'विगत आधी शताब्दी से भी अधिक समय से मैंने भारतीय परम्परा के उन मौलिक रूपों का खोजने का प्रयास किया है जो कालावधि में रूढ़िबद्ध धारणाओं से तथा पाश्चात्य दुर्व्याख्याओं से दूषित हो चुके हैं। अन्तर्दृष्टि एवं प्रज्ञान के ये मूल रूप आत्यन्तिक महत्त्व के हैं। उनकी सामर्थ्य इसी से सिद्ध है कि प्रत्येक युग में उनकी पौनःपुन्येन नूतन व्याख्यायें और अभिव्यक्तियाँ होती रही हैं तथा उन्होंने मौलिक चिन्तन एवं रचनात्मक कल्पनाओं को सतत प्रेरित किया है।'

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7

The Concept of Rta as Expounded by G.C. Pande: A Critical Evaluation

R.R. PANDEY

Among philosophical speculations the first phase is dominated essentially by cosmology. In Greek philosophy, the problem of all philosophers from Thales to Anaxagoras was: what is the nature of that first principle from which all things have issued? Thales asserted that the ultimate principle is water, Anaximander indefinite matter, Anaximenes air, the Pythagoras Number, the Eleatics being, Heracleitus fire, Empedocles the four elements, Democritus atoms, and so on.

The question as to how this universe came into being seems to have been raised by our Indian Rishis in the following manner:

What was the tree, what wood in sooth produced it,
From which they fashioned out the earth in the heaven.¹

In the earlier stage, every God is looked upon as the creator of the universe. Sometimes, the world is presented as a general architectural art. In the *Rgveda* Vishṇu is shown as having measured out the three worlds with his three steps:

I will proclaim the mighty deeds of Viṣṇu of him who measured out the earthly spaces.²

The oft quoted lines in the connection are as follows.

The real is one, the learned call it by various names Agni, Yama and Mātariśvan.³

Man begins by looking outwards upon the external world and not looking within his own self. Here is a demand which is an explanation of nature and it is a dominant cosmological approach. The problems of man, of life, of human destiny, of ethics are treated scantily or not at all. It is not till the time of sophists that the Greek spirit turns inwards upon itself.⁴

The moment man is born he is confronted with a bewildering mass of phenomenal world. He is the 'subject' and the entire universe is his object. The polarity between 'subject' and 'object', *Ahaṁ* and *Idaṁ*, 'Self and not-Self' is very obvious.

All philosophy is a critical enquiry about these two fundamental concepts and their mutual relationship and ultimately its culmination into transcendental unity. In the philosophical enquiry when emphasis is on the concept self, it is *Ātmavidyā*. When the emphasis is on its counterpart, i.e., not-self and its origin and exposition, it is cosmology. G.C. Pande holds that the Vedic conceptual structure is a beautiful conceptual edifice made out of the fabrics of *Ātmavidyā* and *Śṛṣṭi Vidyā*. In the beginning, the *Śṛṣṭi Vidyā* dominated but in the later part of the Vedic era *Śṛṣṭi Vidyā* was replaced by *Ātmavidyā*. *Upaniṣads* declare: '*Ātmā va'are Draṣṭavyaḥ*.' In the earlier Vedic era, the concept of *Ṛta* dominated; Vedic deities were divine forces connected with *Ṛta*. As a matter of fact, *Ṛta*, *Satya* and *Devatā* are the three dimensions of one Absolute Reality; Self on the one hand transcended the concept of *Devatā* and became the very Absolute it-

self: Again *Ātmā Brahma*, on the other hand, *Devata*-creation, *Havi* and *Yājaka* are non different with the Absolute. *Brahmārpanam...Brahmakarmasa-mādhinā*. IV.24.

Man was very much associated with *Yajna*. In the later Vedic era, deities were replaced by the concept of Brahman, *Ṛta* by the concept of *Dharma* and *Puruṣa* by the concept of *Ātman*. *Yajna* was replaced by *Upāsana*, culminating into *Jnāna*. Thus, *Parāvidyā* was identified with *Brahmavidyā*. The pre-Vedic era was dominated by four concepts *Ṛta*, *Devatā*; *Puruṣa* and *Yajna* while in the later Vedic era, the concepts of *Brahma*, *Ātmā*, *Upāsana*, *Jnāna* and *Dharma* gained prominence.⁵

The concept of *Ṛta* is the fundamental concept of Vedic cosmology. Etymology of *Ṛta* is from the root *Ṛ* which means motion; thus *Ṛta* means motion and its path. *Ṛta* has been associated with *Satya* from the very beginning. In the *Avesta* the Iranian form of *Ṛta* is *As'a* which is used for *Satya* and *Dharma*. In old Persian, it is like *Arta*; thus *Ṛta* has been interpreted-joining completely. In this way *Ṛta* means complete binding, i.e. controller or sustaining rule.⁶

Rivers flow due to *Ṛta* the sun has unfolded the creation.⁷

Big warriors fear *Ṛta*.⁸

Following *Ṛta* Sarama got cows.⁹

Adityas, those who follow *Ṛta* their paths are fine.¹⁰

In these illustrations *Ṛta* symbolizes good, truth and right.

In the beginning of creation there was *Ṛta* and *Satya*. *Ṛta* and *Satya* were born out of severe penance, then was born night, then tidy ocean. The *Saṁvatsara* came out of tidy ocean. The presiding deity of magical world created night and day. He created matter the sun and the moon, as usual. He also installed the sky and Earth, *Antariksa* and the Sun.¹¹

Here it has been told that *Ṛta* is associated with *Satya*, and these both were born out of creative penance but, this is a previous stage than the explicit creation and implicit nature. It is suggestive of night and ocean *Avyakta* or *mūla Prakṛiti* only; then does time emerge. In the context of creation or manifestation, it is the concept of time which is the first determining factor. The process of time is coming down from previous *Kalpas*. Even after that the manifestation of the world complex has occurred many times. In this way, the emergence of *Ṛta* and *Satya* is prior to the emergence of the manifest world and unmanifest *Avyakta*. They should be taken under the ontological intelligence or primal intelligence of creator under the creative penance, which could be compared with Platonic Ideas or Aristotelean formal causes. *Ṛta* is the original controlling and sustaining force of the first creator and as the ideal of created things, only they are real. The world of *Ṛta* is the Transcendent world and that is why it has been termed as the *Paramavyoma*.¹²

The location of *Ṛta* is *Paramavyoma*, transcendental world. It is the primal element of creation, it is the controller and ideal of the creations. *Ṛta* is the invariable managing and sustaining principle of various elements and events of the manifest universe. The concept of *Ṛta* or *Dharma* can be compared with the archetypes or natural laws of Western thought. Things are validated by following it as ideal of the world. Following it, motion or function becomes meaningful. Locus of morals and human conduct consists in following *Ṛta*. *Ṛta* is the essence of worship or sacrifice by exploring its meaning. Thus, *Ṛta* has three chief forms, natural laws, moral or rules of human conduct and rules of worship. Combined together they are immanent in the human universe as well as natural world and made everything relevant.

In the modern context the above-mentioned concept appears fallacious because in it there is overlapping of substantial, legal and conceptual elements. Earth, Water, etc., substances are real and they operate under the rule of cause and effect. Such rules are insentient and many. On the other hand, which action is good and which one is bad, what is duty and what is non-duty, etc. depend on does. Imperatives are different from the rules of causation. Source of causation is unknown but it operates; its operation is necessary. Ethical rules are known but they lack necessity. But the rules of inference are different from above-mentioned rules of causation and morals. The concept *Rta* synthesizes the above-mentioned rules of the three categories.¹³

Rta, is thus, associated with both, one and many, immanence and transcendence. Thus, *Rta* connotes substance, reality and motion, rightness of morals and the ideal of world creation all the three aspects. *Rta* and divinities are related invariably. Deities have been referred as *Rta Vrata*. *Rta* is the very normal will of deities.

Let us examine the evidence of *Rta* and its utility. According to some scholars, natural events often repeat themselves. It is because of repetitions *Rta* that is inferred.¹⁴

The motion of the sun, the moon and stars, the cycle of day and night, season, cycle of birth; growth, birth and death, all indicate that the human and natural operations are controlled by some higher rule. Similarities of various kinds among a variety of things, their repetitions and regular relationship lead to the conceptions of the rules of cause and effect. It appears that the concept of *Rta* is the most possible imagination as a concept of general controlling agency. In a way, in the history of knowledge and science, the concept of *Rta* is the early vibration of the concept of rule. As a matter of fact, the

fundamental proof of the concept *Ṛta* is the intuition of *Ṛṣis* which became for others as authority. Finally, natural events, human activities and ritual activities are definite and interrelated. The methods of rituals are useful to human beings as such they are the symbolic expression of *Ṛta*.¹⁵

In the form of natural law the exposition of *Ṛta* is the subject of physics. That the exposition of *Ṛta* in the same way is the subject of Veda or not. This question is natural. A majority of views holds that the subject-matter for exposition of the Vedas is *Ātma Vijnāna* or *Puruṣa Vijnāna* and not that of *Prakṛiti Vijnāna*. In general, the Vedas have transcendental objective and its spiritual means, and not that of physics which deals with things of utility. It also appears quite rational that physics succeeds only by adopting perception and not that of *Āṛsa Jñāna*. Historically, the development of science could be expounded. *Mīmāṃsā* tradition holds that the subject-matter of Vedas for discussion could be *Adṛṣṭa*, because worldly and known things could be known through other means of knowledge, and so we do not need the Vedas at all.

The effect-cause rule in the fields of science is not supported to be an essential rule. Logical rules are supposed to be tautology. Ethical rules are simply tradition; we do not find any known and logical foundation of *Ṛta*. Concept of rule is the natural truth in the human intellect. This natural realization appears to be the concept of *Ṛta*. This concept is the fundamental for the investigation of evidence. Without this, even logical operation is not possible. *Mīmāṃsā* combined together with the subject-matter of the Vedas is *Dharma* and *Brahman* *Athāto Dharmajijnāsā* 1.1.1. *Athāto Brahma Jijnāsā*. 1.1.1 *Dharma* is the transcendental means for the realization of good. *Brahman* is the ultimate good and ultimate reality—

Parama Nishsreyasa and *Paramātmā*. The realization of both transcends all known worldly objects.

According to the new commentators, the concept of *Ṛta* could be the illustration of first vibration of scientific and ethical intellect. While according to traditional view *Ṛta* and *Satya* are identical with *Dharma* and *Brahman*. According to the first view the natural science of Vedas could be the science of that time, while according to the second view whatever natural science is found in the Vedas is the simple translation of the public mind.

Various interpretations of the Veda discussed by G.C. Pande from the point of view of history of ideas are being kept aside here. He concludes that *Ṛta* is the fundamental principle of the universe; its spiritual, social, transnatural and trans-sacrificial aspects have been sometimes discussed in obvious or secret form in the Vedas. Its trans-divine scientific aspect is still a secret. On the one hand it is called myth, on the other hand it is called the metaphysical science.

Let me critically examine G.C. Pande's exposition about the concept of *Ṛta*. It is impossible to read G.C. Pande's writings, packed as they are with serious and subtle thought without being conscious that one is in contact with a mind of a very fine penetration and profound spirituality. In his exposition, G.C. Pande has adopted both methods comparative as well as that of history of ideas. As the polarity between 'Subject and Object', '*Ahaṁ* and *Idaṁ*', *Tat* and *Tvaṁ* is obvious and Pande is quite right when he says that in the beginning *Śṛṣṭi Vidyā* dominated, whether it is Indian philosophy or Greek philosophy and the concept of *Ṛta* is the fundamental concept of Vedic cosmology. And it is equally true that *Ṛtam* and *Satyam* are parallel concepts of the early Vedic cosmology. *Ṛtam ca Satyaṁ ca* (*Ṛgveda*, 10.190, 1) their

parallel journey as the two fundamental concepts of Vedic cosmology and *Ātma Vidyā* continues till their culmination into '*Pūrva-Mimāṃsā-Athāto Dharma Jijnāsā. Athato-Brahmjijnāsā*'. Never before a depth study into the history of these two fundamental concepts has been done when finally concept *Ṛta* is replaced by *Dharma* and the concept *Satya* is replaced by *Brahman*, and the concept *Dharma* is the means to realize *Brahman*.

In such a case, Pande's comparison of the concept of *Ṛta* with 'Platonic Idea' is full of suggestions. There is no exaggeration in the dictum that the entire Western wisdom is footnotes on Platonic thought. According to Plato, dialectic is the crown of knowledge and knowledge is the crown of life. All other spiritual activities are of value only in so far as they lead up to the knowledge of idea.¹⁶

Further, Pande compares the concept *Ṛta* with the formal cause of Aristotle. Aristotle's formal cause is the concept or Plato's idea. I wonder if there are such hints in any history of either Indian or Greek philosophy.

I simply wonder why Pande failed and did not compare the concept of *Nous* as expounded by Anaxagoras. There appears to be plan and purpose in the world. How can design, order, harmony and beauty be brought about by blind forces acting upon chaotic matter? The plan and purpose of world suggest a world controlling *Nous* and it reminds the first aphorism of *Brahmasūtra*; *Janmādyasyayatah* (1.1.2).

Like the Platonic idea, *Ṛta* is the first principle of the Universe. Again, like Platonic Idea *Ṛta* is Universal. Further, like Platonic Idea the locus of *Ṛta* is transcendental world. Then again, like Platonic Idea *Ṛta* could be apprehended by reason alone. Aristotle's observation is very pertinent when he says that Platonic theory of Ideas fails to explain the world of things.

Further, the dichotomy between reason and sense, thought and thing could not be resolved by Plato and this inconsistency prevailed throughout the succeeding Western philosophical tradition. But the above-mentioned dichotomy between subject and object, self and not self is resolved by Advaitins when they identify self with Brahman: *Ayañ ātmā Brahma*.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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8

Understanding Value in *Ātamānusandhāna* Some Observations on G.C. Pande's *Mūlya-Mīmāṃsā*

INDU SARIN

G.C. Pande argues that the distinctive condition of man is that he is a value-seeking being. Man not only lives but also critically reflects on his doings. Starting from his given empirical identity, he seeks for his transcendental identity. The quest for transcendental identity is the quest for values. The search for transcendental identity is potentially present in every human being. Man, in time, seeks for eternity. The quest for value is in this passage from time to eternity.

Man is not satisfied with what it is, he searches for what it ought to be—a shift from the desired to the desirable. Pande holds that from a point of time, the individual seeks the perennial, 'not merely to contribute to another point in future'.¹ This quest for the perennial is the outcome of self-consciousness that is attained not by seeing the factual world but seeing through oneself—traversing the path of values.

With the growth of self-consciousness, man becomes aware of his own tendencies. He does not accept his tendencies as they are but searches for the ideal objects recommended by reason. The search for the ideal objects (in contradistinction to the given objects of experience) in the interval of given things is a specific search of human life. This desire (*aiṣṇā*) for the higher (*parā*) *paryeṣaṇā* is the search for value. Human life is distinguishable from material existence and other forms of life due to its freedom to accept or reject inherent purpose and inert tendencies in the light of reason. Man is never satisfied with the given form of the object but he wants to achieve it in the ideal form.

Pande holds that desire, reason and freedom are involved in the concept of value.² Desire and reason are object-oriented. Freedom, being the characteristic feature of the doer, is subject-oriented. But all the above three dimensions of consciousness project the object of their deeds as well as the subject in relation to its object, revealing both at the same time.

In the value experience, the object of desire (desirable) is not just any object but it is very specific. It is the object which is determined by knowledge. So, the knowledge determined objectivity becomes the differentia of desirability. The objectivity of desire and knowledge hold the same object in the value experience. The subjectivity of desire and knowledge also gets a locus in the same free subject and motivate it to do actions. There is reconciliation of objectivity of desire and knowledge with the subjectivity that wants to express itself as a doer. Therefore, that which is desired in its known form and which can be attained by a free subject can be called value. In other words, it can be said that value is a concept that refers to an object desired in its ontic form by a subject. The relation between the two is that of *sādhya* and *sādhaka*.

Pande holds that freedom is the very characteristic feature of human consciousness. When the latter falls from its nature, it gets in bondage and experiences insufficiency (helplessness) in the midst of finite objects. It then aspires for a complete, sufficient and transcendent state of being. This manifests in the quest of value. Value knowledge, value quest and efforts to achieve value define the true nature of human consciousness.³

Pande distinguishes between desire and desirability. Whatever is valuable is desirable. From this belief some thinkers hold that values are the objects of desire. Pande has gone into the deeper scrutiny of the connection between desire and value. His investigation reveals that on the basis of difference between the reality and ideal of desire, between that which is desired and desirable, a dichotomy of pleasure and good is drawn. If this distinction is accepted as the difference between the objects of desire, then it turns out to be a difference among desires and nothing else. The good also becomes a variety of pleasure (which it is not). However, if it is accepted that some objects are independently sought and chosen by reason, then the dichotomy becomes valid.

However, Pande does not accept the separation of reason and desire in the context of value. He says that in desire itself reason is inherent in the form of the awareness of ends and in the awareness of ends an inherent desire is present due to its being a possible awareness of the object of desire. In Pande's view, reason and desire should not be acknowledged as different types of awareness. The nature of the same object manifests in different dimensions differently due to dominance of one aspect over the other.

Pande maintains that there are two elements in desire—intentionality (*saviṣayatā*) and inspiration (*preraṇā*).⁴

Inspiration turns into action through some latent cause while intentionality is the awareness of an object and organizes its subject. On the one hand, the awareness inherent in desire is the self-consciousness of the subject, which is regulated by the external cause and on the other, it is the means-oriented consciousness of the utility of the object. Knowledge is inherent in desire and the utility-consciousness that emerges out of it, is neither purely dependent on tendencies nor on pure reason. The awareness of natural tendency comes up in the form of expectation and expectation projects the appropriate object on the basis of experience. Reason acts in the whole process as the reconciler of conflict between various desires and self-consciousness of desirable objects-ideals.

In the consciousness of the desirable, there is an emergence of value but at the same time it is also felt that the decision of value is possible through analysis. Pande holds,

अभीष्टबोध में मूल्य का आभास होता है किन्तु साथ ही यह भी बोध होता है कि मूल्य का निर्णय विवेचन द्वारा ही हो सकता है। एषणा मूल्य को आभासित करती है किन्तु यह आभास विवेक-शोध्य होता है। इससे यह ज्ञात होता है कि एषणामात्र मूल्य की जननी नहीं है। इसलिए अभीष्ट होने से ही कोई विषय मूल्यवान नहीं हो जाता, उसे विवेक के द्वारा अनुमोदन भी प्राप्त होना चाहिए... विवेक-सहित एषणा ही पर्येषणा है... इष्टता के बोध में आभासित मूल्य के अन्वेषण को विवेक आत्मदर्शन की ओर ले जाता है।⁵ Self-consciousness is, thus, the combination of desire and reason. The reason-combined desire is *paryeṣaṇā* and its gradual development presents the world of value before us.⁶ *Paryeṣaṇā* puts the individual on the path of *ātmanusandhāna*.

The value is not a part of nature; it is subject-dependent. Natural attributes of an object, according to Pande, are received by way of inherent copying (passively). Those attributes, which are designated as value, emerge out of freedom and their reception depends on the test of an educated (refined) reason. It is delineated through the

symbolic expression and its consciousness is directed to the self through the mediation of a mirror-like anchor. For example, every human being can get joy through music but only those who have a refined taste acquired through education can judge its quality.

Although the material world in its known form cannot be regarded independent of consciousness yet its cognition does not project any self-consciousness. Contrary to this, there is a necessary self-relatedness in value-consciousness, which means that value is not in the objects out there. It is a very significant comment on the nature of value that clearly delineates Pande's view. In a nutshell, we can say that values are subject-type and not object-type. To accept value-consciousness as objective cognition is to render it to the world of entities independent and indifferent to the subject. Value-consciousness, therefore, cannot be accepted as pure cognition.

Pande defines value in terms of an end or ideal worthy to be sought for. Value is projected through reflective consciousness that has the discriminating ability (*vivek*) to distinguish between the deeper and the superficial, artificial and real, and to know what is excellent. Value refers to this level of excellence in the object, which is to be contrasted with the natural qualities of the latter. In this sense, value implies gradation of the qualities of the object by the subject who, after evaluating, seeks for the best. To be befitting and to be worth attaining characterize the value-pursuit that has a dimension of depth in it.

To say that value is subject-dependent is not to prove the irrelevance of the object. Value presupposes the following elements:

1. Subject who judges and seeks an ideal.
2. Objective correlate—the terminus of seeking, object is judged to be valuable.

3. Interrelationship between the subject and the object.

It is only through the convergence between the subject and the object that the core of value gets revealed. Though value presupposes the object yet the factual object as such is not the value-object. To say that this is valuable and this is here (factual object) are not identical. Value is not assimilation of facts but a projection of ideals.

In the above discussion, Pande defines human ends or *puruṣārtha*. They are neither bare objects nor are they bare desires. They are the unity of both. Similarly, value-consciousness is also neither purely subjective nor objective. It is real but its reality is not nature dependent. Its reality lies in the inevitability of its nature, in its rationality and in the mystery of its un-analyzed totality. Its desirability lies in its ideal that is found in the perfection of all imperfect things and which helps in determining their hierarchy and fixing standard for their refinement.

Human awareness starts with the difference between the subject and the object. However, at the level of sense perception, the object of knowledge and the subject remain disconnected. At the mental level, the development of conceptual knowledge gives depth to the object. This knowledge reveals the subject-object difference and renders the subject as a mere point of reference without having any nature of its own.

At the level of rational, concepts become the object of knowledge. The process of merging of these concepts begins in the self. It is realized for the first time that the only real objects are those which are desirable and whatever is desirable should be brought to reality. This is the awareness of value or ideal and this awareness arises only in the process of self-endeavour (*ātmanusandhāna*). It consists in knowing the object fully in context of the whole.

The whole is not in objectivity but is in the synthesis of subject and object, inner and outer. In value-consciousness, the object-consciousness and the subject-consciousness are related dialectically. The self turns out to be helpful for value achievement and value turns out to be helpful for the attainment of the self.

The awareness of value emerges only in the critique of the concept of the self as an object. The unification of subject-object takes place only in the self. The nature of self is both apparent and latent (hidden). As such it becomes an object of search. The apparent self thinks itself to be a finite subject dependent on the world of objects. The real self, on the other hand, is infinite, timeless and autonomous. The tension between the apparent and the real self inspires one to search for its reality and to attain its infinite, autonomous, eternal being. This is the quest of the self as also that of value.

Pande holds that axiogenesis involves knowledge, *bhāva* (emotion) and urge (*aiṣṇā*), but it is not to be identified with any one of them. Value, of course, presupposes knowledge of the object but mere knowledge is not enough. Nothing is regarded as valuable just because one is emotionally inclined towards it. Similarly, nothing is regarded as valuable which is an object only of desire (urge). An object becomes an object of value only when its desire joins with *bhāva* (emotion) and both of them join with its knowledge. When all the above three join together, then the object of desire becomes an end. So, in this sense, value can be called as an end or an ideal.

Value consciousness is cognitive but this knowledge is basically self-knowledge,⁷ which is efficient in judging the objects of knowledge. It supports a reconciliatory insight beyond the analytical partial knowledge. The immediacy of value consciousness makes it sensation-like

but it is different from that because it is not non-reflective or pre-reflective. Value consciousness, therefore, is neither pure reason nor pure sensation.

There is a great controversy over the issue whether values are subjective or objective. Due to this duality, we find two opposite views regarding the nature of value. The cognitivist view assumes it as an ontic object, whereas the conativist view holds it to be the fulfilment of certain desires. Pande maintains that to recognize the value of an object is not liking or disliking it. It is also not merely an attitude towards it.⁸

The choice of an end or an ideal is not a dry logical exercise; it involves the sensitivity of the subject. Knowledge must commit oneself to a distinct praxis. *Bhāva* and desire are required so that the subject identifies himself with the ideal and is possessed with the urge (not psychological but transcendental) to attain it and, consequently, gets transformed. This is the difference between axiological formulation and theoretical construction. Value is not an abstract ideal, it must press for its realization. It is an ideal to be aspired for, which shows the worth and desirability of the ideal. At the rational level, consciousness finds a difference between its objects and its substratum. The urge to know the essence of the object (which is not apparently available) is presented as the ideal. Value-pursuit is the pursuit to achieve the ideal. It involves desire, knowledge and action.

Pande states that the concept of ideal implies ability, relevance, appreciability, its being high or excellent and that subject's attraction towards it.⁹ The ideal must have the ability to become the object of desire. Its relevance lies in its testing, i.e. its being flawless in comparison to other and opposite ends, which makes it higher or excellent. In its mental perception, it must be an object of apprecia-

tion. But mere appreciation is not enough, the subject must be attracted towards it, so that he can attain it and make it a part of his being. Mere appreciation projects the object as such but attraction projects self-awareness. In the spiritual quest, the self itself becomes an object of value and there is a search for its depth, height and truth. The value at this level is self-oriented and self is value-oriented.

Pande maintains that human life is multi-dimensional and every dimension has its own specific ends. There is nothing common among them. From this point of view, it seems that life is divided into multiplicity of values like bodily—social, intellectual-cultural and spiritual-transcendent. The clear picture of value for Pande is to be seen only in the spiritual-transcendent dimension. The discriminating ability (*vivek*) is the highest at this level. This is the process of self-realization (*ātm-khoj*) where the intrinsicity of value is fully captured. At this level, the end is desirable purely for its own sake and not because of something else. One is ready to sacrifice even bodily social, intellectual-cultural values for self-realization.

At the ordinary level, the plurality of values in the context of the above three dimensions appear to be conflicting but at the level of the *ātman*, they get harmonized and unified. *Ātman* is the foundation of the embedded unity of disparate dimensions of value that satisfactorily encapsulates less satisfactory value-profiles. It is only in the pursuit of spiritual-transcendent quest that the real nature of value is understood. The values of different spheres of life achieve systematic unification in the attainment of the self.

The attainment of the real nature of self is the end (*sādhya*) of the spiritual quest of value. It is to be sharply distinguished from the apparent self or ego.¹⁰ Imposition

of external objects on the real self gives rise to ego. The latter gets involved in the world of objects. The present state of self (ego) is the seeker (*sādhaka*). When the *sādhaka* is confused with *sādhya*, an illusion of self-endeavour takes place. To accept the ego as the source of value is selfishness, ignorance and the root of misunderstanding. Pande states,

अहं को मूल्यों का मूल मानना ही स्वार्थ है, सत्काय है, दृष्टि है, अविद्या है, अनर्थ-मूल है। स्वार्थ-त्याग से मूल्य प्राप्ति होती है।...¹¹

Value is realized in abandoning selfishness and the process of abandoning culminates in the dissolution of ego. The lower objects of consciousness can be sacrificed for the higher ends. Value-quest is not *bhog* but is *upāsana*, the words of Pande. Appreciating an object and getting involved in it is *bhog*. Abandoning it for the attainment of higher end is *upāsana*.

Pande contrasts practical life with *sāadhanā*.¹² He mentions three types of following *triputis* [trinities]:

- (a) Trinity of knowledge (*jñāna*)—knower, knowledge and known (*pramātā*, *pramā* and *prameya*).
- (b) Trinity of desire (*aiṣṇa*)—desirer, desire and desired (*aiṣitā*, *aiṣṇā* and *aiṣya*).
- (c) Trinity of action (*karma*)—doer, action and deed (*kartā*, *karma* and *kārya*).

In the quest for the self (*ātmanūsandhāna*), these trinities dissolve into the cohesive trinity of *sādhaka*, *sadhanā* and *sādhya*. In practical life, the above three trinities form three different dimensions but in *ātmanūsandhāna*, they reconcile with each other and dedicate to the quest of value. Pande says,

प्रमाता, प्रमा और प्रमेय, एषिता, एषणा और एष्य, कर्ता, कर्म और कार्य, ये तीनों त्रिपुटियां आत्मानुसन्धान की प्रक्रिया में समरस होकर साधक, साधन और साध्य की महात्रिपुटी में पर्ववसित होती हैं। व्यवहार के स्तर पर ये त्रिपुटियां

पृथक्-पृथक् आयाम बनाती हैं, साधना के स्तर पर ये समन्वित होकर मूल्य का सन्धान अर्पित करती हैं।¹³

In practical life, knowledge depends on causality and functions in the backdrop of public practice. Desires remain blind either by selfish motives or by social conventions. Actions aim at objects, which are given by inherent tendency or obtained by conventions. These three dimensions in practical life conflict with each other. To avoid the conflict between publicly accepted purpose and environment, action exploits knowledge to fulfil the desire. The inconsistency between internal expectation and experience creates the difference of reality and imagination, of valid knowledge and illusion. For the success of action, the knowledge of helpful means and obstacles is necessary and knowledge grows in this very backdrop.

The awareness of purpose and awareness of object emerge in practical life in different ways. Awareness of purpose is an intuition of the end, whereas the awareness of object emerges as the knowledge of alternative means. In practical life, the publicly accepted purposes are normally accepted as they are. The awareness of worldly objects becomes progressive valid knowledge through science by examining the means of obtaining that particular knowledge.

The direction of desires is determined by the tendencies (*samskāras*), that of action by desires and that of knowledge by actions, although by their very nature desires remain inherent tendencies, actions remain the self-emerged externalizing causal activity and knowledge remains the managing element of the doer. Consequently, although interdependence is imposed on desire, knowledge and action in practical life, in their very nature they remain separate from each other. Pande states,

फलतः व्यवहार के सन्दर्भ में इच्छा, ज्ञान और कर्म के बीच पारतन्त्र्यात्मक संबंध आरोपित होते हुए भी वे स्वरूपतः पृथक् पदार्थ रहते हैं...¹⁴

Desires remain separate at the level of emotions, knowledge and actions remain separate at the level of external activity. Due to this separation, many thinkers hold the view that the different dimensions of consciousness have different values such as beauty (for desire), goodness (for action) and truth (for knowledge).¹⁵

Contrary to the above view, some thinkers hold that value is desire-oriented and regard it separately from knowledge. In fact, in all these views, there is a misunderstanding about the practical and the *sādhana* aspect of life. To quote Pande,

...कुछ विचारक मूल्य को एष्णात्मक मान कर वस्तु और ज्ञान से पृथक् एवं अन्य विचारक मूल्य को वास्तविक मान कर एष्णा और ज्ञान से पृथक् प्रतिपादित करते हैं। वस्तुतः इन सभी मतों में जीवन के व्यावहारिक और साधनात्मक पक्षों की अविवेक है।¹⁶

Human desire, by enslaving knowledge, can either become a race in the heated sand of practical life to achieve the mirage of *artha* and *kama*, or be in the stream of *sādhana*. The latter can find the value pilgrimage, which is above (*parā*) the common level (*apara*).

Pande distinguishes *sādhana* from following conventional religious social practices. The latter, according to him, is only the external form of religion based on ego and blind faith. He says,

एक सामाजिक परम्परा के पालन के रूप में धर्म को बहिरंग ही माना जा सकता है। उसका आधार सामाजिक संस्कार, भय, अन्धविश्वास, स्वार्थ-लिप्सा आदि होते हैं।¹⁷

Calling oneself Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and Christian, etc., denotes following religion as a social fact.¹⁸ *Sādhana*, on the other hand, is the realization that impels the *sādhaka* constantly to transform him. At this level, the duality between the other and myself vanishes.

With the growth of *sādhaka bhāva* the doer-ship is transformed in the direction of freedom from the demerit of

ego-based dependence, knower-ship is transformed (in the direction of freedom) from the demerit of indifference and aspirant-ship is transformed (in the direction of freedom) from the lust-based dependence. Pande remarks,

...आध्यात्मिक साधन एक जीवन्त अनुभूति और अभीप्सा है जो साधक को निरन्तर अपने आपको बदलने और अपने अहंकार एवं वासना की परिधि के बाहर निकलने पर बाध्य करती है।¹⁹

When life becomes *sādhana*, man gets acquaintance with a world of rhythm of *līlā* (playfulness) instead of the indifferent objective world of struggle driven by the urge of survival and passion. He yearns to attain perfection in his life and seeks for eternity in time.

Pande says that perfection of the self is a candidate of value.²⁰ Pande examines the concept of perfection. Perfection, he says, is conceived as a quality of having flawless attribute. It can be two types:

1. Perfection is the quality of having some attributes without incompleteness or impurity. It is fully actualized. Plato's concept of the universal is the standard of this type of perfection. Its objectivity is out there independent of the self. Pande calls this 'partial perfection'. The realm of value for him does not belong to it.
2. The complete perfection is the perfection of the self (*ātman*), which is personal. It can be definitely seen in the concept of value. The Buddhist term *pāramitā* is the most appropriate for this kind of perfection. Human perfection is neither given nor is inborn attribute. It is something to be achieved. It is to be realized by the specific individual. It is universal-specific and cannot be explained in a general form. It is to be realized through the concretization of the ideals.

Sensuousness is to be transcended for mental, mental is to be transcended for rational and rational is to be transcended for the real self (*ātman*). Knowledge, for Pande, reveals that which is. Bliss (*ānanda*) cannot be the object of knowledge, it is not to be known but to be felt. Only love-seeking (not pleasure-seeking) desire comes to realize the latent or real self. At this point, the meaning of love-seeking needs more elaboration. Pande has not elaborated upon the concept of love. Love, ordinarily speaking, has many connotations. To my mind, Pande is not using the concept of love in the mundane sense as blind infatuation belonging to the psycho-physical dimension of man. He is using it in the spiritual sense founded on faith (*śraddhā*), devotion and sacrifice.

The real self itself is the criterion of the realization of value. There is no objective criterion to judge this value, the individual himself is the paradigm. The peace or tranquillity of consciousness (*ātmic śānti*) is the criterion of reliability. Pande says,

जब तक अनित्यता, अशान्ति, सीमितता, तृष्णा, अप्रकाशता आदि का बोध रहता है, तब तक स्पष्ट ही अभ्रान्त आत्मज्ञान की प्राप्ति नहीं हुई...चेतना को स्वरूप-बोध का लक्ष्य, दिशा और प्रप्ति का विश्वास दिलाने के लिए किसी अन्य तत्व की आवश्यकता नहीं है। इस दृष्टि से आध्यात्मिक साधना चैतन्य की निजी स्वातन्त्र्य की साधना है जो उसे दुःख और अशान्ति से दूर अपने पास ले जाती है।²¹

My value is not different from my own being. Value does not make me more informed or skilful but transforms the very being of the individual. There can be an objective criterion to judge the truth and falsity of a fact and that of efficacy of a skill. The relationship between consciousness and the object in the above cases is external and it may not transform the very being of the individual. A good doctor may not be a good person. One may be very efficient in handling and manipulating things but may be practising disvalues.

The relationship between consciousness and the object of value is internal. The knowledge of completeness of the object cannot be attained by searching the infiniteness of its forms and qualities. The knowledge of completeness lies in its relation to consciousness and can be achieved in consciousness. Looked at this way, values, which seem to be there in the objects, turn out to be the symbols of spiritual values. Self is not given to me the way the things are given to me. The knowledge of object and that of subject merge into the knowledge of values. Since there is an immediacy in self-knowledge, the knowledge of object also gets transformed in the knowledge of values. Values give meaning to the empirical world but they are not parts of the empirical world.

The self-oriented values are to be distinguished from the values seen in the social context (social morality). The social morality is other-oriented. Values are understood in terms of duties and obligations towards the other. In *ātmānusandhāna*, the emphasis is on carving one's own self. But this, of course, does not lead to renunciation of one's duties. The goodness of actions will spontaneously emerge out of one's being.

Spiritual dimension is not the development of one aspect of man's being but is the realization of the total being of the individual. It leads to a cohesive unity of all the dimensions without ignoring or condemning them. The central search is the realization of self, the worldly domain is understood through the spiritual dimension. Devoid of this central search, value-pursuit ends in irresolvable problems of justifying worldly values landing in dilemmas. Morality becomes more significant if it is seen through the spiritual perspective. The worldly duties may contribute to the realization of the highest end. To be a great artist may be a great achievement.

But unless this art transforms the being of the artist, elevating him from the lower self to that of the higher, it will eventually lose its importance.

Self-realization is the culmination and end of the value-journey. The distinction between the self and value gets fused and coalesced into an uplifting spiritual experience. Objects and events are experienced in terms of the emerging ultimate meaning. The quest for value, thus, is the quest for one's authentic being entering the realm of freedom.

The self-illuminated state of consciousness is achieved through faith (*śraddhā*). Pande holds,

अलौकिकता की प्रतीति किसी वस्तु के बाहरी प्रत्यक्ष से नहीं होती बल्कि चेतना कि एक विशेष संवेदनशील अवस्था में अप्रत्यक्ष और अतिमानवीय शक्ति के बोध से होती है। अलौकिकता का परिचय मन की विलक्षण स्थिति में होता है...मन की वह शक्ति जिससे वह आत्मिक ज्ञान का ग्रहण करता है श्रद्धा कही जाती है।²²

Pande does not appreciate an overemphasis on reason. Faith is not against reason but it goes beyond the limits of reason. It implies self-certitude and personal commitment and does not need any proof to certify it. Pande states,

आत्मज्ञान के लिए प्रमाण की आवश्यकता नहीं है क्योंकि उसमें संशय का ही अवकाश नहीं है।²³

The man of faith is ready to take any risk for the fulfilment of his values. It is a state of consciousness where antithesis presented by reason does not have any place and there is no room for doubt. The others may doubt it but the scepticism loses its sense when its pointer is fixed to one's own self.

The above analysis reveals Pande's deep philosophical insights into exploration of the value-quest without presupposing any ontology of the self. The value-quest is neither at the level of ego nor in already realized *ātman*,

it is in *ātmānusandhāna*. Pande ends his reflections on the nature of value with the happy synthesis of subject and object, inner and outer, desire and knowledge, time and eternity. The transcendental ideals are to be realized within time, though they are not historically conditioned.

Pande no doubt delineates the mechanism of value-pursuit with all its nuances. He has saved it from the demerits of cultural relativism. However, the question arises: is there any role of culture in nurturing the spiritual value-quest? Is it purely innate? Does culture contribute anything in developing the values that are potentially present within man? The materialistic culture in contradistinction to that of spiritualistic may have a different impact on the development of the character of the individual. Pande has not tackled this question in his book *Mūlya-Mīmāṃsā*.

There can be two perspectives regarding value-pursuit—historical and transcendent. In the former, the starting-point is historicity and the emphasis is on human agency. In the latter, the transcendence is the starting-point as well as the end of value-pursuit. Historicity acts only as a lip service to the transcendent. Pande takes the transcendent (*ātmic*) viewpoint. No doubt he has highlighted human praxis but the importance of historicity is only as a contribution to the transcendent. His emphasis is not on the agency of historically situated individual. But if the significance of value-pursuit is only in and through the world, is it possible to give less importance to the historicity of the individual? The reconciliation of the above two perspectives is an irresolvable problem, opening up new space for further exploration, which is informatively very rich and invites for further exploration in the value-pursuit.

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9

Culture as Realization: The Primacy of a Metaphysical Alternative

GEETA MANAKTALA

This is a small note on Professor G.C. Pande's book *The Meaning and Process of Culture*, highlighting some of the issues dealt therein. It is neither possible nor desirable to arrive at a satisfactory definition of the term 'Culture' as this concept designates a polymorphous reality, implying complex meanings and significance. Now the term 'Culture' has come to be used for distinct intellectual disciplines and in several systems of thought. Culture took on the meaning of cultivation and a process. Raymond Williams described it as a 'tending of natural growth and cultivating it'. The meaning was extended to a process of human development. Bacon called it 'the culture and manure of minds' and Hobbes' a culture their minds'. Culture has also been used in the sense 'material' as distinct from 'spiritual motions'.

Broadly speaking, culture is used in three ways. First meaning a whole way of life of a people, material, intellectual and spiritual, of a given society; second a process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development, and,

finally, a general body of the arts and intellectual works such as music, painting, literature, sculpture, etc. For any discussion of culture, its conceptual used has to be clarified to simplify the issues relating to it.

'Culture' can be studied from the humanistic, anthropological, sociological and an axiological point of view. G.C. Pande takes an axiological standpoint and defines culture as the tradition of values, of self-realization. He further states that, values are the objects of valuing, a fundamental human activity. Valuing implies seeking, choosing, approving.¹

From the earlier period of human society, man has created values, as mere facts have never satisfied him. He has consistently examined facts in terms of meanings and values. The human tendency to evaluate factual realities in terms of ends and means is the proof of man's interest in those objects and activities, which carry some value. As constituents of culture only those ideas, habits and technical processes were evolved by man, which contribute to the enrichment of life that 'entail' deep changes in man's personality.² Culture is man's greatest difference from animals. This difference is not biological, but social, constantly developing and acquiring increasing multiformity corresponding to the multiformity of conditions of existence of various peoples, their histories, development and social reform. Culture is nothing but the ever-changing and developing human nature in the entire multiplicity of objectivization of human activity. The human activity is objectivized not only in material objects, but also spiritually, since man's education, professional skills and talents in creating works of art and science, for all their material 'tangibility', are objectivizations of social consciousness and knowledge. The same is true for spiritual needs as cultural phenomena which they are necessarily

objectivized, all the while remaining spiritual rather than material needs. Thus, G.C. Pande maintains that 'the objects which enter as elements into a culture are not 'natural' or independent or self-subsistent. They are dependent on a self-consciousness and, as items in it, their status is symbolic or expressive. What they express is a certain self-realization'.³

Thus, we can say that the culture of a person consists of sense of values fashioned in the light of his knowledge. The consciousness that constitutes culture is as much a value consciousness as it is factual consciousness; it is the consciousness of the actual and the possible apprehended as significant. Man is constantly picturing to himself the possibilities of his existence; these possibilities constitute the values for which he lives. Being conscious of these possibilities, man succeeds in emancipating himself from the order of factual necessity and in effecting his entry into the realm of values. To live in the realm of values, is for him to be attached to and anxious for things whose existence is bound up with his own creative longings and aspiration with the requirements of his specifically human or spiritual self.

Professor Pande further states that, 'Human nature exists at many levels, from the biological to the purely spiritual, seeking self-fulfilment at each level. Consequently, the gamut of values extends from self-preservation to mystical communion. Since the lower realization are only virtual (*aupadhika*), they contain an inherent urge for self-transcendence. From the lower realizations of the self in terms of finite accidents (*upādhis*) to their complete transcendence is pure self-experience, the human seeking follows, a process of dialectical evolution.' The revelation of values also thus follows an evolutionary process. The expression and communication of valued

experiences gives a socio-historical actuality to the ideal process and cultural world is thus created as the historical tradition of the human endeavour for self-realization.⁴ Cultures as socio-historic orders or traditions are the particular versions of the 'universal tradition of wisdom'. Underlying the overt structure there subsists, what may be called, a 'philosophy of life or Weltanschauung'. As an operative idea of life as a whole it enters into the making and working of institutions. As faith it guides the individual person's quest for what is right and authentic, what constitutes excellence and ultimate good. As a fragmentary glimpse of cosmology and anthropology, a metaphysic, essential but without formal definitions and system, it functions as the matrix of fundamental suppositions for the thinkers of the age. This basic faith or Weltanschauung, itself springs from an intuitive vision or revelation of an essentially spiritual character which is inseparable from praxis and being expressed symbolically enters into the social tradition. Vision, praxis, tradition, structure of norms and principles of practice constitute the underlying basis of a culture. The intuitive vision, in which the culture reveals itself, occurs in a 'individual psyche and enters social tradition creatively as symbol'.⁵

Thus, the phenomenon of culture is characterized by its inherent dynamism, its growth, its manifestation in the various aspects of human and social life. The growth is from the gross empirical to the trans-empirical. It is an impulse which perpetually drives man towards, 'something beyond' his awareness of existence and qualifies himself by the disciplined progress for the realization of this 'something beyond' within himself. Thus it is that we find that in 'culture' there is a definite shift of emphasis from the external to the internal, from the objective to the subjective. Man develops a fine susceptibility to physi-


cal, mental, moral and spiritual stimuli that produces an openness in thought and action and makes man surrender his self love and self seeking, and brings out the inherent nobility in him. It follows that man as a mystery ennobles the development of culture from nature. As Wittgenstein remarks, 'These are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical'.⁶ This point of view suggests that man is mysterious in his cultural situation because his nature is a bundle of paradoxes:

The relationship between man and culture is thus as diverse as the ways in which man may be conceived, in different ways. Also, each of these different conceptions have a profound influence on the way a society and culture shape themselves, is perhaps the most important thing that can be said about man himself. Professor Pande states that 'the distinction between "selves" or between "self" and "nature" is the product of analysis within experience. Cultural differences arise from the manner in which social experience is analyzed and articulated into concepts, symbols and attitude.'⁷ It further implies that each man has his own experience of life within himself, in accordance with the interaction with nature and with other people. Each has made its own response to the challenges of life and drawn therefrom its own lessons regarding what promotes and what destroys life in its many dimensions. It is important here to note the type of question that is being answered. It is not merely one of tactical adjustments in response to temporary threats, nor is it a pragmatic question of appropriate means. Rather, the question is what we wish to realize above and through any and all such expediencies. What is taking place is the progressive uncovering of the meaning of life and of the values which are worthy of commitment. According to

Professor Pande, 'Culture is the social expression of value-seeking and history is its process. Human history must in effect aspire after being a spiritual autobiography of man, a 'discovery of lost times' which is simultaneously a creative transformations of the present, a discovery of what is hidden in the past experiences of the soul'. History is at once 'remembrance of what really happened' as well as 'coming to learn from critical enquiry' where learning and criticism relate to the self'.⁸

There is a difference between human history and natural history. Natural history is governed by the adaptation of the organism to the environment in the struggle for existence, and the development of more efficient anatomies. The historian of man, according to Professor Pande, should not confine himself to the transformation of social anatomies in the process of the struggle of societies with nature and each other. He ought to seek to penetrate to the heart of the tradition of value seeking and appraise historical action from within as it were, and trace the activity of social organisms in their controlling centre in the hierarchical configuration of value and the success of social enterprise in the light of its latent values and the values themselves in their dialectically dynamic relationship with historic effort.⁹ Thus, here the collective will of persons is central. What people find true in terms of its appreciation of meaning and value is accepted and reaffirmed; what is discovered to be degrading and destructive tends to be disavowed, rejected and discouraged. Thus, tradition differs from natural history. It is not all that has happened in the past, for that would include the bad as well as the good.

The development of values and virtues and their integration as a culture of any depth or richness takes time, and as such depends upon the experience and creativity



of many generations. The culture which is handed on, comes to be called as cultural tradition; as such it reflects the cumulative achievement of people in discovering, mirroring and transmitting the deepest meanings of life. The cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values of a culture through time is not only heritage or what is received, but new creation and this is passed on in new ways. Taking tradition in this active sense allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths—which Socrates sought—but to perceive the importance of values we receive from the tradition and to mobilize our own life project actively towards the future. Tradition then, is not, as in history, simply everything that has ever happened, whether good or bad. It is, rather, what appears significant for human life; it is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true and necessary for human life. It contains the values to which our forebears first freely gave their commitment in specific historical circumstances and then constantly revived and rectified and progressively passed on generation after generation.

Even Professor Pande is of the view that, 'tradition is communion with the past, a continuing dialogue which reinterprets the past and also the present. This aspect of tradition is fundamental to the awareness of values. While positive knowledge and technology are open to all and practically testable, accepted and rejected in accordance with their manifest utility or efficiency, value remains in the ultimate analysis imponderable, a matter of unarguable insight. The knowledge of value is not subject to any such automatic diffusion or snow balling as is common in the history of positive knowledge or technology. Value can be experienced, symbolically expressed and personally communicated; it cannot be stated or proved or learnt

impersonally from a book to which one is emotionally indifferent. It is not that value experience is very time fixed and final, but that it grows from within like the unfolding of a flower in time. This is the essence of tradition—it is a developing communion of the foundational experience of value.¹⁰

Value thus represents the gestalt and the basic identity of culture and originates transcendently into the esoteric experience of the sublime undergone by a few specially enlightened individuals called rishis, prophets, Buddhas, siddhas, nabis or avatars on whom the Divine or spiritual revelation bestows itself. It is they who bring it into the spoken level. That is to say, as the vehicle of revelations they become virtual representations of it later extended, supplemented and interpreted by a tradition in such a way as to bring mundane and vegetative aspects of life in line with it. As a perpetuating factor tradition become a sacrosanct and fundamental source of value consciousness and/or value seeking in the material world, of which history is an inherent process. The identity of group of people is tradition pacific.¹¹

Professor Pande talks of the unity in a culture as a unity, which belongs to the subject. He explains: 'There are two types of unity which may be discovered—objective and subjective. Objective unity is the unity of a system where different but interrelated particulars produce systemic orderliness. This kind of unity is found best in abstract creations or even in nature to the extent to which it is possible to look at something in it as an object of construction. Does culture form a unity of this kind? Does it have this kind of interrelatedness, some kind discoverable order in its relations? On the other hand what actually produces the sense of unity in a culture is not like at all. It is a unity which belongs only to the subject;

it is the unity of cultural awareness.'¹² He says, 'when-ever we are impressed in a culture by a painting or a philosophy, the really unifying thing is the unity of self-consciousness: unity of the feeling that the self is realized through these.... For something to become an image of culture, it has to become expressive of awareness. The cultural unity is the unity of self-awareness. Therefore culture is a subjective existence, which is 'self-conscious', and nature is an objective existence, which though 'has a reference to consciousness but not to a self-consciousness. In this sense culture is not part of nature. The status of the items of the cultural world is the status of symbols. They have a meaning, yet they do not have an independent or objective existence. They are symbols functioning in a self-consciousness. What are they symbols of? Of values and of various kinds of experience. But all these things are different ways of regarding the same complex. Mind expresses itself alone.'¹³ Now, culture is the revelation of meanings in a self-realizing self-consciousness. And when these revealed meanings are expressed in symbols and communicated, socio-historic orders are created. He says the culture 'arises when a world of symbols is created to express a revelation or intuition of value and subsists within the social tradition into which the world of symbols is embedded as the expressive aspect of the ideal context of its consciousness. Within the concrete, historic actuality of a social tradition, or civilization, culture remains as its essential and ideal self-awareness. The concrete and individual experience of value constitutes the core of meaning in culture while its creative articulation, communication and participation constitutes its basic process.'¹⁴

A unity of culture seems to be a polysemantic concept, with multiple openings, horizons and aspects. Most researchers conclude that to seize the unity of culture means

defining it by its 'invariants'; recovering, organizing and generalizing common elements of culture as a specifically and exclusively human creation. From the creator's point of view, culture means values; therefore, human meanings and choices, internationality and purpose, human prospects and ideals. As a unitary concept with universal openings, humans are the basis of a universal calling also to the specific dimension: Culture. That is, culture is unitary, because there is a unitary human nature from which it springs, a way of existence that is specific to mankind.

RELATION OF SCIENCE AND CULTURE

Professor Pande also talks of science, technology and culture, he says, 'every culture has to develop some science and technology to meet the common need for physical security, comfort and leisure. Different cultures, however, place different values on the fulfilment of these needs and as a result do not pursue science and technology with the same zeal. Thus while science and technology are inevitable and universal elements of culture they occupy different places in the different places in the different traditions of culture. It is only in recent times that progress in science and technology has been accepted as almost the central value of culture'.¹⁵

The use of new materials and new use of the old materials was determined by knowledge developed, i.e. science and the manner this was used and the artifacts developed were dependent upon the technology which was generated and used. The manner of usage of materials, the degree of efficiency of usage and the way men were utilized to produce goods were all determined by economics. The organization of men created to use materials and produce goods created social organizations

and the techniques used to generate and keep these social organization became politics of society and generated values, culture and social ethics.

Within each society in every period of human history, we are met with two processes interrelated with each other. Firstly, there are the overall goals of the society which are set by the organization of the society. Secondly, within this overall goal there are goals of groups and individuals. The degree to which the overall goals of society and groups and individuals are in agreement determines the degree of harmony and progress. However, when the overall goals of society and different groups within it and various individuals within the groups are not in agreement, the progress is slow or limited and may even lead to strife and disintegration of society. There is evidence throughout human history of how the latter process has disrupted those civilizations and disintegrated cultures which had looked as if they were everlasting.

Looking at the relationship in this manner, it is possible to show science and technology in a dynamic equilibrium with social organization and value system. Since they are in a dynamic equilibrium, any change in one lead to changes in others to bring back the system into dynamic equilibrium. New scientific knowledge widens horizons and provides new perspectives and these become the forebearers of development of new technology. Each new technology—when it becomes the basis of new industry and production system—changes the relationship between men and the changed relationship brings forth the need for a newer social organization which, in turn, changes the value system. For instance, when the technology of mass production was developed, the artisan become a wage worker and the relationship between men became one of contract labour and profit thus be-

came a part of the value system. Further, with increased production, scientific knowledge came to be utilized to motivate people to purchase the goods produced and the philosophy of consumerism came to be established with its waste as a basic ingredient. The culture of waste is in sharp contrast to earlier tradition.

If one studies the writings of earlier scientists then one may notice in sharp contrast to present commercialization that scientific activity for them was a religious activity that explained the power of God and the use of knowledge improved the condition of man. From the writings of the scientists, it also becomes evident that they were hoping to use science as a weapon against moral corruption by tending to develop a new value system against social exploitation through control of knowledge and discipline. These examples show that science being a human activity is part of value system, culture and social organization in a particular period of history. The ethos and the nationalism it promotes are socially determined. In earlier periods nature was feared and after the industrial revolution it came to be a raw material to be exploited and utilized, which ultimately damaged nature. Now the attitude towards nature is changing. From raw material it is becoming a part of the environment, which is vital for human survival. Consequently, factors which were ignored are now being taken into account when natural resources are to be utilized. In order to do that a whole series of new disciplines forecasting technologies model making technology assessment science society dynamics environmental studies, etc., are being developed in order to meet these requirements. The development is in no way different from the development of statistics and theory of probability to meet the requirements of merchant industrial society.

Scientific and technological tradition has its roots in human activity in relation to materials and in relation of man with other men. It is universal and international. However, its culture, organization and goals have differed in different areas of culture and different periods of history. Despite these differences, succeeding developments have been based on earlier achievements and there has been a steady development of understanding and increased sophistications of knowledge which, in turn, has been effectively utilized to generate new capabilities and new vision. According to Professor Pande, every culture has to develop some science and technology so as to meet the common need for physical security comfort and leisure. Different cultures, however, place different values on the fulfilment of these needs and, as a result, do not pursue science and technology with the same zeal. Thus, while science and technology are inevitable and universal elements of cultures, they occupy different places in the different traditions of culture. It is only in recent times that progress in science and technology has been accepted as almost the central value of culture. This technological materialism suffers from a number of fallacies. In the first place, it confounds the knowledge of reality with the positive knowledge of natural reality. In the second place, it forgets that even within a given state of scientific knowledge, more than one alternative technology is possible and the choice between such alternatives has to be made on non-technological grounds. It is neither logically necessary nor empirically evidenced that given a state of science and technology, the other aspects of culture are uniquely determined. The fact is that science and technology give man knowledge and power over the material world and enable him to secure and satisfy his physical and sensuous self in an increasing

measure. But this resultant and progressive material or 'sensate' culture of man—including scientific concepts and theories which are operational tools—represents only a particular grade of human self-realization and yields value only in the sense of pleasure or satisfying sensations. That too is possible only within a healthy social and moral order. Unfortunately, the progress of science and technology does not automatically lead to the creation of a just, free, peaceful or happy society, let alone the creation of literary, artistic or religious values. In fact, the application of scientific and technical knowledge to social engineering shows no signs of resolving human conflicts or fulfilling the human quest for security. The increasing ability of man to control his natural environment has not led to any corresponding ability on his part to control his socio-cultural environment where, in any case, autonomy is of greater moment than automation. In diverse utilization, science and technology function like the natural environment of man, presenting only a partially defined situation within which man has to build his socio-cultural life.¹⁶

Logic, science and common sense seem to take up almost the whole of the available space for enquiry today. Such a point of view on philosophy reflects only a certain cultural orientation defying science. Kant had been impressed by the bare progress of science but did not reflect over the implications of fallibility in the corrigibility of scientific ideas. The fallibility of science suggests that scientific truth is not 'necessary' but essentially empirical and pragmatic. On the other hand, modern positivists and pragmatists can hardly offer a satisfactory answer to the fundamental problem raised by Kant. They cannot explain how mathematics can be at once practically useful and logically necessary.

Science symbolizes a subtle causal order underlying the gross sensible world which men commonly take to be real. Consequently, scientific knowledge enlarges the practical efficiency of human enterprises in the concrete physical world. This utility of science is the source of the faith in it; it does not, however, remove philosophical doubts and puzzles because they arise from the basic duality of man. Just as sensation is the door to the knowledge of nature, similarly the knowledge of reality is adumbrated in self-consciousness which, in different degrees, pervades all experience. Man does not spontaneously consider himself a part of nature. For example, while he believes that all natural events are determined by definite causes, he still considers himself to be free. Even within an unstable and perishing world, he does not abandon the hopes of immortality. It is the constructive activity of thought which projects our habitual world of which experiential moments are one pole and logical concepts another. In reality, if fact and reason were wholly disparate, no connection could be established between physics and mathematics; nor could logic ever find a practical application.¹⁷

It is indeed true that modern technology has contributed enormously to the development of life, including man's inter-relation and expression. In the previous century, there was nothing which has not been touched by human technological invention. Heidegger noted that when the Romans built the first bridge across the Rhine, it was an act of respect for the river and also for the nature, wherein new technologies and 'development' have simply ignored the contours of nature. Therefore, in this changing situation, the response to these changes will require: (1) recognition and reaffirmation of the dignity of human person; and (2) understanding and recognition of human self as a mystery, i.e. the human self shall not

be reducible to the empirically observable or the mathematically calculable objects of science. In other words, the human self is a unique and limitless expression of Being as such.

Looking from this perspective, it may be said that we have reasons to think that science can break beyond culture. At the same time, intellectuals also ask whether what is generally referred to as science is itself culture free or instant essentially an expression the respective histories and cultural manifestation of a particular country. It is also noted that ignoring the formative elements of culture would tantamount to undermining control by its own culture. Accordingly, there emerged a pervasive dimension of technology which, in turn, enslaved the human self and bounded him with its ills.

As G.C. Pande puts it, 'In the modern view, however, the ideal of culture is only the limiting conception of the national development of cultures. The emphasis is not on an old and given tradition propagated by seers and sages, philosophers and prophets which requires men to believe and act as ordained by it patiently and dutifully since their highest fulfilment does not lie within their mortal career. The emphasis now is on creating and changing the tradition that men may discover new means of fulfilling themselves of earth.'¹⁸

Therefore, we may state that culture is the ensemble of values and assets achieved by man during the process of his evolution to humanity. Values and assets have a different connotation as all values do not become assets. By assets we mean the things comprehended by our conscience from the point of view of value or outside a value, i.e. things that are valued. The existence of assets supposes the antecedent values. The assets represent a wide category, beginning with those that satisfy the vital functions of the organism, up to the highest spiritual assets

such as good will, love and friendship: But all assets represent unions of things and values or things to be valued, because the achievement of values and assets in conjunction with the idea of humanity is a process of culture. It also states the ideal which guides it, namely, humanity as the harmonious development of man's positive features, i.e. the innermost harmony of personality. Hence, a double hypostasis of man is obvious in the form of both a subject and an object of culture which necessarily implies the possibilities of the primacy of a metaphysical alternative in our approach toward the understanding of culture.

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3. Pande G.C., op. cit., p. 1, Ibid.
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7. Pande, G.C., op. cit., Preface.
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10

Consciousness: Cosmic Dimension

G.L. PANDIT

I

It was sometime in September 2002 that I received a letter of invitation from Professor R.C. Pradhan, Member-Secretary, ICPR, asking me to make a presentation at the National Seminar (3–5 March 2003) on 'The Thoughts and Works of Professor G.C. Pande'. I know that I cannot do justice to Professor Pande's thoughts and works, not even to one single aspect, if only because of their vast range and great depth. G.C. Pandey has made original contribution to the development of knowledge in Indian philosophy, Indian culture and ancient Indian history, poetry, art, literature and criticism, Buddhism and Jainism, and consciousness studies, among many other fields. And he is still at work. To my regret, I am not among those who can truly call themselves G.C. Pande scholars. I am a latecomer on this scene. And yet I have agreed to speak on this rare occasion, so as to not to miss this opportunity to interact with him and with those who have taken pains to read his important works in various fields. There is another reason for this. Thanks to ICPR,

recently, I have gone through the texts of two publications of G.C. Pande entitled *Consciousness, Neuroscience and Philosophy*—(CNP) and *Neurosciences and Philosophy—Some Problems in the Light of Indian and Buddhist Philosophy*, both of which I find philosophically significant and interesting. His thoughts here deserve careful attention, and not just intellectual admiration. I myself admire his views as formulated in these two publications. I also would like to respond to some of them. Among these, I have here in my mind particularly the following: (i) his criticisms of the reductionist approaches to understanding consciousness such as neural reductionism; (ii) his general approach of keeping philosophical issues separate from the factual researches of the neurosciences; (iii) his thesis that a person not only seeks values but the person alone has value *per se*; (iv) his thesis that the 'rigorously empirical methods cannot fully comprehend human reality; (v) his claim that Yoga is the science of consciousness: 'Yoga seeks to show the way to the unification of the finite empirical self with the infinite transcendental consciousness'; (vi) his bold thesis that philosophical questions cannot be settled by factual discoveries of any kind; and (vii) his attempt to connect neuroscience to the science of Yoga.

On a careful look, it seems possible to disagree on some of these lucidly presented aspects of Professor Pande's position, particularly (iv) and (v). In what follows, I want to do so by raising some fundamental methodological questions concerning consciousness studies. But my main aim here is to pose a question for G.C. Pande. On the one hand, today's cosmology carries forward the oldest philosophical tradition of inquiring into the origin, nature and structure of the universe in the light of the fundamental physical discoveries made by science (Pandit 1982, 1991, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2006). On the other hand, for the first

time in the history of science, researches active at the frontiers of today's fundamental physics find in cosmology an extended and fertile testing ground for their theories (Pandit 1991). For example, for high energy physics, the early universe provides the best testing ground both for theory-finding and theory-testing (Pandit 2002a, 2002b). Thus, there is not only a fertile give and take relationship between these sciences but a dynamic interface between them (Pandit 2002a, 2002b). Interestingly enough, there is a cosmological dimension to the problem of consciousness, which poses questions of great challenge to Indian philosophy, even greater than the challenge any empirical investigation of consciousness and pose. *Just think of the mother universes with consciousness, of the observer-universe which we occupy, still in its childhood, just on the way to asking questions.*¹

II

Let me now proceed with some details regarding what I have just said. To begin with, I want to raise some fundamental methodological questions. *First*, should not the consciousness studies be grounded more and more in the philosophical, even cosmological, context than in the context of the neuro- and cognitive sciences? It can be shown how even the latter context is not entirely free from philosophical assumptions. The most important philosophical, or cosmological, question that can be raised about consciousness is then this: How is it possible for consciousness to arise in a physical universe? Is not a universe without the presence of consciousness conceivable? What is there in the very design of the laws of physics that allows the existence of consciousness? These questions clearly indicate how poorly we understand even the physical universe itself. And how difficult it is to

predict any breakthrough in our understanding even in the remote future. *Secondly*, why is there this kind of paradoxical problem-situation before us? The more scientific the account we try to give of consciousness, we invariably end up with some algorithmic/mechanical/reductionistic analogue or picture of it, in which we conscious beings figure as yet another species of objects among other objects of study. The reductionisms all share the common danger found in all science, viz., a flight away from nature and a flight away from ourselves (Pandit 1995a, 1996a, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a). All such accounts—e.g., the one which holds the mind to be a computer—result in highly impoverished pictures of the human mind. *On the other hand*, the less scientific and the more philosophical the account we give of consciousness, we fall back upon those concepts and principles which share the same original mystery with which one always begins. This is as much true of the Indian philosophical view of consciousness as that of the Western cosmological conception known as the anthropic principle.

As to the Indian philosophical view as discussed and presented by G.C. Pande, let me quote: ‘...consciousness is not a substance nor an illusory phenomenon or epiphenomenon. Nor can it be understood or controlled as a machine or an animal body. Consciousness is the deepest *telos* immanent in the evolutionary process of nature and society. To realize the full nature of consciousness would be to realize divinity on earth.’² Essentially, I am in agreement with this view. Whether consciousness and divinity on Earth can be connected in this way is, in my view, debatable. Invoking Yoga as a science of consciousness, as G.C. Pande does, the Indian philosophical view, so lucidly presented, argues for the existence of a transcen-

dental consciousness or self that can only be known transcendently.³ This is the same timeless consciousness or subject without which mental states of a person could neither become experience nor become states of consciousness. This point is also valid, I think, in the context of *knowledge* traditionally recognized, in India as in the West, as the subjectively produced mental state of belief where a person is in a position to make or defend a claim to that effect by declaring 'I know that p'. Of course, this kind of knowledge presupposes self-consciousness rather in a stronger sense. Thus, in the absence of self-consciousness, there could be no knowledge in the subjective sense of the term (Pandit 1991). But there are certain consequences following from this view, which we must face. Self-consciousness—or pure consciousness as G.C. Pande calls it—cannot become an object of knowledge in the same context without landing one in an *infinite regress* (Pandit 1991). Whether this still leaves us with a possibility, as G.C. Pande suggests, of a higher level of Yogic consciousness where pure consciousness is realized or known transcendently is what is debatable, at least to my mind.

And yet, following Professor Pande, I want to say that I find Yoga as a science of moral self-development as a singular contribution of Indian thought. It has the potential of benefiting the humanity as a whole, not just the capacity to uplift the individual alone. As a part of my continuing philosophical query, however, I do not believe in the *end-of-everything-theory* of Yoga, the theory which says that Yoga is the science of self-realization or of pure consciousness or of the liberation of the soul. I think that it has been rightly said: 'Who can say that life is not death and death not life'. If we heed it, we need Yoga as a science of life here and now more than as a

science of pure consciousness or transcendental consciousness, which is so still and pure as not to take in any objects.⁴ We live in a deeply troubled world which is in real need of a healing technology. In my view, Yoga should be developed and applied globally as a technique that can heal humanity irrespective of caste, creed or religion. Think of those who need it most because they do not own their responsibility in uprooting and terrorizing entire communities of women, children and men, making them homeless and irrelevant (Pandit 2006b). They do not even ask or entertain questions about the victims of uprootment. Particularly, think of those who have been enjoying power and authority and yet who have remained a mute witness to uprootment, making people refugees in their own countries (Pandit 2006b). It is these people who need to be healed as a first priority wherever they are to be found, in the East and in the West. Think of Tibet. And think of the South Asian Scenario of the last sixty years, particularly the human condition in Kashmir which was known as Sharda Peeth (Norelli-Bachelet 2004, Pandit 2005a, 2006b).

III

At this point, let me return to the cosmological problem of consciousness, which still remains a subject of great neglect. Here the problem is how to reconnect one mystery—our presence in the universe or what I call observer-universe—with other mysteries of existence, or with other possible non-observer mother universes. Take the anthropic principle, which seeks to connect the mystery of the intelligent life with the universal mystery of existence and prompts us to ask: What could be the role of consciousness in a universe which it self-selects, *as it were*, out of all possible universes (Pandit 2006a)? It is

quite correct to argue, at this cosmological level, that there must be deeper reasons (like the anthropic principle in some form, strong or weak) for the emergence of consciousness in the physical universe. And that once it was there, consciousness is of powerful selective advantage to species *Homo sapiens*. In other words, even if it is not itself a product of evolution favoured by natural selection, it remains open that its emergence can bestow a powerful selective advantage on the future survival of man under the most advance planetary conditions. When Leibnitz introduced for the first time the cosmological idea of many possible universes, or worlds, in philosophy, he was not far from anticipating the anthropic principle. Leibnitz argued that the universe, in which we live, is the best of all possible universes. Today, we all know that we are hardly knowledgeable enough about our universe or other universes to be able to tell whether this is really so. We would rather never know whether our universe is really that which Leibnitz called the best of all possible universes (Pandit 2006a). But there remains a fundamental cosmological problem of consciousness formulated by the following question: Given our presence in the universe, what kind of universe(s) must exist out there?⁵ In other words, consciousness refers to a principle of how one form of existence (say, the universe, either as self-selected by consciousness or as singled out by the presence of self-consciousness) is *embedded* in other forms of existence (say, the universe, as singled out by the fundamental physical constants). *It could not be said of every possible universe, that it allows for the emergence of life and intelligence in it at some stage.* Just as the presence of the child indicates the presence of the mother, so our presence in the universe, indicates the kind of universe(s), in which our universe, must be embedded, or with which it must

be capable of interacting. Thus, what I want to suggest is that we think of the universe(s), as the mother of consciousness where we may be wanting to show our preference for the image of consciousness as the mother of the universe.⁶

We might argue that to be self-conscious is to ask questions and participate in an implicate order of being and becoming, which has interrogative and interpretive activity and, therefore, the human condition of language, at its very core (Pandit 2003). The question arises: What is the rationality of interpretive activity through which we can enhance the quality of our participation in the implicate order of *universal interconnectedness* (Pandit 2001d, 2006a). I think that it is an important task of philosophy, of metaphysics, of ontology, of epistemology and of aesthetics and moral philosophy, to propose improvements in the interpretive activity in so far as it lies at the very core of our many forms of life and activity. Since this raises the prospects of rival interpretations, not just complementary interpretations, in one and the same field, we must find out how they relate to one another, given that they all share the same basic assumptions, or similar assumptions, about the same kinds of objects of interpretation. Most important of all, outside these shared, or shareable, assumptions, how and where do they make contact with their object(s) of interpretation (Pandit 2003, Saxena et al 2005)? While it may not be easy or simple to answer these questions, one thing is clear. Philosophy, metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, aesthetics and moral philosophy—all of them share the same task of changing and developing the worlds of interpretation in which we all live and ask fundamental questions about ourselves and our place in the universe. Language or text provides a very good example of the kinds of world I am here

hinting at. Notice *first* that we are prone to divergently interpret nearly the same world in which we are born and in which we learn to acquire and use our languages, which are themselves so rich and diverse in their resources, in nearly the same way. Secondly, within the same language, we are prone to interpret and translate nearly the same text, producing different interpretations and different translations, depending upon the *languagescapes*, the changing contexts of the human condition of language, that dominate our perceptions and our interactions within an interpretational world which rules our life-worlds, populated as it is with plural viewpoints and indefinitely many possibilities of multiple interpretations based on them.⁷

To conclude, the question 'What is consciousness, or what is self-consciousness?' is one which not only invites reductive answers of all hues and colours, depending upon one's expertise, one's context, one's background knowledge and one's methodology, but also shares deep-rooted philosophical, or metaphysical, assumptions with other similar questions that are being posed in other areas of human experience. Thus, one may be similarly interested in asking the question 'What is life or a living state?' And, at a rather universal and fundamental level, one might ask 'What are the presently observed values of the fundamental physical constants or their present relations that single out our universe from all possible universes?' The similarity between these questions is indeed highly misleading, not just superficial. For self-consciousness refers to the kind of reality about which one cannot simply ask: What is it? That is to say, it refers to a *principle of universal interconnectedness*. In some respects, its character can be clarified by referring to music. The very presence of music composes a world of its own,

singling it out as a world of the musical instruments, the works of music, the musicians as composers and players of music, the enclosed spaces of the concert halls and the audiences who let themselves be enclosed by them to enjoy music.⁸ In this context, what can we expect to know if we still ask: What is music? Is not music that which is present in all of them and yet irreducible to any one of these, even to all of them taken together? Is it not rather some kind of universal ordering principle? Just as our presence as a species specializing in language, in imagination, in interpretation, in reason, in interrogation, in science, in art, in technique, and in values might be regarded as an ordering principle embedding us all (or our observable observer-universe) in other mother-universes.

NOTES

*Research on this article is based on Pandit, G.L. (1982, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d).

1. Relevant discussion can be found in G.L. Pandit 'Bewußtsein und seine Existenzformen: Zurueck zum moralisch ungeteilten Universum', *Cognitio humana—Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte*, Hrsg. von Christoph Hubig und Hans Poser, XVII. Deutscher Kongress fuer Philosophie—Workshop-Beiträge Band I, Leipzig 1996, s. 34–41; and G. L. Pandit, *Consciousness in search of its ecology*, in D.P. Chattopadhyaya (ed.) *Self, Society and Science: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture (PHISPC), Vol. XI/part 2, Centre for Studies in Civilizations: New Delhi, 2005, pp. 70–76.
2. G.C. Pande, NCP-ICPR Consciousness Series 3, 2000, pp. i–iv, 1–11 (delivered as keynote address at National Seminar on Science and Consciousness, September 8–10, 2000, IAS, Simla), p. 10.

3. Reference 2, p. 13.
4. Reference 2, p. 9.
5. Rene Descartes' philosophy is based on a similar question, making it possible for him to prove, *first*, the existence of his own self and, then, those other forms of existence in terms of which one can make out the kind of universe that we live in.
6. Reference 2, p. 7. Here G.C. Pande says: 'One may say that consciousness has no definable nature of its own but is the infinite ground and unity of all natures. That is why it has been described as the Mother of the Universe.'
7. The concept of *languagescape* is introduced by me in G.L. Pandit, 'The Work and the Pilgrims of Music' in Andrea Deciu (ed.) *Interpretation and Ontology: Study in the Philosophy of Michael Krausz*, Rodopi Publishers, Amsterdam: 2003, pp. 293–302 *Languagescapes* of a language are conceived there as being akin to the landscapes of a country. Think of an original text in Sanskrit or German which has different translations in English by different authors. A particular translation of it can be regarded as its co-text. Several translations of it either in the same language or across different languages would all count as its co-texts in different *languagescapes*.
8. For details turn to reference 7.

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प्रो० गोविन्द चन्द्र पाण्डे के दर्शन में मूल तत्त्व
की अवधारणा: एक अध्ययन

लालन प्रसाद सिंह

प्रो० गोविन्द चन्द्र पाण्डे मूलतः एक दार्शनिक हैं। वे एक बीज गर्भित व्यक्तित्व एवं आधुनिक आर्ष परम्परा के पुरोधा हैं। इतिहासकार, साहित्यकार, भाषा वैज्ञानिक आदि उनके दार्शनिक व्यक्तित्व के विभिन्न आयाम हैं। उनके दर्शन एवं चिंतन का मूलाधार उनकी मूल तत्त्व की अवधारणा है। उनके अनुसार मूल तत्त्व चिन्मय एवं शाश्वत सत्य है। शांकर वेदान्त में उसे सच्चिदानन्द, काश्मीरीय शैव दर्शन में उसे परम शिव एवं महायान बौद्ध दर्शन में उसे बोधि चित्त कहते हैं। वह बौद्धिक दृष्टि से अज्ञात एवं अज्ञेय है। यह ज्ञान प्रत्ययात्मक तार्किक ज्ञान के परे साक्षात्कारात्मक ज्ञान है। प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार 'एकः सदविप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति' भारतीय दार्शनिक सांस्कृतिक परम्परा का मूल उत्स है। यह सार्वभौम असम्प्रदायिक एवं संश्लेषनात्मक भावधारा है। इस तरह उनके चिन्तन में धर्म, दर्शन, योग एवं तंत्र एक ही अर्थ के विभिन्न नाम हैं। माया, मल, आभास एवं अविद्या नित्या एवं अविनाभावी है। प्रकाश एवं विमर्श, प्रज्ञा एवं उपाय, शून्यता एवं करुणा एक ही मूल तत्त्व के एकात्मकता बोधक है। प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार मूल तत्त्व प्रज्ञोपाय एवं शिवशक्तित्यात्मक है। परिदृश्यमान जगत् उसी अव्यक्त की व्यक्त अभिव्यक्ति है। वह आध्यात्मिक अनुभूति का विषय है बौद्धिक विमर्श का नहीं। इस आध्यात्मिक अनुभूति को

ब्रह्मात्म विज्ञान कहते हैं। यह निर्विकल्प अखण्ड ज्ञान अभिप्रेत है। पराविद्या, आत्मविद्या, ब्रह्म विज्ञान एवं सद्विद्या मूल अर्थ में पर्यायवाची हैं। मूल तत्त्व का ज्ञान साक्षरात्मक एवं अद्वय के साथ-साथ प्रपञ्चात्मक नामरूप का एवं उनके तिरस्कार का अधिष्ठान भी है।

प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार ज्ञान, कर्म और भाव धर्म के तीन विधान हैं। धर्म के सनातन क्रियापक्ष का नाम तंत्र है। आध्यात्मिक क्रिया अनेक युगों में अनेक प्रकार से मिलते हैं। प्राचीन काल में नाना प्रकार के देवी-देवताओं को बलि देकर प्रसन्न करने का विधान रहा है। एक देवता को पुरुष वत समझकर भजन से प्रसन्न करते रहे हैं। मूल तत्त्व को पुरुष वत समझकर तात्त्विक ध्यान करते हैं। ध्यान हो, प्रार्थना हो या बलिदान हो ये सभी धार्मिक विधान के मूल में 'मैं' जिसे अणु समझा जाता है उसे भूमा यानि महान शक्ति के साथ सम्बन्ध स्थापित करना ही तंत्र साधना है। तंत्र शास्त्र के अनुसार तंत्र का तात्त्विक आधार कोई पुस्तक नहीं है। प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार मूल तत्त्व का ज्ञान अपौरुषेय ज्ञान है। इसी को आगम करते हैं। यही ज्ञान आगम शब्द रूप में अविभूत होते हैं। प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार तंत्र सभी महान धर्मों का रहस्यात्मक आधार है। तंत्र का मूल उद्देश्य प्रसूप पराशक्ति का उन्मेष है। यह एक रहस्यात्मक प्रक्रिया है जिसके द्वारा मनुष्य के अन्तर्भूत आध्यात्मिकता का उन्मेष करना है। प्रत्येक तत्त्व एवं सत्ता का अपना एक विशेष प्रकार की ध्वनि एवं स्पन्दन होता है। यह ध्वनि एवं स्पन्दन को मंत्र कहते हैं। यही मूल स्पन्दन ही आत्मा का स्वातंत्र्यरूप पराशक्ति है।

(१) शब्द एक प्रतीक है।

(२) शब्द एक अवधारणा है।

(३) तंत्र के अनुसार 'शब्द' सृजनात्मक क्रियाशक्ति की अभिव्यक्ति है।

यह दृष्टिकोण एवं विचारधारा आधुनिक दार्शनिक तथा भाषा वैज्ञानिक के विन्तन एवं दृष्टिकोण के विरुद्ध है। 'शब्द' रहस्यात्मक संज्ञा है। शब्द मान्त्रिक संज्ञा है। प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार 'मंत्र' एक प्रकार से आध्यात्मिक आदेश है। यह आध्यात्मिक आदेश सार्वभौम नहीं है। वर्कले के अनुसार वस्तु भूमा मन का अर्थ बोध है। तंत्र इस आध्यात्मिक आदेश का उन्मेष

एवं एक रहस्यात्मक क्रिया है मूलतत्त्व को अनुभूत करने का तंत्र शास्त्र अस्तित्व एवं स्वयं का अर्थ बोध अनुभूत करने की चिन्तात्मक प्रक्रिया है। सृष्टिकाल में इसी शब्द से अर्थ का आविर्भाव हुआ था। 'अनादिनि धनं ब्रह्म' शब्द का परमतत्त्व है। उससे अर्थ आविर्भूत होता है। इसके बाद वही अर्थ जगत् रूप में देश और कालगत अनन्त वैचित्र्य के प्रतिभास पूर्वक प्रकट होता है। भट्टहरि ने कहा है—'अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरं विवर्तते अर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः।' यह सर्वदा समीचीन है।

प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार बौद्ध दर्शन चित् दर्शन है। हीनयान के अनुसार मन अथवा चित् विचार तथा भावना है। महायान के अनुसार मन अथवा चित् में अन्तर्भूत निर्वाण का बीजाक्षर है। चित्तशून्यता ही निर्वाण है। जीवन को हर स्तर पर परामुक्त करना है। मन कल्पवृक्ष है। यह चिन्तामणि है। हिन्दू दर्शन के अनुसार इस आविर्भाव के बीज को शक्ति कहते हैं। शिव और शक्ति के सम्बन्ध को अविना भावी भी कहते हैं। शिव बहिर्मुख होने पर शक्ति है और शक्ति के अन्तर्मुख अवस्था को शिव कहते हैं। बहिर्मुख तथा अन्तर्मुख दोनों भाव समानता है। शिव तत्त्व में शक्तिभाव गौण और शिव भाव प्रधान है—शक्तितत्त्व में शिवभाव गौण तथा शक्तिभाव प्रधान है। प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार शिव और शक्ति एक रस है। यह साम्यावस्था है। यही तत्त्वातीत है। इसे पूर्णाहंत कहते हैं। प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार अद्वैत का अर्थ है दो का नित्य समारस्य।

उनके अनुसार अद्वैत व्यवृत्तिमूलक नहीं है। यह अनुवृत्ति एवं सर्वात्ममूलक है। इनके अनुसार माया ब्रह्ममयी, नित्या एवं सत्य स्वरूपा है। और इस तरह से प्रो० पाण्डे ब्रह्म तथा माया में एक रसता स्थापित कर अद्वैत को द्वैत के असत्कल्पता दोष से मुक्त करने में सफल हो जाते हैं। सृष्टि का यह मूल विज्ञान स्रष्टा के आत्मज्ञान से अभिन्न है। इसे ही ब्रह्मविद्या, आत्मविद्या, सद्विद्या या ऋत—चित् एक ही अर्थ के विभिन्न नाम हैं।

प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार जड़ और चैतन्य में कोई भेद नहीं है। स्वातंत्र्य या पराशक्ति सर्वदा आत्मा के साथ अविनाभी है। स्वातंत्र्य की विशेषता है कि वह ब्रह्म के साथ नित्य अभिन्न रूप में रहते हुये भी भिन्नवत् प्रतीत होता है। उसे ही 'प्रकाश' के नाम से अभिहित किया गया है। प्रकाश और विमर्श दोनों एक ही होने पर दोनों में अनिर्वचनीय विलक्षणता

है। प्रकाश विमर्शहीन अवस्था में स्वरूपतः प्रकाश रहने पर भी स्वप्रकाश के रूप में परिगणित नहीं होता है। विमर्श के बिना प्रकाश एवं अप्रकाश दोनों में कोई पार्थक्य नहीं रहता। दर्शन की भाषा में अप्रकाश को ही जड़ कहा जाता है।

प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार मूल तत्त्व परम साम्यावस्था—स्वरूप है। उपनिषद्, इसके स्वरूप—निर्देश के सम्बन्ध में 'परमं साम्यं' कहा है। हम नाम रूप की कल्पना नहीं कर सकते हैं। यह अवाङ्मसगोचर है। इसे तत्त्व एवं तत्त्वातीत दोनों कहा जाता है। विश्वात्मक होते हुये भी यह विश्वातीत है। प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार यही वेदान्त का पूर्ण है। इनके अनुसार यह सही नहीं होगा कि विश्वात्मक पक्ष मिथ्या है, विश्वातीत ही सत्य है। प्रो० पाण्डे के दर्शन में शिव और शक्ति, ब्रह्म और माया, पुरुष और प्रकृति समरस है—एकाकार है। यह नित्य अवस्था है। अनन्त वैचित्र्य भी है और एकाकार भी।

जब यह साम्य भंग होता है तभी विश्व का अर्विभाव होता है। यह बिन्दु ही शक्ति—अंश में परिणाम—लाभ करता है और शिवांश में साक्षी रहता है। साक्षी अपरिणामी और एक है। शक्ति क्रमशः स्तर स्तर में फैलती रहती है। शक्ति में प्रसारण और संकोच—दो अवस्थाएँ हैं। साक्षी निरपेक्ष द्रष्टा है। वह आत्म—भावापन्न मूल या साम्यमयी शक्ति का द्रष्टा है वैसे ही प्रसारण और संकोच नामक अवस्थाद्वय का भी द्रष्टा है। साक्षी विश्वातीत है। यह कालचक्र का नाभिस्वरूप है। शक्ति के प्रसार को सृष्टि कहते हैं और संकोचन को संहार। प्रसार और संकोच दोनों का आदि और अन्त साम्यवस्था है। इसके अन्तर में वैषम्य यानि कालचक्र का आवर्तन होता है। वैषम्य के भी अन्तस्तल में साम्यावस्था है। सृष्टि और संहार, प्रसार और संकोच, शक्ति का स्वधर्म है। अधोगति और ऊर्ध्वगति, प्रवृत्ति और निवृत्ति का मिलित नाम ही कालचक्र है। प्रो० पाण्डे का अभिमत है। 'प्रसिद्ध दार्शनिक स्वाइटहेड के अनुसार प्रत्येक युग के चिन्तन की विभिन्न दिशाओं में एक सामान्य विचार—योजना अन्तर्निहित होती है और यह सृष्टि विद्या के रूप में अभिव्यक्त होती है। यह निस्सन्देह एक गंभीर सत्य है, पर इतना ही गम्भीर सत्य यह है कि प्रत्येक युग की विचारधारा अन्ततोगत्वा मनुष्य की आत्म परिकल्पना पर आधारित है। मनुष्य का आत्मानुभव और विश्वानुभव एक साथ जुड़े रहते

हैं। प्रत्येक युग का विज्ञान इस मूल तत्त्व का ज्ञान होता है जिससे सृष्टि होती है और समझी जा सकती है। आत्म और अनात्म, अहं और इंद दोनों की प्रतीति के पीछे क्या मौलिक तत्त्व है और किस प्रकार संबद्ध है, यह अनुसंधान सभी सांस्कृतिक विचारधाराओं को उनका आधारभूत रूप प्रदान करता है। सभी अनुभवों के विषयी के रूप में मानवीय स्वरूप के अनुसन्धान को आत्मविद्या कहा जा सकता है।¹ प्रतीति के पीछे क्या मौलिक तत्त्व है यह दर्शन एवं विज्ञान के चिन्तन एवं अनुसंधान का केन्द्र बिन्दु रहा है। दर्शन एवं विज्ञान के चिन्तन का यह मूलाधार है। विभिन्न प्राच्य एवं पाश्चात्य दार्शनिक सम्प्रदाय के उद्भव एवं विकाश की कहानी यहीं से शुरु होती है। मूल तत्त्व का ज्ञान इन्द्रिय-संवेदन तक विस्तृत है अथवा वह प्रत्ययात्मक तार्किक ज्ञान के परे साक्षात्कारात्मक है उसकी विवेचना ही प्रो० पाण्डे का मुख्य विषय है। साहित्य, सौंदर्यशास्त्र, इतिहास दर्शन एवं मूल्यमीमांसा का अवलोकन एवं परीक्षण का केन्द्र बिन्दु प्रो० पाण्डे की मूल तत्त्व की अवधारणा है। उनके दार्शनिक चिन्तन एवं विचारधारा में सार्वभौमिकता एवं आध्यात्मिकता है। वे पाश्चात्य दर्शन के पुरोधा प्लेटों एवं हीगेल के दर्शन में भी आध्यात्मिकता एवं सार्वभौमिकता को ही उनके चिन्तन का मूल स्वर मानते हैं। प्रो० पाण्डे लिखते हैं, 'ज्ञान को व्यावृत्तिजन्य दरिद्रता से बचाने के लिये हीगेल ने उसकी चरमपरिणति ज्ञान के ही आत्म ज्ञान में स्वीकार की और प्लेटो ने चरम प्रत्यय को अखण्ड सत् के प्रत्यय से अभिन्न बताया। ऐसे प्रत्यय को समस्त प्रत्ययचक्र की नाभि कहा जा सकता है।'² प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार मूल तत्त्व का ज्ञान व्यवृत्यात्मक बौद्धिक ज्ञान नहीं बलिक पारमार्थिक साक्षात्कारात्मक ज्ञान है। महर्षि पातञ्जलि इसे निर्विचारवैशारद्यंऽऽयात्मप्रसाद। झृतम्भरा तत्र प्रज्ञा' कहा है। साक्षात्कारात्मक आध्यात्मिक ज्ञान कोई काल्पनिक ऐतिहासिक एवं सांस्कृतिक दृष्टि नहीं होकर यह भारतीय परम्परा का मूल स्वर है। 'धर्मस्य तत्त्वं निहितं गुहायाम, यह चिन्तन एवं मनन भारतीय धर्म दर्शन का मूलाधार है।' प्रो० पाण्डे ने इसकी विशद व्याख्या अपनी पुस्तक-भारतीय परम्परा का मूलस्वर में किया है। यह अन्तर्निहित सत्य कल्पना एवं महज सांस्कृतिक अवधारणाओं का विषय न होकर भारतीय तत्त्व दर्शन का आधार

ज्ञानात्मक पक्ष है। प्रो० पाण्डे के अनुसार 'धर्म कल्पना का क्षेत्र न होकर एक सनातन बोध की नानायुगीन अभिव्यक्ति है।'³

मूल तत्त्व एक और नित्य सौन्दर्य-स्वरूप है। यह विज्ञान या ज्योतिः स्वरूप है। वह एक ओर अभिन्न है, परन्तु इसमें वैचित्र्य-सम्पादक भेद-प्रतिनिधिमान की सत्ता है। यह स्वरूप ज्योतिः नित्य-स्वप्रकाश है। इसके सिवा जो कुछ है सभी इसी के अधीन एवं आश्रित है। इसी का शक्तिस्वरूप है। उसकी स्वतंत्र सत्ता नहीं है। ज्योति भाव है, तम अभाव है। ज्योति का अभावं अन्धकार है। प्रकृत क्रिया स्पन्दात्मक है। मूल तत्त्व न पुरुष है, न प्रकृति है बल्कि वह दोनों का अभेदात्मक सामरस्य है। यही पूर्णाहंता है। परम शिव के स्वाङ्ग से पराशक्ति का स्वान्तःस्थ प्रपञ्च उनसे निर्गत होता है। इसी का नाम विश्व है। प्रो० पाण्डे के दर्शन में ब्रह्म एवं माया, पुरुष एवं प्रकृति, प्रज्ञा एवं उपाय में समरसता है। उनके अनुसार मूल तत्त्व दो का नित्य सामरस्य है। उन्होंने माया को स्वीकार कर उसको ब्रह्ममयी, नित्या और सत्यस्वरूपा स्वीकार कर उन्होंने ब्रह्म और माया की एकरसता स्थापित कर अद्वैत दर्शन का प्रतिपादन किया है।

पूर्वोक्त संक्षिप्त विवरण से स्पष्ट है प्रो० पाण्डे के दर्शन में मूल तत्त्व की अवधारणा उनके चिन्तन एवं मनन का मूलाधार है। उनके अनुसार तंत्र और वेद की मौलिक दृष्टि एक ही है। उनके अनुसार वेद अनन्त है। 'वेदा अनन्ता' प्रो० पाण्डे ने आगम तथा निगम के बीच समन्वय एवं समायोजन स्थापित करने में सफल हुए हैं। उन्होंने भारतीय परम्परा के मूल स्वर की एक मौलिक व्याख्या प्रस्तुत की है। समकालीन भारतीय चिन्तधारा का एक जीवन्त एवं मौलिक दार्शनिक विश्लेषण प्रस्तुत कर हमारा गौरव बढ़ाया है।

इन्द्रियों को गोचर में जो है, वही लोक है। वही परिदृश्यमान जगत् है। जो इन्द्रियों के अगोचर है वही परमतत्त्व है। पूर्ण अद्वय अनन्त-अखण्ड है, वह एक ही है, दो नहीं। इस पूर्ण से जो निःसृत होता है, वह भी पूर्ण है। यह पहले ही कहा जा चुका है कि पूर्ण एक के अलावा दो नहीं होता। यह समझ लेना चाहिए कि जिससे निःसरण होता है तथा जिसका निःसरण होता है, एक ही सत्ता एवं समरूप में वह पूर्ण हैं। गणित-शास्त्र में जिस प्रकार अनन्त से किसी परिमित या अपरिमित

संख्या को घटाने पर अनन्त ही शेष रहता है, यह भी ठीक उसी तरह का है। पूर्ण से धारा निर्गत होती है एवं जो निर्गत होती है, वह पूर्ण है, फिर भी पूर्ण का हास नहीं होता, कारण पूर्ण निर्विकार है।

सन्दर्भ एवं टिप्पणियाँ

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About the Contributors

G.C. Nayak studied M.A. (Philosophy) at Allahabad University, and got his Ph.D. from the Bristol University, U.K. as a Commonwealth scholar in the year 1965. He was Professor and Head of the Post-Graduate Department of Philosophy of Utkal University from 1978 to 1989 and the Vice-Chancellor of Sri Jagannath Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Puri from 1989 to 1992.

He was the Senior Fellow, ICPR during 1996–98, and UGC Emeritus Fellow, at BHU, Varanasi during 1999–2000, and Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla during 2001–2004.

Some of his important publications are: *Nirvāṇa in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā* (IIAS, Shimla, 2006), *Philosophical Reflections* (Zud and enlarged edition, ICPR, New Delhi, 2002), *Mādhyamika Śūnyatā* (ICPR, New Delhi, 2001), *Understanding Religion Phenomenon* (Dharmaram Publication, Bangalore, 1997), *Evil and the Retributive Hypothesis* (MLBD, New Delhi, 1993), *Philosophical Enterprise and the Scientific Spirit* (Ajanta Books International, Delhi 1994).

Dr. S.R. Goyal (b.1932) is the retired Professor and Head, Department of History, JNV University, Jodhpur. Described as 'one of the five best recent historians of ancient India' by Professor David N. Lorenzen, the great Mexi-

can Orientalist, Professor Goyal combines all the qualities associated with scientific scholarship. He has authored about forty-five voluminous works and over 150 research papers which cover so diverse fields as political history, religious history, literature, biographies, numismatics and epigraphy. He was honoured with the General Presidentship of the Silver Jubilee Congress of the Epigraphical Society of India held at Udupi in April, 1999 and was elected the Honorary Fellow of the Society.

Professor S.R. Bhatt is an eminent philosopher and Sanskritist. He was General President of Indian Philosophical Congress and Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad (All India Philosophical Association). He retired as Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi. He is internationally known as an authority on Ancient Indian Culture, Buddhism, Jainism and Vedānta. His research areas include India Philosophy, Logic, Epistemology, Ethics, Value-theory, Philosophy of Education, Philosophy of Religion, Social and Political Thought etc. He has lectured in many universities and research institutes of India, China, Sri Lanka, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Turkey, Germany, United States and Trinidad.

Professor Bhatt has authored and edited 18 books and has more than 100 published research papers to his credit. His important publications are *The Philosophy of Pāñcharātra*; *Studies in Rāmānuja Vedānta*; *Knowledge, Values and Education*; *Buddhist Epistemology*; *The Concepts of Ātman and Paramātmā in Indian Thought*; *Major Religions of the World*; *Buddhist Thought and Culture In Indian Thought*; *Major Religions of the World*; *Buddhist Thought and Culture In India and Korea (Ed.)*; *Buddhist Thought and Culture in India and Japan (Ed.)*; *Glimpses of Buddhist Thought and Culture (Ed.)*.

Professor Navjivan Rastogi was formerly Professor and Head Department of Sanskrit, as well as Hony. Director, Abhinavagupta Institute of Aesthetics & Śaiva Philosophy at the University of Lucknow. He specializes in Kashmir Shaivism, Tantricism and Indian aesthetics. His major publications are: *Krama Tantricism of Kashmir, Vol. 1; Introduction to the Tantrāloka: A study in Structure; Tantrāloka with the Viveka of Jayaratha, 8 Vols (jointly with R C Dwivedi, ed.) and Kāsmīra. Sivādvayavāda Kī Mūla Avadhāraṇāyeṇ.* Presently he is busy in co-editing the Volume on Kashmir Shaivism of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* with Karl H Potter and an anonymous commentary on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśinī* of Abhinavagupta. His (ed) *Abhinavā: Perspective on Abhinavagupta: Essays in Memory of K C Pandey* is ready for publication.

Professor Dr. (Ms.) Shashiprabha Kumar, Chairperson, Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies, JNU, is an acclaimed Sanskrit scholar, well versed in classical Indian philosophy. Before joining JNU, she taught at the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi; Department of Sanskrit at Maitreyi College, New Delhi and R.G. Post Graduate College, Meerut. More than twenty research scholars have obtained M.Phil/Ph.D. under her guidance.

Professor Shashiprabha has fifteen books to her credit and has contributed more than seventy research papers to reputed journals and edited volumes. She has participated in several International Conferences and National Seminars besides lecturing in India and abroad.

Recipient of Sri Ramakrishna Sanskrit Award (World Education Foundation, Canada, 2003) for her distinguished and outstanding contribution to Sanskrit research and teaching and Shankar Puraskār (K.K. Birla Foundation, New Delhi, 1998) for her first book entitled *Vaiśeṣika*

Darśana mein Padārtha-Nirūpaṇa, she has won many other prestigious awards and fellowships.

Dr. Indu Sarin is Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Panjab University, Chandigarh. She has published one book entitled *Kierkegaard: A Turning Point* and several papers in journals and volumes in India as well as abroad. She has participated in the various international conferences. The areas of her interest are Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, Existentialism and Phenomenology.

Dr. Geeta Manaktala is Professor of Philosophy at Panjab University Chandigarh. Her areas of interest are Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Culture and Phenomenology. She has published several papers in various National/International journals. Dr. Manaktala has actively participated and presented papers in National/International Conferences and Seminars including World Congress of Philosophy at Istanbul and New Delhi. Recently she has published a book entitled *PHILOSOPHY OF G.E. MOORE: Phenomenalism to Phenomenology* (Booksurge, USA) She is a member of the council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) Washington D.C. and also associated with the Centre for Study of Culture and Values (CSCV) Washington D.C.

Professor L.P. Singh Professor of Philosophy at Magadh University Bodh Gaya, he was senior fellow ICPR during 1996–99 and fellow Indian Institute of Advance Studies Shimla during 2000–2003. He was also visiting Research Professor at Catholic University of America, Washington D.C. in 2004. He obtained D.Litt Degree from Ranchi University, Ranchi in 1972, on the topic "Tantra: Its Mystical Scientific Basis".



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